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ABSTRACT 
 
The end of the Cold war has brought with it the emergence of the new international 
security environment. State actors can no longer calculate their national interests as 
they did it before. Thus, it seems sensible to explore the question of how security is 
being organised in the post-Cold War era. In addition to a significant change in the 
structure of the international system, a new security concern has emerged. That is, as 
a result of the termination of two superpowers rivalry between the US and the former 
USSR, there has been an important change in global nuclear proliferation arena. For 
example, nuclear proliferation challenge which comes from „suspect states‟ such as 
Libya and North Korea has become a key issue in relation to nuclear proliferation.  
 
The North Korean nuclear crisis has gone through very d ifferent historical phases 
between 2001 and 2008. The first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis saw the 
bilateral confrontation between the US and North Korea. The second phase 
demonstrated the multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear issue through 
China‟s proactive engagement in the nuclear issue. The third phase could be 
distinguished by the United Nations‟ involvement in dealing with the North Korean 
case. Each phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis has revealed its unique 
characteristics regarding the notion of international security. Each phase has seen the 
operation of different security models: the first phase can be interpreted from the 
perspective of a hegemonic power structure; the second phase might be understood as 
the operation of a concert of powers; the third phase can be relevant to the notion of 
collective security. 
 
To sum up, the North Korean case can be regarded as a good example which 
describes how security is being organised in the post-Cold War era. In conclusion, it 
seems difficult to consider that security in the post Cold War era can be organised 
through a single way. Rather, it seems reasonable to take into account the mixture of 
divergent security models when managing security issues in the post-Cold War era. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
At the end of the Cold War, it seemed that questions about nuclear weapons and the 
organisation of regional security had been rendered obsolete. The United States (US) 
was left as the unchallenged global hegemon and arms races seemed to be things of 
the past. Even security studies as a discipline abandoned much of its Cold War 
research agenda, and began instead to consider the broadening (such as environmental 
security) or deepening (human security) of the concept of security.  
 
For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union led many students of security studies to 
consider non-traditional security issues such as environmental degradation, the spread 
of HIV (Human immunodeficiency virus)/ AIDS (Acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome) and transnational crime as security threats (Collins, 2007). In other words, 
as Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman point out, in the post-Cold War era, 
“[i]nternational security is no longer conceived of solely as defence of national 
territory against “external” military threats under state control. The security agenda … 
incorporates political, economic, social and environmental dimensions as well as the 
many linkages between them.” (2004: 1) Furthermore, they give an answer to the 
question of why non-traditional security issues are international issues. According to 
them, “[n]on-traditional security challenges can and do spill over territorial borders 
and cause a range of wider security threats and sources of instability – such as refuge 
flows, illegal trafficking in narcotics and humans – or otherwise disrupt international 
markets. Human security threats are therefore interdependent and very much an 
international concern that require international cooperation among a range of actors. ” 
(Thakur and Newman, 2004: 4) 
 
Nevertheless, despite the deepening and broadening of security studies in the post-
Cold War era, the North Korean nuclear crisis forces us to return to more traditional 
questions of responses to nuclear proliferation and how regional security might best 
be organised. For example, the Bush administration regarded the possession of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by rogue states or terrorists as a serious threat 
to its national security in the post-Cold War era. US President Bush designated a 
certain group of states – such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq – as the axis of evil which 
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might challenge the US‟s and its allies‟ national security with WMD (Bush, January 
29, 2002). In particular, the Bush administration perceived North Korea‟s nuclear 
programme as an immediate threat to its national security (Global Security, December 
31, 2001). 
 
Moreover, it was North Korea‟s fear of the possibility of a pre-emptive strike by the 
US that led North Korea to pursue nuclear armament. North Korea repeatedly 
emphasised that the Bush administration‟s hostile policy towards North Korea forced 
it to develop a physical deterrent force (KCNA, May 5, 2003; KCNA, May 11, 2003). 
North Korea justified its missile launches in July 2006 by claiming that the missile 
launches were a routine military exercise, undertaken as an independent state (KCNA, 
July, 2006). It eventually conducted a nuclear bomb test on 9 October 2006. North 
Korea asserted that the US nuclear threat against North Korea led it to carry out the 
nuclear bomb test for the purpose of self-defence (KCNA, October 11, 2006).  
Therefore, this thesis will ultimately explore questions of responses to nuclear 
proliferation and how regional security management can be organised in the Northeast 
Asian regional context in the post-Cold War era.  
 
This introductory chapter will begin by examining the emergence of this new security 
environment and the importance of the non-proliferation issue in the post-Cold War 
era. This will lead us to consider the North Korean nuclear issue. In relation to this, an 
overview of the recent literature on the North Korean case will be given. Secondly, 
the chronology of the North Korean nuclear crisis will be categorised into three 
different historical phases and a set of research questions will be presented. Thirdly, 
the analytical framework – a hegemonic power structure, a concert of powers 
(including an alliance system) and the notion of collective security, which will be 
utilised in investigating each phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis – will be 
discussed. Fourthly, the methodology which identifies the time frame, the 
geographical scope and the method of text collection for the research will be given. 
The final section of this chapter will briefly outline the structure of the thesis. 
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1.1. Research Questions  
 
New security environment in the post-Cold War era 
 
It seems obvious that the end of the Cold War significantly affected the security 
environment of the international system. For much of the 20th century international 
politics were subjected to superpower rivalries – hot and cold wars – which were 
conducted at the global level with global interests. For example, during the Cold War 
two super powers – the United States (US) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) – regarded a number of regional conflicts in Africa, the Middle 
East and elsewhere as part of the superpower competition. As a result, many of 
regional conflicts were internationalised at the global level (Lake and Morgan, 1997). 
 
By contrast, the post-Cold War era requires a new way to manage security concerns 
which have been scattered into various parts of the world. For example, since the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, much of the Cold War security strategy 
evaporated from view or diminished in significance (Miller 2001). This is because the 
burden on major powers to improve their global role by exploiting regional conflicts 
as component of power politics has considerably declined. As a result, organising 
international security noticeably decentralised and therefore nations within a 
particular region have encountered a new situation that enforced them to pursue their 
own security by themselves (Hurrell and Fawcett 1995). 
 
In other words, the end of the Cold War has brought with it the emergence of a new 
international security environment. State actors can no longer calculate their national 
interests as they did before. As David Lake and Patrick Morgan indicate, “[g]reater 
responsibility now falls on local states to manage their own conflicts.” (1997: 7) Thus, 
it seems reasonable to consider that the post-Cold War era has provided students of 
international relations with a distinctive prospect of engaging in the testing and 
refinement of various theories of security studies. In this regard, it seems sensible to 
explore the question of how security is being organised in the post-Cold War era, 
particularly in relation to regional security order.  
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The Non-proliferation issue in the post-Cold War era 
 
Along with this significant change in the structure of the international system, a new 
security concern has emerged as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. Put 
differently, the termination of ideological confrontation between two superpowers and 
the collapse of the former Soviet Union created an important transformation in the 
global nuclear proliferation arena.  
 
During the Cold War, the possession of nuclear weapons was considered as a final 
option to deter nuclear attack. Furthermore, it was possible for the super powers to 
persuade those states who were seeking nuclear weapons capabilities to give up their 
nuclear ambitions by providing nuclear umbrella (Record, 2004). However, the post-
Cold War era has witnessed new types of nuclear proliferation challenges. In the first 
place, the dissolution of the former USSR generated unexpected nuclear weapon 
states such as the Ukraine, which as a republic of the former USSR, had soviet 
nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Moreover, another nuclear proliferation 
challenge has come from “suspect states” (Simpson, 1994: 27) such as Iraq and North 
Korea, who have violated their obligation to commit to non-proliferation treaties 
(Simpson, 1994). Thus, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery 
systems has been identified as the greatest threat to international security in the post-
Cold War era (Yuan, 1999). In other words, as John Simpson (1994) notes, the end of 
the Cold War “has put nuclear proliferation concerns and non-proliferation strategies 
at the core of international security policies.” (Simpson, 1994: 17) 
 
To sum up, it seems significant to examine nuclear proliferation challenges in relation 
to organising regional security in the post-Cold War era. In particular, this research 
will consider the North Korean case as a distinctive example demonstrating a regional 
proliferation challenge. 
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The North Korean nuclear crisis and the Six Party Talks1 
 
It was in Northeast Asia that changes in the balance of power caused by the ending of 
the Cold War were particularly apparent. The former USSR retreated from a 
hegemonic struggle whereas the US became, in terms of overall national strength, the 
only superpower possessing first class military-political capabilities and the economy 
to support such capabilities. Furthermore, a considerable reduc tion of the military 
confrontation in the region gave more freedom of action to China and this put China 
into the centre of all security dimensions in the region (Buzan, 2003). Consequently, 
the Northeast Asian region has faced the need for a new framework for long-term 
regional security to handle “the source of possible threats to the region‟s stability and 
the feasible and desirable conflict-management models needed to establish peace and 
stability in the region.” (Kim 2002: 6-7) 
 
Under these circumstances, a specific security issue, which may cause a serious 
instability in the region, has emerged in North Korea‟s nuclear development. The first 
North Korean nuclear crisis emerged in the 1990s. In 1993, North Korea rejected the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)‟s request to inspect unreported nuclear 
facilities suspected of plutonium production in North Korea. Furthermore, on 12 
March 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) and this triggered a critical challenge to the nuclear non-
proliferation system (Yun, 2005).  
 
The first North Korean nuclear crisis was solved through a bilateral negotiation 
between the US and North Korea. Bilateral talks between them concluded a 
comprehensive resolution of the first North Korean nuclear crisis on 21 October 1994, 
in Geneva, which is called the 1994 Agreed Framework (AF). According to the main 
tenet of the 1994 AF, North Korea promised to stop its plutonium production 
programme and to fully implement the IAEA safeguards in exchange for getting 
benefits such as the construction of two Light Water Reactors (LWRs), normalisation 
of diplomatic relations with the US and US‟s promise of no pre-emptive nuclear 
                                                 
1
 The term „Six Party Talks‟ will appear as block capitals because it is the official term used by the 
participants. In addition, the Six Party Talks will be considered as the plural, not as the singular 
because the Six Party Talks are not an institution, but on-going processes which have a regular pattern 
of meetings. 
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attack (Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic 
People‟s Republic of Korea, October 21, 1994).  
 
However, before the 1994 AF was fully implemented, the Bush administration took 
office in January 2001 in the US. The Bush administration decided to review its 
policy towards North Korea and stopped US‟s implementation of the 1994 AF. North 
Korea was strongly against US‟s new policy. Thus, it seems possible to say that the 
Bush administration‟s policy review and North Korea‟s reaction against it initiated the 
second North Korean nuclear crisis (Yun, 2005). In this regard, it seems valuable to 
examine the time of two Bush presidencies in order to observe the security 
implications of the North Korean case with respect to organising regional security in 
the post-Cold War era. 
 
In terms of organising regional security, as Christopher Hemmer and Peter 
Katzenstein indicate, it seems unlikely that the Northeast Asian region can establish a 
cooperative regional security regime easily because the region lacks both a collective 
regional identity and multilateral institutional experiences due to the legacy of 
colonialism and the bipolar structure during the Cold War (Hemmer and Katzenstein 
2002). However, the North Korean nuclear crisis had meant that dialogues on how to 
manage a regional security issue have emerged. The North Korean nuclear activities 
encouraged the major players in the region to cooperate with each other to remove the 
unstable security factor in the region. Subsequently, considerable regional 
negotiations to deal with North Korea‟s nuclear threats have taken place – the Six 
Party Talks, which include all major players in the region as participants: the two 
Koreas (South and North), China, the US, Japan and Russia.  
 
Furthermore, it is a combination of two major factors – the need to create a new 
security order among the major actors in the region and the need to deal with a 
regional proliferation challenge originating from North Korea – that characterises the 
current security environment in Northeast Asia. The North Korean case may be a 
good example as it reveals how the major powers – the US, Japan, China and Russia – 
have been pursuing their security interests in the region since the end of the Cold War. 
In addition to this, a nuclear bomb test by North Korea in October 2006 and reactions 
of the international community against it will help us explore various dimensions of 
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the North Korean nuclear issue in relation to its regional security implications. An 
investigation into the security implications of the North Korean nuclear development 
not only helps us understand what kind of security order is emerging in Northeast 
Asia in the post-Cold War era, but also provide useful information to evaluate 
academic discourses relating to security studies. 
 
The existing literature on the North Korean nuclear crisis 
 
At this stage, it seems necessary to have a look at the existing literature on the North 
Korean nuclear issue. The various discourses on the North Korean case can be 
categorised into three different groups: 1) some scholars focus on analysing two major 
actors‟ – the US‟s and North Korea‟s –  interests and strategic intentions; 2) a number 
of scholars examine the implications of the North Korean case in relation to the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime; 3) others discuss the potential of the six party 
framework as a regional security institution.  
 
Firstly, at the initial stage of the North Korean nuclear crisis, Victor Cha and David 
Kang (2004) drew attention to an interpretation of North Korean behaviour because 
they thought that the prescription of how to deal with the North Korean case depended 
on how to perceive North Korea‟s strategic intentions. 2  The more recent literature 
considers the impact of US policies such as the financial sanctions and the state 
sponsors of terrorism list. For example, Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo (2007) 
argue that a compromise on the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue 3  significantly 
contributed to the settlement of the February 13 agreement. 4 Terence Roehrig (2009) 
explores the usefulness and limitation of US state sponsors of terrorism list in dealing 
with the North Korean nuclear issue. According to Terence Roehrig, US state 
sponsors of terrorism list has been used as an economic and diplomatic leverage to 
                                                 
2
 According to Victor Cha and David Kang (2004), soft-liners US policy makers consider that North 
Korea‟s fear of US pre-empt ion leads it  to a nuclear development programme, and that therefore the 
Bush administration should solve this issue through diplomatic negotiations with North Korea. By  
contrast, hard-liners suppose that North Korea‟s violat ion of the NPT and the 1994 Agreed Framework 
is resulted from its intention of regime survival, and that the only strategy worth pursuing might be 
isolation and containment policy.  
3
 On 15 September 2005, the US froze North Korea ‟s asset in BDA bank. This issue will be fully 
discussed in chapter 2. 
4
 On February 13, 2007, the Six Party Talks issued the Joint Statement which announced deta iled 
implementations for the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme. This will be examined 
in chapter 4.  
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pressure North Korea. However, it was also emphasised that the effectiveness of this 
policy tool remained uncertain because North Korea could exploit US state sponsors 
of terrorism list to strengthen its position. That is, North Korea compelled the US to 
pay political costs by threatening its extraction from the nuclear negotiations unless 
the US delisted North Korea from the list (Roehrig, 2009).  
 
Gilbert Rozman‟s study (2007) makes a distinctive contribution. Gilbert Rozman 
suggests that, regarding the North Korean nuclear crisis, US policy options have 
demonstrated four points according to four distinct periods between 2002 and 2007: 
“(1) the fall of 2002 as the prospect of a crisis arose; (2) the summer of 2003 as 
leaders settled on the six-party framework; (3) the fall of 2005 a  Joint Statement was 
issued at the fourth round of talks; and (4) the period October 2006 to June 2007 when 
the U.N. Security Council responded to the North‟s defiance with resolutions 
imposing some sanctions.” (2007: 601-602) Gilbert Rozman links US strategy to each 
stage of these periods. For example, in the first stage, the US did not consider the 
nuclear issue as a regional one. The second stage witnessed the setting up the idea of 
complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the North Korean 
nuclear programme through the alliance consultation such as Trilateral Coordination 
and Oversight Group (TCOG) meetings. The third stage saw the success of a 
multilateral approach by producing a Joint Statement. However, in the fourth stage, it 
was inevitable for the US to lean towards the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) resolution (Rozman, 2007).  
 
Secondly, along with analyses of strategic intentions of major actors, at the early stage 
of the North Korean nuclear crisis, a few scholars have discussed the impact of the 
North Korean nuclear issue on the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. For 
instance, Narushige Michishita (2003) points out that it was North Korea‟s 
withdrawal from the NPT that significantly damaged the symbolism of the NPT. He 
underlines that the North Korean case – with its withdrawal from the NPT – proves 
the limitation of the NPT as an international regime because Article X of the NPT 
which guarantees each nation‟s right to leave the treaty in order to protect its 
sovereignty, can be used as an excuse for negative behaviour (Michishita, 2003). 
Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba (2004) also argue that the North Korean nuclear 
programme may intensify „second-tier proliferation‟ that can be defined as the spread 
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of nuclear weapons-relevant materials within states which are not members of the 
formal nuclear exports groups, and that this may challenge the existing nuclear non-
proliferation regime in the end. 
 
Finally, the third group of scholars has drawn attention to the six party framework. 
For example, Charles Perry and James Schoff (2004) underline that the six party 
framework has a potential to play as a guarantor of regional security in the long term. 
In other words, they consider that the possibility exists for the Six Party Talks to 
develop from diplomatic processes into a more complex institution although the Six 
Party Talks started as a political negotiation to manage a specific security challenge. 
In this regard, Peter Van Ness (2003) suggests an interesting conceptualisation. He 
characterises the Six Party Talks as “a four-plus-two security consortium” (Ness, 
2003: 255) which can become a long-term security institution to remove instability in 
Northeast Asia and emphasises that the six participants have a good chance of 
evolving the existing dialogues dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis into the 
establishment of a new security regime capable of providing security stability for the 
region. According to Ness, if the major powers of Northeast Asia – China, Japan, 
Russia and the US – could commit themselves to cooperation, the six party 
framework  would construct “a security consortium or a formal concert of powers” 
(2003: 265) for the region. 
 
Furthermore, in his more recent work, Van Ness (2008) highlights that despite the 
unsuccessfulness of the Six Party Talks in dismantling North Korea‟s nuclear 
programme, it is still essential for the participants to cooperate with each other in 
order to create institutional arrangements for regional stability because the nuclear 
proliferation issue could not be managed by individual states. In order to achieve this 
goal, Van Ness (2008) suggests the concept of cooperative security and stresses the 
importance of the six party framework for successful multilateral security cooperation. 
According to Van Ness (2008), the Six Party Talks still offer the regional actors the 
greatest prospect to form a new security institution in the Northeast Asian region. 
Sung-han Kim (2008) also points to the probability of the six party framework as a 
cornerstone for a multilateral security institution in Northeast Asia. According to him, 
the six party framework could develop into the starting point of a peace and security 
mechanism in the region through encouraging cooperation among regional actors. As 
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evidence to support his point of view, Kim (2008) gives such examples as the 
September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 which declared new “ways and means for 
promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia” (The September 19 Joint Statement 
of the Six Party Talks, September 19, 2005) and the February 13 Joint Statement of 
2007 which announced the establishment of a Working Group on a Northeast Asia 
Peace and Security Mechanism. 
 
As mentioned above, the existing literature on the North Korean nuclear crisis has 
contributed to security studies in some ways. First of all, it explored two key actors‟ 
strategic interests and the implications of their policy tools. Secondly, it also 
questioned the role of the existing NPT regime in relation to non-proliferation in the 
post-Cold War era. Finally, the literature discussed the potential of the Six Party Talks 
from the perspective of establishing a security institution in Northeast Asia.  
 
Nevertheless, there is little literature which discusses the relations between organising 
regional security in the post-Cold War era and the security implications of the North 
Korean nuclear crisis. Only a few scholars examine historical phases of the North 
Korean nuclear crisis and the security implications of the six party framework 
separately. For example, Rozman (2007) helpfully categorised the whole process of 
the North Korean case into different phases which should be interpreted in different 
ways. However, his interpretation only focused on US ‟s policy options. In addition, it 
seems that Van Ness (2003) properly described the Six Party Talks by using the 
notion of a concert of powers. But he did not examine more practical evidence which 
might lead us to a comprehensive understanding of the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
Thus, it seems significant to separate the North Korean nuclear crisis into different 
phases and to explore how each phase reveals its unique characteristics in relation to 
organising regional security. 
 
Prior to discussing the security implications of the North Korean nuclear issue, it 
seems necessary to think about the route that the nuclear issue has followed. This may 
allow us to have a comprehensive understanding of the second North Korean nuclear 
crisis. The processes can be divided into three different phases: the first phase which 
refers to a bilateral confrontation between the US and North Korea, the second phase 
which is relevant to the multilateralisation of the nuclear issue through China‟s 
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engagement policy and the establishment of the Six Party Talks, and the third phase 
which witnesses the United Nations‟ involvement.  
 
The first phase: A bilateral confrontation between the US and North Korea 
 
The first phase of the North Korean nuclear confrontation might be characterised by 
the two crucial events – the Bush administration‟s policy review in 2001 towards 
North Korea and the revelations about North Korea‟s covert nuclear programme, 
which emerged in October 2002. After coming into office in January 2001, the Bush 
administration started to re-evaluate the Clinton administration‟s approach to the 
North Korean nuclear programme including the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994. 
US policy review towards North Korea concluded that North Korea should act first 
for improving the US-North Korea relations (Office of the Press Secretary, June 13, 
2001). For example, the US asked North Korea to accept international inspections 
under IAEA safeguards before North Korea obtained the LWRs under the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project (Prichard, July 26, 
2001). 
 
North Korea perceived the Bush administration‟s policy review as an initiation of its 
hostile policy towards North Korea. This was because the new US government 
emphasised that its engagement policy would be different from that of the Clinton 
administration. The Bush administration asked North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
programme first instead taking steps for diplomatic normalisation between the US and 
North Korea under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Pyongyang regarded the US‟s new 
approach as an aggressive policy against North Korea (KCNA, February 22, 2001).5 
 
North Korea‟s response to US policy review was firstly guided by its emphasis on US 
implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, after US President Bush‟s 
„State of the Union address‟ in January 2002, calling North Korea “an axis of evil”, 
North Korea‟s approach to the nuclear issue changed dramatically. North Korea 
perceived that the US would go to war in the Korean Peninsula rather than resume a 
                                                 
5
 In the absence of credible opportunities to obtain policy documents that North Korea prov ides, it 
would be useful to examine North Korea‟s official statements produced by the Korean Central News 
Agency (KCNA). 
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dialogue. For example, in relation to Bush‟s announcement of “an axis o f evil”, North 
Korea commented that “[t]his reveals the US reckless intention to seize the DPRK by 
force of arms after designating it as the second target of “anti-terrorism war.”” 
(KCNA, February 2, 2002) 
 
Furthermore, on 16 October 2002, the US publicly released information on North 
Korea‟s covert nuclear activities. According to a Press Statement of the US 
Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific, James 
Kelly, visited Pyongyang in October 2002 to discuss the Bush adminis tration‟s policy 
regarding North Korea-related issues. At this meeting, James Kelly notified that the 
US had obtained information on North Korea‟s highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
programme for nuclear weapons in violation of 1994 Agreed Framework and North 
Korea did not deny that it had such a programme (Boucher, October 16, 2002).  
 
Following a public revelation of North Korea‟s covert HEU programme, a clear 
picture of what would become the US strategy emerged. Firstly, only a week after 
James Kelly had visited Pyongyang on 5 October 2002, the US Congress voted 
overwhelmingly to approve military action against Iraq, another member of the “axis 
of evil” (Mitchell and Hulse, October 11, 2002). Secondly, the international 
community‟s pressure on North Korea, which was initiated by the US, significantly 
increased. In the first place, on 14 November 2002, the KEDO decided to suspend 
future shipments of heavy fuel oil (HFO) (KEDO, November 14, 2002). Moreover, on 
6 January 2003, IAEA adopted a resolution demanding North Korea to take necessary 
steps for international inspection and to abandon its nuclear programme in a verifiable 
manner. Soon after the IAEA resolution passed, North Korea declared its withdrawal 
from the NPT (KCNA, January 10, 2003). 
 
The second phase: The multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear issue 
 
The second phase of the North Korean nuclear issue witnessed China‟s engagement in 
the issue. The US invasion of Iraq led China to play a proactive role in resolving the 
North Korean nuclear issue. Trilateral talks among the US, North Korea and China to 
discuss the nuclear issue were held in Beijing in April 2003 and this paved the way 
for coordination of and consultation on the nuclear issue. Eventually, the Six Party 
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Talks including all of the major actors in the Northeast Asian region – the US, North 
Korea, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia – were initiated in August 2003. 
 
At the initial stage, Beijing‟s policy stance towards the North Korean nuclear issue 
was just to encourage two key actors – the US and North Korea – to negotiate on the 
issue through a bilateral dialogue (Xinhuanet, March 6, 2003). However, The US 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003 certainly increased China‟s fear of a war in the 
Korean Peninsula. China was deeply afraid of any military conflict in the Korean 
peninsula similar to that in Iraq. 
 
The maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula has been one of the 
most important national interests of China in order to achieve its national strategic 
goal that is economic growth (China‟s National Defense 2002). Therefore, the 
invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration pushed Beijing to make diplomatic efforts 
in order to mediate a rapidly escalating nuclear confrontation between the US and 
North Korea. 
 
As a result of a bold diplomatic effort by China, the Three Party Talks among the US, 
China and the DPRK were held in Beijing in April 2003. The participants in the talks 
presented their official positions on the issue. Each player expressed their respective 
perceptions on the nuclear issue as well as their mutual concerns over security 
(Sanger, April 25, 2003). 
 
China‟s engagement and the trilateral talks were the starting point of the 
multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear issue. After the ending of the Three 
Party Talks, China carried out shuttle diplomacy to promote cooperation among the 
regional actors and a result of this, the Six Party Talks were eventually started. For 
example, the head of the Chinese delegation, Wang Yi, held individual pre-
conferences with Alexander Lusyukov (head of Russian delegations), James Kelly 
(head of the US delegations), Yi Su-hyok (head of South Korean delegations) and 
Mitoji Yabunaka (head of Japanese delegations) during August 2003 (World News 
Connections, August 26, 2003). 
 
 23 
In addition to this, on 27-29 August 2003, the Six Party Talks – a multilateral 
framework to discuss a solution of the North Korean nuclear issue – were held in 
Beijing. However, the first round of the Six Party Talks could not produce any 
significant outcomes because there was still a considerable gap between US‟s and 
North Korea‟s policy positions. Although there was no significant breakthrough 
during the first round of the Six Party Talks, it seems notable that the first round 
established a multilateral forum including all major actors in Northeast Asia to discuss 
a regional security issue. 
 
The third phase: North Korea’s bomb test and the United Nations’ involvement 
 
Since the first round of the Six Party Talks in August 2003, there have been a number 
of rounds to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue. 6 Nevertheless, despite the long 
journey of the nuclear talks between 2003 and 2005, the six parties failed to prevent 
North Korea from conducting a nuclear bomb test. The third phase of the North 
Korean nuclear crisis witnessed North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test and a strong 
reaction from the international society, represented by the United Nations (UN).  
 
The second session of the fourth round, which was held on 13-19 September 2005 in 
Beijing, issued the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 signed up by all participants. 
The September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 illustrated necessary steps to conclude the 
North Korean nuclear crisis and declared the six parties‟ commitment to the 
agreement. 7  Although most of the key elements of the Joint Statement were 
repeatedly discussed during the previous rounds of the Six Party Talks, it was 
significant in that all parties involved came to a formal agreement.  
 
Nevertheless, different interpretations of the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 by 
two major actors revealed that there still remained a major disagreement between 
them. For example, both the US and North Korea released separate statements 
claiming their own interpretation on the issue of the provision of LWR. While the US 
                                                 
6
 The second round on 25-28 February 2004, the third round on 23-26 June 2004, the first session of 
the fourth round on between 26 Ju ly and 7 August 2005, the second session of the fourth round on 13-
19 September 2005, the first session of the fifth round on 9-11 November 2005. 
7
 For details of the agreement, see the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks (September 
19, 2005). 
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pointed out that North Korea‟s civilian nuclear project for the purpose of electricity 
generation would only be considered after North Korea‟s complete disarmament of its 
nuclear programme (Hill, September 19, 2005a), North Korea maintained that the 
provision of LWR should be provided before it considered its implementation of the 
September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 (KCNA, September 20, 2005). 
 
Responding to the continuation of the nuclear confrontation, North Korea further 
escalated tensions. On 3 October 2006, North Korea declared that it would conduct a 
nuclear bomb test for the purpose of developing a nuclear deterrence (KCNA, 
October 3, 2006). On 9 October 2006, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) 
announced that North Korea succeeded in performing underground nuclear test 
(KCNA, October 9, 2006). North Korea claimed that it was the US nuclear threat to 
North Korea that led it to possess nuclear weapons (KCNA, October 11, 2006).  
 
North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test resulted in the UN‟s official engagement in the 
nuclear issue. On 14 October 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1718  
which imposed sanctions on North Korea. The resolution called for member states to 
freeze any funds related to the production or distribution of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD). It also encouraged member states to take part in inspecting all 
North Korean shipments regardless of their port of origin (UNSC Resolution 1718, 
October 14, 2006). 
 
Research questions 
 
It seems to be complicated to examine the security implications of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis because it still remains concerned. Nevertheless, it seems worth 
exploring the process of international negotiations dealing with the North Korean 
nuclear issue because the processes have demonstrated several aspects which can test 
a set of assumptions of security studies. As examined above, s ince early 2000, the 
North Korean nuclear crisis has undergone three different phases. The first phase, 
between early 2001 and March 2003 witnessed a bilateral confrontation between the 
US and North Korea. The second phase demonstrated a multilateralisation of the 
North Korean nuclear issue through China‟s engagement in April 2003. Moreover, 
since August 2003, the North Korean nuclear issue has moved towards the 
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establishment of a multilateral forum, the Six Party Talks. Finally, since North 
Korea‟s nuclear test in October 2006, the North Korean nuclear crisis has witnessed a 
third phase which demonstrated a formation of joint action by the international 
community such as the UNSC resolution 1718. 
 
Put differently, the actual processes of the North Korean nuclear issue have 
demonstrated that very different security models have driven each phase of the crisis 
during the two Bush administrations. For example, in the first place, it might be 
possible to say that a bilateral confrontation between the US and North Korea could 
be understood through the notion of a hegemonic power structure. Moreover, a 
multilateralisation of the nuclear issue – the Three Party Talks and the Six Party Talks 
– could be interpreted as the establishment of a concert- like diplomacy in dealing with 
the nuclear issue. Eventually, a joint action of the international community such as the 
UNSC resolution 1718 might be considered as an operation of collective security.  
 
The key research question of the thesis will be the question of how international 
security, in particular regional security, is being organised in the post-Cold War era. 
In this regard, the issue of whether certain historical phases of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis can be categorised into and explained by different security models such 
as hegemony, a concert of powers and collective security. Therefore, the following 
research questions will be explored: 
 
1) Can the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis be examined through the 
notion of security under a hegemonic power structure?  
2) Are the key assumptions of hegemonic stability theory applicable to examining the 
process of the bilateral nuclear confrontation between the US and North Korea?  
3) Can the second phase be interpreted through the perception of security under a 
concert of powers system? 
4) What impact did an alliance system have on the North Korean nuclear issue?  
5) Can the notion of collective security be employed in analysing the security 
implications of the third phase? 
6) What was the role of collective security regimes in describing the third phase?  
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1.2. Remarks on Analytical Framework 
 
This research will examine the applicability of different models of international order 
and their respective perceptions of international security: a) a hegemonic power 
structure; b) a concert of powers and alliance system; c) collective security. In order 
to achieve this goal, a set of hypotheses will be considered. For instance, the first 
hypothesis is that the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis, which 
demonstrates a two-sided conflict, can be categorised as an example proving the 
concept of security under a hegemonic power structure. The second hypothesis is that 
the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis, which shows a multilateralisation 
of the issue, can be interpreted as a case validating the notion of security in a concert 
of powers system. In particular, the second phase also verifies an operation of an 
alliance system within a concert of powers. The third hypothesis is that the third phase 
of the North Korean nuclear crisis, which demonstrates the UN‟s engagement, can be 
classified as a significant example illustrating the perception of security under 
collective security. 
 
At this stage, it seems useful to outline an overview of analytical framework which 
will analyse historical phases of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The following 
section will briefly discuss the key elements of four different security models: a 
hegemonic power structure, a concert of powers, an alliance system and collective 
security.8 
 
A hegemonic power structure 
 
A hegemonic power structure historically can be seen from the Pax Britannica in the 
19th century and the Pax Americana in the 20th century. In both periods, the 
international system saw relative peace which was initiated by a hegemon‟s 
predominance in controlling world politics. Both Britain and America enjoyed their 
dominant status in world politics and regulated international security matters and the 
international political economy respectively.  
 
                                                 
8
 Deeper and wider d iscussions of these security models will be g iven at the beginning of chapter 2, 
chapter 3 and chapter 4 respectively.  
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A hegemonic power structure needs to benefit from two principal elements: the 
certainty of the status quo and a stable international political economy. Firstly, as 
Robert Gilpin (1981) notes, both a hegemon and the subordinates have a stake in 
maintaining the reliable status quo rather than in taking a risk with unpredictable 
changes in the international system. This is not only because a hegemon wants to 
enjoy its leading position, but also because the subordinates prefer organising their 
own security by accepting the existing international order established by a hegemon. 
Secondly, with respect to the status quo, it is important for a hegemon to maintain the 
stability of international political economy because it is necessary to provide a stable 
international political economy in order to persuade the subordinates to accept the 
international order initiated by a hegemon. In Charles Kindleberger‟s terms, there 
should be “one stabilizer” (Kindleberger 1973: 305) which is responsible for 
preserving the reliability of the world economy. 
 
In relation to the provision of security under a hegemonic power structure, it is 
necessary to explore the notion of international regimes and the provision of public 
goods. According to Robert Keohane (1984), it is essential for a hegemon to create 
international regimes. This is because in order for a hegemon to exert its preponderant 
power, it is necessary to organise the international system in accordance with its own 
ideals. The formation and continuation of international regimes are critical in doing so. 
In this regard, it seems notable that hegemonic stability theory regards public goods – 
such as an open market system which is established and maintained by a hegemon – 
as international regimes. For example, Kindleberger (1981) claims that a hegemon 
can make the international political economy stable by providing such public goods.  
 
A concert of powers 
 
A concert of powers system originated from the European Concert in the 19th century. 
After the ending of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, the five great powers – Britain, 
Austria, Prussia, Russia and France – shared the idea that it was important to maintain 
the balance of power in Europe. Thus, Europe was able to enjoy long peace between 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Crimean War of 1854 (Acharya, 1999; 
Zelikow, 1992; Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991).  
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The status quo under a concert of powers can be understood through two key 
objectives: „prevention of major war among the great powers‟ and „maintenance of 
territorial stability‟. As Robert Jervis (1985) argues, each member of a concert of 
powers is worried about whether its partners build up excessive power. This concern 
might lead the members of a concert of powers to checking and balancing against 
each other to maintain the balance of power. In other words, under a concert of 
powers, it is a more important security interest for the members to prevent major war 
cooperatively rather than pursue their particular national interests individually (Shirk, 
1997). 
 
In addition to the objective of the prevention of major war among the great powers, a 
concert of powers considers another norm, the maintenance of territorial stability for 
other countries. For example, the European Concert in the 19 th century had the five 
great powers take a special responsibility to preserve the stability in Europe. Thus, the 
Concert of Europe did not accept any territorial changes without mutual agreement 
among them (Zelikow, 1992; Elrod, 1976).  
 
As Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan (1991) indicate, a concert of powers has 
no formal institutions to make a decision. Rather, a concert of powers consults 
security issues through informal negotiations based on the regular pattern of meetings. 
In this regard, it seems noteworthy that a concert of powers has a hidden structure to 
come to a decision. As mentioned above, the European Concert set the rule that the 
great power were responsible not only for sustaining the peace in Europe, but also for 
maintaining the territorial stability. In exchange for this, the great powers were able to 
enjoy special status that granted their particular interests through concert diplomacy 
(Elrod, 1976). However, it is difficult to imagine that a concert of powers runs in the 
21st century like the European Concert did in the 19th century. This is because, as a 
result of the spread of democracy in the world, a concert of powers in the 21st century 
needs a more normative element than the Concert of Europe did. Thus, the creation of 
acceptable norms such as multilateralism might become a critical element of a concert 
of powers in the 21st century (Shirk, 1997; Rosecrance, 1992). 
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An alliance system 
 
State actors tend to join each other in order to increase their power. They attempt to 
expand their external power by building up an alliance (Claude, 1962; Waltz, 1979). 
The existence of mutual strategic trust and common security interests are necessary 
conditions for nations to take part in forming an alliance. By joining an alliance, the 
members expect that they will be able to manage any potential or actual aggressions 
against their territories or other security interests (Shen, 2004).  
 
Historical examples of an alliance system can be seen from the West-East 
confrontation during the Cold War. For instance, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) was established to unite Western European nations with the US against the 
threat of Soviet expansionism. The Warsaw Pact was constructed as NATO‟s counter-
balancer by combining Eastern European nations with the Soviet Union (Shen, 2004).  
 
Nations form an alliance to increase or protect common interests among them. 
Common interests might be shared values and ideas such as democracy or shared  
benefit such as collective defence (Tertrais, 2004). However, as Kenneth Waltz points 
out, the common interest shared by the members of an alliance is typically a negative 
one such as threats from outside. Therefore, states make an effort to add their 
resources together by forming an alliance in order to effectively control their national 
security (Sheehan, 1996). 
 
With respect to the provision of security under an alliance system, two significant 
concepts need to be considered: „signals of intention‟ and „the institutionalised 
cooperation‟. One of the important functions of an alliance is to inform the likelihood 
of intervention to both allies and potential aggressors. The formation of an alliance 
signifies the willingness of the allies to support their members in the case of conflicts. 
Such signals might discourage threatening nations from provoking members of an 
alliance (Leeds, 2003b; Morrow, 1994). However, an alliance can be regarded as a 
kind of contract among the members. Thus, it is necessary for the members to create 
certain safeguards to ensure mutual compliance in the event of conflicts. It is common 
to make regulations in order to grant the continuation of the members ‟ commitment 
(Lake, 1996). This means that under an alliance system, states tend to make an 
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alliance more reliable by facilitating the members‟ motivations to cooperate with 
allies. In other words, an alliance system pursue providing institutionalised security 
cooperation such as integrated command of military forces, which is designed to 
increase the credibility of the members‟ joint commitment (Leeds, 2003b).  
 
Collective security 
 
As a result of witnessing World War I and World War II, the ineffectiveness of a 
concert of powers system in the 19th century became apparent. Therefore, there was 
an increasing request for establishing new security systems to challenge the 
international security issues of the 20th century. Collective security emerged as an 
alternative to replace the old pattern of conferences among the great powers. The 
League of Nations, which was established as an outcome of the Versailles Treaty in 
1919-1920, might be considered as the first example of collective security 
organisation. Another example can be seen in the UN, created in 1945 after the end of 
the Second World War. 
 
The key concept of collective security is the motto of „all against one‟. This means 
that any attack on one state encourages the others to organise joint actions against an 
aggressor because the other will consider the attack as an attack on them (Thompson, 
1953). According to Inis Claude (2006), the perception of collective security can be 
described by three central ideas: indivisibility of peace, the certainty of collective 
action and impartiality of world politics.  
 
Regarding the provision of security under a collective security system, it seems 
significant that collective security can be interpreted as a regime planned to maintain 
a specific status quo (Bennett and Lepgold, 1993). In this regard, it is necessary to re-
examine the notion of international regimes in relation to realising the perception of 
collective security. For example, Janice Stein (1985) proposes the usefulness of the 
security regime by exemplifying the increasing probability to narrow down different 
understandings of security among states. 
 
There have been two distinctive examples of collective security regimes: the UN 
Charter and the nuclear non-proliferation regime (NPT regime). The UN Charter, 
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Article 1 clearly announces general principle and norms by stating that “[the purpose 
of the United Nations are] to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace.” (Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945) The 
NPT regime, based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also has played as 
collective security regime at the global level by establishing a set of principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures in relation to nuclear non-proliferation. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 
This research will not attempt to give any prescription for settling the North Korean 
nuclear issue. The study intends to make a practical analysis of how the North Korean 
case demonstrates ways of organising regional security in the post-Cold War era. 
Therefore, the study will examine different security models which are applicable to 
the historical phases of the North Korean nuclear crisis.  
 
The thesis is structured by analytical frameworks of particular security models. In 
other words, the thesis will explore the perception and provision of security under 
particular security models, that is, a hegemonic power structure, a concert of powers, 
an alliance system and collective security. Reflecting on the key assumptions of 
analytical frameworks, the thesis will study the applicability of different security 
models to different historical phases of the North Korean nuclear crisis.  
 
In order to achieve the basic objective, the study will limit the timeframe. The study 
will focus on the two Bush presidencies because the North Korean case has well 
demonstrated operations of different security models during those periods. The study 
will therefore cover from 2001 to 2008. 
 
In relation to the geographical scope, the study only considers the major actors in 
Northeast Asia because the nuclear talks have proceeded through consultation among 
the major actors in the region. Major actors include the US, China, Russia, Japan and 
the two Koreas. The US is not an Asian power. However, it can be considered as an 
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integral part of Northeast Asia as the US has deep interest in organising security in the 
region.9 
 
In particular, this thesis will mainly focus on analysing three key players ‟ – the US‟s, 
North Korea‟s and China‟s – policy perceptions and roles in dealing with the North 
Korean nuclear crisis. This is because it was these three states that took the initiative 
regarding the North Korean nuclear issue in the region. The US and North Korea were 
immediate stake-holders. China played a key role in multilateralising the North 
Korean nuclear issue and in maintaining the multilateral forum to deal with the 
nuclear issue (that is, the Six Party Talks).  Although South Korea, Japan and Russia 
also took part in the Six Party Talks, their role were less significant than those of the 
US, China and North Korea. Russia seemed primarily concerned with acting as a 
counter-balancer to check any US unilateral action rather than taking initiatives itself 
on the nuclear issue. South Korea and Japan tended to simply support their key ally, 
the US.  
 
In order to answer the research questions, it is necessary to collect and analyse raw 
text. In political science field, three main methods are commonly used for collecting 
raw text: document analysis, empirical observation and interviewing (Johnson and 
Reynolds, 2005). 
 
Using interviews may allow us to obtain raw text about the contemporary North 
Korean nuclear issue. For example, it might be possible to obtain information about 
decision making process and security perception of each country by interviewing 
political elites who are responsible for dealing with the nuclear talks. However, the 
research did not conduct elite interviews because there are a couple of disadvantages 
in conducting elite interviews. Firstly, it seemed difficult to expect that political elites 
in each country might give honest answers in relation to their strategies on the on-
going nuclear issue. Secondly, it was also hard for the researcher to expect conducting 
balanced interviews around the six countries because it seemed almost impossible to 
                                                 
9
 According to David Lake, among a number of variables consisting of a regional system, the most 
important factor that creates regional systems is “local transborder externalities” (1997: 50). Although 
geographic proximity is central to the concept of a regional system, local externalit ies are not 
necessarily limited with in a part icular geographic zone. Thus, the US can be considered as part of 
Northeast Asia regional system (Lake, 1997). 
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interview North Korean officials. Thus, the research is basically supported by 
document analysis and empirical observation.  
 
Document analysis was conducted as one of the significant information sources. 
Firstly, the research analysed government publications such as „The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America‟, „China‟s National Defense 2002‟ and „The 
Statement of Spokesman for DPRK (Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea)‟ in 
order to figure out their perceptions of security in relation to nuclear proliferation 
issue. Secondly, the research conducted a broad survey of the most recent literature on 
the North Korean nuclear crisis to clarify key aspects of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis. 
 
With respect to empirical observation, the research was largely dependent on internet 
sources (internet governments and internet media). This is because in general terms, 
internet sources provided broad primary sources which may comprehensively draw 
the North Korean case. In particular, internet sources allowed the research to construct 
chronological coherence in relation to the North Korean nuclear crisis. In order to 
identify immediately relevant archives on the internet, the research used specific key 
terms such as “North Korea”, “North Korean nuclear programme,” “Six Party Talks”. 
Moreover, the research collected and analysed reliable media reports when necessary 
in order to make in-depth chronologies of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The New 
York Times, Washington Post, British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) and China 
View were noticeably used. However, in relation to North Korea‟s official statement, 
the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) was significantly considered because very 
few alternative materials are available, which could give details of North Korea‟s 
policy perception.10 
 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 1 has discussed the new security environment in the post-Cold War era and 
pointed out that the North Korean case would be a good example which might 
                                                 
10
 All materials which appear in the thesis were originally written in English.   
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demonstrate the way of how regional security was being organised after the end of the 
Cold War.  
 
The principal objective of Chapter 2 is to observe whether the bilateral nuclear 
confrontation between the US and North Korea could be considered as an example 
which gives an explanation about the perception of security under a hegemonic power 
structure. It begins with observations of the historical contextualisation of the first 
phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis and the origin of a hegemonic power 
structure. In order to construct an analytical framework which will be applied to an 
examination of the first phase, hegemonic stability theory is considered as it might 
provide an understanding of the notion and the provision of security under a 
hegemonic power structure. In this regard, three assumptions will be investigated: 1) a 
hegemon defines and enforces the rules and rights that shape its own behaviour and 
that of other states in a particular system; 2) a hegemon creates and controls the 
network of political, economics, and security relationship in the system; 3) a hegemon 
needs to supply a stable economic order to encourage other states to be interested in 
following its lead. After that, for the purpose of testing these key assumptions of 
hegemonic stability theory, Chapter 2 explores three major issues of the first phase: 
US designation of North Korea as one of the axes of evil, the issue of the PSI, and the 
BDA issue. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the applicability of the notion of a concert of powers to the 
second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The basic goal of Chapter 3 is to 
examine whether the multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear crisis can be 
regarded as an example which gives details about the insight of security organisation 
under a concert of powers. It also makes a start by looking at the historical 
contextualisation of the second phase and the origin of a concert of powers. An 
analytical framework for Chapter 3 will be accomplished from observing the existing 
literature which discusses the European Concert in the 19th century and the modern 
concert of powers. The central assumptions of a concert of powers which are to be 
examined will be: 1) members of concert of powers seek to prevent themselves from 
major war; 2) a concert of powers works through no formal institutions but the 
promotion of cooperation – the regular pattern of meetings to monitor events and, if 
necessary, to organise collective initiatives; 3) a concert of powers does not restrain 
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its role within a material aspect such as the maintenance of territorial stability. A 
modern concert needs to provide norms which may regulate international 
relationships. In addition to this, the residence of alliance within a concert of powers 
will be discussed because an operation of an alliance within the Six Party Talks is 
quite different from that of the European Concert in 19th century. In order to examine 
these assumptions, Chapter 3 analyses four different cases: China‟s engagement, the 
establishment of the Six Party Talks, the notion of CVID as a norm and the US allies‟ 
role in dealing with the nuclear issue.  
 
Chapter 4 is an examination of the security implications of the engagement of the UN 
in the North Korean nuclear issue from the perspective of collective security. Thus, 
the main work of this chapter is to explore whether the third phase of the North 
Korean nuclear crisis could be considered as a good example of the notion of 
collective security. The historical contextualisation of the third phase and the origin of 
collective security will be firstly observed. And an overview of the existing literature 
on collective security might construct an analytical framework for this chapter. An 
exploration of the notion of collective security leads us to three important 
assumptions: 1) the motto of all against one; 2) effectiveness of collective security in 
balancing against aggressors by reducing the uncertainties of organising joint action; 
3) promotion of cooperation through international regimes. Chapter 4 examines three 
critical issues in the third phase: the UN‟s engagement regarding the notion of all 
against one, the six party framework in relation to organising collective action, and 
the UN Charter and the nuclear non-proliferation regime with respect to the role of 
international regimes in collective security.  
 
Chapter 5 summarises what the research has discussed by highlighting the theoretical 
and empirical contributions of the thesis. Firstly, research findings will be examined. 
The US‟s multilateralism, China‟s engagement policy, an operation of an alliance 
within a concert of powers system and the emergence of collective security regime 
will be given as key research findings. Secondly, the theoretical implications of 
research finding will be discussed. In general, the research‟s contribution to security 
studies in the post-Cold War era will be considered. The significance of the existing 
nuclear non-proliferation regime will also be discussed. More specifically, the key 
research findings will be combined into discussion about the necessity of considering 
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multitude security models in organising security in the post-Cold War era. Finally, the 
limitations of the thesis will be identified and suggestions for further research will be 
given. 
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Chapter 2. Hegemony 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Historical contextualisation of the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis 
 
The second North Korean nuclear crisis was, at the initial stage, triggered by the Bush 
administration‟s negative assessment of the Clinton administration‟s engagement 
policy towards North Korea. In addition to this, North Korea‟s aggressive reaction 
against the Bush administration‟s policy review also contributed to escalating the 
bilateral nuclear confrontation between the United States (US) and North Korea 
(Bluth, 2005). 
 
In early June 2001, the US government issued the conclusion of a policy review 
demanding North Korea to meet its obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework 
(AF). Apart from the implementation of the 1994 AF, the policy review also asked 
North Korea to accept a discussion of a broad agenda, including “verifiable 
constraints on North Korea‟s missile programs and a ban on its missile exports; and a 
less threatening conventional military posture.” (Office of the Press Secretary, June 
13, 2001) However, North Korea refused such suggestions by US policy review and 
regarded it as US hostile policy towards itself (KCNA, June 18, 2001).  
 
Moreover, in his 2002 State of the Union address, US President Bush designated 
North Korea as one of the “axis of evil,” which pursued Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) and engaged in international terrorism. Bush announced the US‟s 
pre-emptive strategy against the “axis of evil” by stating that the US would take pre-
emptive action against threats, rather than wait until the US or its allies were attacked 
with WMD (Bush, January 29, 2002). 
 
The bilateral nuclear confrontation was substantially intensified after the revelation of 
North Korea‟s covert nuclear programme in October 2002. On October 16, 2002, the 
US and North Korea discussed the Bush administration‟s policy position in 
Pyongyang. At this meeting the US warned North Korea that North Korea ‟s 
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clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme was a serious violation of the 
previous 1994 AF. After the October 2002 meeting, the US considerably changed its 
policy towards North Korea. Instead of pursuing comprehensive approach such as 
discussion of a broad agenda including economic assistance and conventional military 
posture, the US urged North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programme in a 
verifiable manner under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards 
(Armitage, February 4, 2003). 
 
North Korea considered the Bush administration‟s policy review as a beginning of US 
hostile policy towards itself because the US government pointed out that its 
commitment would be different from that of the Clinton administration. The US‟s 
new approach was regarded by North Korea as an attempt to disarm North Korea first 
without taking essential steps for establishing diplomatic relationship between the US 
and North Korea under the tenets of the 1994 AF (KCNA, February 22, 2001). Thus, 
instead of accepting the suggestion of the Bush administration‟s policy review, North 
Korea persistently insisted that in order for itself to agree with the resumption of the 
US-North Korea dialogue, a discussion on realising the 1994 Agreed Framework 
should be a starting point (KCNA, June 18, 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, since US President Bush‟s State of the Union address in January 2002, 
identifying North Korea “an axis of evil,” North Korea‟s perception of US policy has 
significantly changed. North Korea understood that the US might go to war in the 
Korean Peninsula in preference to remaining in dialogue with itself. For example, as 
mentioned before, North Korea indicated that Bush‟s announcement of an axis of evil 
revealed “the U.S. reckless intention to seize the DPRK by force of arms after 
designating it as the second target of “anti-terrorism war”.” (KCNA, February 2, 
2002) 
 
As mentioned above, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific, 
James Kelly, visited Pyongyang to discuss the Bush administration‟s policy. However, 
after the meeting in Pyongyang in October 2002, a statement issued by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the DPRK (Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea) justified its 
nuclear activities by stating that it had the right to posses any type of weapons to 
defend its sovereignty and to protect itself from the nuclear threat by the US (KCNA, 
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October 25, 2002). Eventually, North Korea announced its immediate withdrawal 
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that it would be free from any 
regulations of the IAEA safeguards (KCNA, January 10, 2003).  
 
The purpose of this chapter 
 
Despite the serious nuclear confrontation between the US and North Korea there have 
been few investigations into the security implications of this event from the 
perspective of a hegemonic power structure. One of the distinctive discourses 
interpreting the nuclear confrontation as an exercise of US hegemonic power can be 
seen in David Kerr‟s work in 2005. According to David Kerr, “hegemony denotes a 
particular mode of exercising power.” (Kerr, 2005: 412) He continues “[h]egemony 
implies conditionality, that is, force if necessary, but only after other instruments have 
failed, and respect for sovereignty unless this is over-ridden by some system-
governing principle, most obviously the secure functioning of the hegemonic order 
itself.” (Kerr, 2005: 412) 
 
In relation to an exercise of hegemonic power, Kerr gives the North Korean case as an 
example. He indicates that in order to solve the North Korean nuclear issue the US 
has attempted to use alternatives such as the 1994 AF and the comprehensive policy 
review by the Bush administration before the US lean towards its hegemonic power. 
However, Kerr points out that US policy towards North Korea has dramatically 
changed since September 11, 2001 and the US‟s new approach revealed through 
Bush‟s speech at the State of Union in January 2002 designated North Korea as a 
possible target of the War on Terror due to its engagement in proliferation of WMD. 
More significantly, he concludes that North Korea‟s clandestine nuclear activity of the 
HEU programme, revealed in October 2002, compelled the US to take a hard stance 
towards North Korea (Kerr, 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, Kerr‟s analysis simply moved onto an examination of Great Power‟s 
strategic relationships in the Northeast Asian region rather than focusing on an 
investigation into an actual exercise of US hegemony in relation to North Korea‟s 
nuclear programme. This is because Kerr perceived that it seemed difficult for the US 
to benefit from its predominant position regarding the security environment in the 
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Northeast Asian region due to the complexisities of Great Powers‟ relationships. He 
concluded that “[t]he problems of the region are too complex and the configurations 
of power too interlocking to permit overt hegemonic behavior. If anything, the region 
demonstrates the opposing tendency and the weakening of U.S. capabilities in 
hegemonic management.” (Kerr, 2005: 432)  
 
However, regardless of the complexity of Great Powers‟ relationships in the region, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that the increased tension between the US and North 
Korea was initially outlined as a bilateral confrontation between them, and that in this 
context, the US has played a role of a guarantor of global security.  Thus, it seems 
worth looking at the bilateral nuclear confrontation between the US and North Korea 
from the perspective of a hegemonic power structure.  
 
This chapter will focus on analysing the security implications of the nuclear 
confrontation between the US and North Korea from the perspective of a hegemonic 
power structure. The foremost objective of this chapter is to find out whether the first 
phase of the second North Korean nuclear crisis could be interpreted as a good 
example which demonstrates the notion of security under a hegemonic power 
structure. 
 
The other objective is to review hypotheses of hegemonic stability theory that are 
significantly applied to this study and defining the notion of security. The 
appropriateness of the hegemonic stability theory will be examined through 
comparing the main arguments of the theory of hegemonic stability and the actual 
process of the nuclear confrontation between the US and North Korea.  
 
In order to achieve its objectives, this chapter will examine the following questions.  
1. Considering the actual process of the bilateral nuclear confrontation, can the 
notion of security under a hegemonic power structure be applied to the first 
phase of the second North Korean nuclear crisis? 
2. Do the main hypotheses of the hegemonic stability theory have 
appropriateness in explaining the security implications of the nuclear 
confrontation between the US and North Korea? 
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The analytical contribution to the overall thesis 
 
This chapter focuses on the first phase of the second North Korean nuclear crisis. The 
methodological focus of this study aims at a structural analysis of the bilateral nuclear 
confrontation between the US and North Korea. This analysis and its empirical study 
will be informed by the question of the applicability of the hegemonic security model 
and its perception of international security.  
 
The attempt to analyse the applicability of hegemony to the bilateral nuclear 
confrontation must begin with the design of an analytical framework which can be 
used in examination of a particular phase of the second North Korean nuclear crisis. 
The subject of this chapter implies that the first phase of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis, that is, bilateral nuclear confrontation between the US and North Korea, can be 
categorised and explained through the notion of hegemonic security.  
 
This chapter will begin with the examination of hegemonic stability theory. In the first 
place, the notion of security under a hegemonic power structure will be discussed. In 
addition, a discussion of how a hegemon can provide security to subordinate states 
will be considered. In this context, the main assumptions of hegemonic stability 
theory will be examined, since the theory of hegemonic stability appears to be the 
analytical framework which can introduce both the notion of security and the 
provision of security under a hegemonic power structure.  
 
After examining hegemony and hegemonic security, three issues of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis – President Bush‟s announcement of the axis of evil, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) and the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue – will be investigated 
as empirical evidence to support an application of hegemonic security to the North 
Korean nuclear crisis. From this investigation, the key assumptions of hegemonic 
stability theory as a proper analytical framework to answer the question of the 
applicability of a hegemonic power structure will be explained.  
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Its argument 
 
In general terms, the history of the nuclear talks between the US and North Korea 
shows that both countries broke off agreements, imposed sanctions, engaged in very 
hostile policy towards each other, or decided to trust each other again. Nevertheless, 
in specific terms, the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis shows that 
antagonistic opposition led to a serious bilateral confrontation.  
 
In order to examine the key characteristics of the bilateral nuclear confrontation, it 
seems necessary to establish a set of hypotheses. A number of hypotheses can be 
formulated, based on findings from the literature as to how the United States can deal 
with security issues as a hegemon. The hypotheses are based on the three key 
arguments abstracted from the theory of hegemonic stability. Firstly, it is 
hypothesised that a hegemon defines and enforces the rules and rights that shape its 
own behaviour and that of subordinates in a particular system. Secondly, it is argued 
that a hegemon creates and controls the network of political, economic and security 
relationship in the system. Thirdly, it is assumed that a hegemon needs to supply a 
stable economic order to encourage other states to be interested in following its lead.  
These hypotheses will be studied with the examinations of three key issues of the first 
phase: the designation of North Korea as an axis of evil by the US, the PSI issue, and 
the BDA issue. 
 
First, as Robert Gilpin notes, a hegemonic power structure characterises an 
international system in which “a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser 
states in the system.” (Gilpin, 1981: 29) Put differently, hegemony refers to a situation 
in which “one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing 
interstate relations, and willing to do so.” (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 38) Describing 
North Korea as an axis of evil could be a good example that demonstrates the US‟s 
intention to exercise its hegemonic predominance in terms of manipulating interstate 
relations. By doing so, the US successfully isolated North Korea from the US-led 
international system and warned other states that countries suspected of proliferation 
would be a target of US pre-emptive strategy. 
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Second, in order for a single state to be a hegemon that creates the rules and rights in 
the international system, it is necessary to obtain reputation as a leader. In Gilpin‟s 
terms, for a hegemon it is essential to establish “the hierarchy of prestige among 
states,” which is “the functional equivalent of the role of authority in domestic 
politics.” (Gilpin, 1981: 30) The formation and exercises of the PSI shows that the US 
actually exerts its dominant position by compelling other states to conduct 
cooperative actions under the rules that it created. However, it seems controversial 
whether the PSI interdiction principle could be applicable to a wider range in terms of 
international law. 
 
Finally, as the theory of hegemonic stability assumes, the maintenance of a stable 
international monetary system must be an important example of the provision of 
public goods because it encourages individual states to gain benefits from 
international trade (Gilpin, 1981). The BDA issue demonstrates that the US can 
exercise its financial power to expel a certain country from the US-led international 
monetary system. Moreover, North Korea‟s efforts to sustain its financial connection 
to the international finance system show the importance of the benefits from the 
international economy system for subordinate states.  
 
2.2. An Analytical Framework of A Hegemonic Power Structure 
 
In order to observe the security implications of a hegemonic power structure, firstly, it 
seems necessary to explore historical examples of hegemony. This is because an 
examination of the origin of hegemony might provide indications to understanding the  
perception of security and the provision of security under a hegemonic power 
structure. In addition to this, it is important to build up a theoretical tool to be used 
when analysing selected cases. Therefore, following an examination of historical 
examples, this section will discuss the question of what is security under a hegemonic 
power structure. After that the question of how a hegemon can provide security to its 
subordinates will be addressed. 
 
In this regard, it seems necessary to examine the question of whether the US can be 
considered as a hegemon in the contemporary international system. As John Agnew 
indicates, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a variety of terms that point to 
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the US‟s predominant status, including unipolarity, hegemony and imperialism 
(Agnew 2003). Thus, it is essential to distinguish between these three concepts. 
Firstly, the concept of polarity can be defined as “the relative distribution of 
capabilities within the global international system.” (Krahmann, 2005: 533) The Cold 
War period can be categorised as a historical example of a bipolar system. However, 
since the collapse of the Soviet-Union, the US has remained as the sole superpower 
and therefore the current international system might be regarded as a unipolar system 
(Wilkinson, 1999). Secondly, the term „hegemony‟ can be defined in terms of the 
distribution of power within the international system. As David Wilkinson indicates, 
hegemony denotes “a highly unequal political or politico-military influence 
relationship (perhaps coercive, perhaps consensual, perhaps commercial, perhaps 
legitimate).” (Wilkinson, 1999: 142) In this regard, hegemony can be distinguished 
from unipolarity in the sense that hegemony refers to influence over other states as 
well as the distribution of power. Finally, the definition of imperialism can be 
described as its coercive policy in addition to capabilities and influence (Krahmann, 
2005). Thus, according to Agnew, a critical difference between hegemony and empire 
is “its reliance, to some degree, on persuading or rewarding subordinates rather than 
immediately coercing them, although even empire … is never reliably achieved by 
purely coercive means.” (Agnew, 2003: 876) Based on this differentiation between 
unipolarity, hegemony and imperialism, it seems reasonable to consider the US‟s 
status in the international system as hegemony. For example, during the Cold War, the 
US was perceived as a hegemon in relation to its allies within the Western Europe and 
in Asia. Under the unipolarity of the post-Cold War era, the US seems to have more 
strengthened its hegemony in Europe and in Asia-Pacific region (Krahman, 2005).  
 
The origin of a hegemonic power structure 
 
In relation to historical examples of hegemony, it seems reasonable to consider British 
predominance in the 19th century and American supremacy after the Second World 
War. This is because, as Robert Keohane notes, “[t]hose eras are imagined to be 
simpler ones in which a single power, possessing superiority of economic and military 
resources, implemented a plan for international order based on its interests and its 
vision of the world.” (Keohane, 1984: 31) In Robert Gilpin‟s terms, “[t]he Pax 
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Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system 
of relative peace and security.” (Gilpin, 1981: 145) 
 
The Pax Britannica refers to a period of „relative peace‟ in Europe in the 19 th century 
when Britain controlled and dominated the international order based on its military 
and economic preponderance. According to Robert Gilpin, “with the final defeat of 
Napoleon at Waterloo, the last French effort to challenge British economic and 
political predominance came to an end. From then until the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, no nation would have the economic and territorial base to 
challenge British world hegemony.” (Gilpin, 1981: 135) Put differently, after the 
victory at Waterloo in 1815, defeating the ambitions of Napoleonic France, Britain 
developed its power in controlling the international system of Europe. As a result of 
this, between 1815 and 1914, the international system witnessed a relatively stable 
period referred to as the Pax Britannica era. During this period, Britain played a role 
as a hegemon by dominating the international system (O‟Brien, 2002).  
 
In relation to the provision of security, the Pax Britannica enjoyed two principal 
aspects. In the first place, the end of the Napoleonic wars resulted in the 
rearrangement of territories in Europe. The Congress of Vienna codified the great 
powers‟ ambitions (Gilpin, 1975). As a result of this, “the four major powers on the 
continent [Russia, Prussia, Austria and France] were kept in check by their own 
rivalries and by Britain, which, having no direct interests at stake on the continent, 
could play a balancing and mediating role.” (Gilpin, 1975: 81-82) Moreover, British 
naval superiority supported the maintenance of the Pax Britannica. As Robert Gilpin 
notes, “Britain‟s geographic position directly off the coast of continental Europe and 
her possession of naval bases strategically located throughout the world enabled her to 
control continental Europe‟s access to the outside world and to deny overseas colonies 
to her European rivals.” (Gilpin, 1975: 82) In fact, outside Europe, the British Royal 
Navy conducted such activities as “checking piracy, stopping slaving ships, landing 
marines, and restraining local rulers.” (Kennedy, 1988:154) 
 
Futhermore, in terms of the international political economy, Britain controlled the 
worldwide commercial business with its “high share of world trade in goods and 
services, of capital flows, of new technology” (O‟Brien, 2002: 14). For a hegemon it 
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is necessary to possess economic supremacy that allows control over the international 
political economy. Economic supremacy can be exercised when a leading state 
benefits from technological advances, free trade and the international monetary 
system (Gamble, 2002). For example, after victory at Waterloo in 1815, defeating the 
ambitions of Napoleonic France, Britain developed its power in controlling the 
international system of Europe. At this stage, Britain already enjoyed a dominant 
position in leading the world economy. Britain supplied a substantial portion of the 
world production based on its advanced technology following the Industrial 
Revolution and benefited from the international free trade system. The expansion of 
the international free trade allowed Britain to take a role as a stabiliser of the 
international economy in the 19th century (O‟Brien, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, as Robert Gilpin notes, under a hegemonic power structure, the costs of 
dominance tend to increase because of unbalanced growth of power among states. 
This means that for a hegemon, “the costs of protection of the status quo rise faster 
than the economic benefits of the status quo” (Gilpin, 1981: 169). Thus, it is difficult 
for a hegemon to continue to bear the increasing burden of preserving an open market 
policy (Gilpin, 1981). 
 
The Great Depression in 1929 enforced subordinate states to protect themselves by 
raising their barriers against free trade. This left Britain vulnerable in carrying out its 
leading role in preserving a stable international economy. Other states also rejected 
remaining followers of the British leadership. Britain moved away from its free trade 
policy and eventually gave way to American hegemony in 20th century (Stein, 1984). 
 
The Pax Americana describes a period of relative peace in the international system 
since the end of World War II in 1945. In Robert Gilpin‟s terms, Pax Americana 
refers to the period that “American economic and military power was supreme, and it 
provided the basis for an American-centered world economic and political order.” 
(Gilpin, 1981: 231) 
 
As Jochen Hippler points out, the Second World War created a new international 
system. In particular, American hegemony replaced the Pax Britannica. The US‟s 
dominance in economic, political and military field allowed it to take a role of a 
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leader in a new international system (Hippler, 1994). In other words, “[a] common 
ideology and broadly common interests camouflaged overwhelming US domination 
over its allies. … In the Western camp [symbolised by NATO] American 
predominance was politically and economically indisputable and therefore virtually 
forced on its European allies.” (Hippler, 1994: 8) 
 
In terms of the provision of international security, the Pax Americana witnessed no 
armed conflict among major Western countries themselves although there have been 
various regional wars such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War.  
This was because, as Robert Gilpin notes, US hegemony was exercised through “the 
extension of its nuclear deterrent to its allies.” (Gilpin, 1987: 134) Moreover,  Lars 
Mjøset indicates, “[t]he historical context of U.S. hegemony … involves the whole 
array of advanced capitalist countries (reflecting different varieties of organized 
capitalism) joined in one network of U.S.-centered military alliance.” (Mjøset, 1990: 
42) 
 
Regarding the grouping of advanced capitalist countries, the US made plans for a 
European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan) which intended to “build Europe 
into an independent center of military and economic power, a third force.” (Ikenberry, 
1989: 386) In order to support the Marshall Plan, the US and the Western Europe 
nations established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. In terms 
of military security, the NATO alliance provided a nuclear umbrella to protect Europe 
from the former USSR‟s threat (McCormick, 1989). Thus, after the end of World War 
II, the relations between Western Europe and the US were denoted by a sort of 
“Atlantic compromise” (Mjøset, 1990: 43) that allowed the US to be in a dominant 
position in dealing with security matters (Mjøset, 1990). 
 
With respect to the stability of the international political economy, the US established 
a series of international economic institutions such as International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), known collectively as 
the Bretton Woods system (Ikenberry, 1989). The principal tenet of the Bretton 
Woods system can be categorised as the establishment of an international free trade 
system like the liberal trading order in the 19th century. For example, the GATT 
 48 
opened a way to free trade by encouraging nations to negotiate with each other (Stein, 
1984). 
 
In order to recognise the US‟s economic supremacy, it is also essential to look at the 
role of the dollar in the international monetary system. As Robert Gilpin indicates, the 
US positioned the dollar as the top currency (reserve currency) in the international 
political economy. The dollar has taken a role as “reserve, transaction, and 
intervention currency extended economic and political privileges to the United 
States.” (Gilpin, 1987: 137) As a result, it was possible for the US to be the world‟s 
banker and this encouraged the continuance of the Pax Americana in the 20th century. 
 
2.2.1. Perception of security under a hegemonic power structure 
 
In order to understand a hegemonic power structure, it seems necessary to explore 
„the certainty of the status quo‟ and „a stable international political economy‟ because 
the notion of security under a hegemonic power structure mainly consists of these two 
elements. A hegemonic power structure assumes that a hegemon and its subordinates 
enjoy „the certainty of the status quo‟. It also expects that one predominant state 
creates and maintains the international political economy. This section will examine 
the questions of what „the certainty of the status quo‟ is and why „a stable 
international political economy‟ is required in achieving the certainty of the status quo. 
 
2.2.1.1. A hegemonic power structure and the certainty of the status quo 
 
A hegemonic power structure 
 
According to Hedley Bull, the international system is unable to control itself due to its 
anarchical nature (Bull, 1977). However, it seems noteworthy to consider that despite 
the absence of management in the international system, a certain degree of 
cooperation works out regarding international relations. In Robert Gilpin‟s terms, this 
sort of international order can be understood as “relative control” (Gilpin, 1981: 28).  
 
According to Gilpin, there are three major factors in relation to an operation of the 
international system: the distribution of power between countries, the hierarchy of 
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prestige among states and a set of rights and rules.11 Gilpin highlights in the first place 
that the distribution of power among states might be the most significant aspect in 
making a decision of “who governs the international system and whose interests are 
principally promoted by the functioning of the system.” (Gilpin, 1981: 29) Secondly, 
he underlines the importance of hierarchy in the realm of international relations which 
may operate as the authority of government in domestic politics. Finally, he 
emphasises that an establishment of a set of rules and rights is essential in shaping 
international relations among states (Gilpin, 1981). 
 
What kind of international systems will emerge, is basically dependent upon how “the 
dominant powers in the international hierarchy of power and prestige organize and 
control the processes of interactions among the elements of the system.”12 (Gilpin, 
1981: 29) In other words, history demonstrates that every international system is 
regulated and managed by the leading powers of the day. This means that those 
leading states determine and impose the principal regulations that may shape both the 
way they behave and the manner the other states in the system must follow (Gilpin, 
1981). 
 
A hegemonic power structure is a distinctive one where “a single powerful state 
controls or dominates the lesser states in the system.” (Gilpin, 1981: 29)  Hence, a 
hegemonic power structure can be considered as a situation in which “one state is 
powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and 
willing to do so.” (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 38) 
 
The certainty of the status quo 
 
In order for a hegemonic power structure to be exercised, there should be a 
“stabilizer” (Kindleberger, 1973: 305), which can be defined as a hegemon; that is “a 
single power, possessing superiority of economic and military resources, implemented 
a plan for international order based on its interests and its vision of the world.” 
(Keohane, 1984: 31) Regarding the way of how a hegemonic power structure works 
                                                 
11
  For the details of an exp lanation of these factors, see Gilpin, 1981: 28-38. 
12
 In this regard, Robert Gilp in suggests three types of international systems: a hegemonic power 
structure, a bipolar structure, and a balance of power system. For details, see Gilpin, 1981: 29.  
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out, it seems notable to examine again Gilpin‟s explanation of the control of the 
international system. 
 
According to Robert Gilpin, the leading powers of the international system provide 
the other states with “public goods (security, economic order, etc)” in order to 
encourage the other states to accept their dominant status in the system. In return for 
this, the other states recognise the existing international order, which is established by 
the leading power. This is because the other states want to benefit from the “certainty 
of the status quo” rather than to take a risk with the “uncertainties of change.” (Gilpin, 
1981: 30) This sort of relationship can be applied to an understanding of the 
relationship between a hegemon and the subordinate states under a hegemonic power 
structure. Put differently, a hegemonic power structure assumes that the subordinate 
states may have to establish their security relationship with a hegemon by accepting 
the existing order – the certainty of the status quo – whereas a hegemon can take 
advantage of its predominant status.  
 
2.2.1.2. A stable international political economy 
 
As can be seen from the previous discussion, a hegemonic power structure assumes 
that the “certainty of the status quo” prevails over the international system. Regarding 
the implication of the “certainty of the status quo”, the theory of hegemonic stability 
underlines the importance of maintaining a stable international political economy by a 
hegemon. Robert Gilpin points out that historically hegemonic power sought “to 
organize political, territorial, and especially economic relations in terms of their 
respective security and economic interests.” (Gilpin, 1981: 144 ) At this stage, it seems 
necessary to examine the question of what the stability of international political 
economy does imply. 
 
The principal assumption of hegemonic stability theory is that the lack of leadership 
may create an unstable international political economy and may result in negative 
conditions for individual actors in the international system. Reflecting this proposition, 
Charles Kindleberger claims that “for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to 
be a stabilizer, one stabilizer.” (Kindleberger, 1973: 305) 
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According to Robert Gilpin, a hegemon takes responsibility for maintaining a stable 
international political economy because by doing so, a hegemon can “benefit 
relatively more than other states.” (Gilpin, 1981: 138) In other words, for a hegemon, 
“[t]he benefits … of a secure status quo, free trade, foreign investment, and a well-
functioning international monetary system were greater than the associated costs.” 
(Gilpin, 1981: 145) On the other hand, other states can also benefit from a stable 
international political economy because they can enjoy “the international political and 
economic status quo” (Gilpin, 1981: 145), provided by a hegemon. Thus, in relation 
to international security, a stable international political economy denotes another 
aspect of “the certainty of the status of quo.” (Gilpin, 1981: 30) 
 
2.2.2. Provision of security under a hegemonic power structure 
 
With respect to the provision of security under a hegemonic power structure, it seems 
necessary, in the first place, to examine the concept of international regimes because 
international regimes have often been created and maintained by a hegemon in order 
to help a hegemon to exert its rule and power. In addition to this, it seems essential to 
explore the provision of public goods because public goods are regarded as one of the 
most important international regimes provided by a hegemon in relation to the 
maintenance of a stable international political economy. Finally, there is a necessity to 
investigate the notion of hegemonic leadership because in order for a single dominant 
power to be a hegemon it needs to be accepted as a leader of the international system 
by other states. Therefore, this section will study three factors: the role of 
international regimes, the provision of public goods and the exercise of hegemonic 
leadership. 
 
2.2.2.1. International regimes under a hegemonic power structure 
 
Definition of international regimes 
 
Prior to considering the role of international regimes regarding the provision of 
security under a hegemonic power structure, it seems necessary to look at the question 
of how the notion of international regimes can be perceived in the realm of 
international politics. This is because an explicit description of international regimes 
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might be a cornerstone in order for us to have a good understanding of how 
international regimes can play its role in providing security by a hegemon. 13 
 
In his work in 1975, John Ruggie introduced the notion of international regimes as “a 
set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and 
financial commitment, which have been accepted by a group of states.” (Ruggie, 
1975: 570) As an example of a regime, Ruggie pointed to the international safeguards 
related to nuclear materials, which include inspection regulations and responsibilities 
for members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to declare their nuclear-related 
activities (Ruggie, 1975). 
 
In accordance with Ruggie‟s definition, a more explanatory definition of a regime can 
be seen in Stephen Krasner‟s work. According to Krasner, international regime can be 
described as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors‟ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.” (Krasner, 1982: 186) Moreover, he gives basic descriptions 
about the terms of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. He adds 
up “[p]rinciples are belief of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice.” (Krasner, 1982: 186) 
 
As Stephen Krasner suggests, the idea of international regime consists of four 
distinctive elements: principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. 
Nevertheless, precise elaborations of these four factors have been developed through 
Robert Keohane‟s work. According to him, the principles of regimes identify the 
goals that members of international regimes are looking forward to accomplishing. 
For example, the nuclear non-proliferation regime entails the principles that the 
expansion of nuclear weapons states is undesirable. Norms clarify what sorts of things 
members can do and what they should not, by outlining regulations. For instance, the 
                                                 
13
 The notion of international regimes will be considered again when this research examines collective 
security in chapter IV. This  is because a collective security system also expects the role of international 
regimes. In this regard, it  seems notable that the role of international regimes is not different between a 
hegemonic system and a collect ive security system even if those migh t be created for the different 
reasons. 
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norm of the nuclear non-proliferation regime enforces members not to involve in the 
network of nuclear proliferation. The rules of regimes explicitly stipulate rights and 
obligations of members through establishing a set of comprehensive regulations.14 
The decision-making procedures play its role in both implementing the principles and 
revising rules (Keohane, 1984). 
 
The establishment and maintenance of international regimes by a hegemon 
 
In relation to the creation of international regimes, the theory of hegemonic stability 
provides an operational explanation of regime dynamics. According to hegemonic 
stability theory, the establishment and maintenance of international regimes are much 
related to the existence of a single dominant power. As Robert Keohane notes, 
“hegemony often plays an important role, even a crucial one” in forming international 
regimes (Keohane, 1984: 49). 
 
The motivation of creating international regimes by a hegemon can be found in a 
hegemon‟s desire to construct the world in line with its own ideals. In this regard, it 
seems useful to pay attention to Keohane‟s observation. According to him, in general 
terms, powerful states try to build the international system in order to realise “their 
interests and their ideologies.” (Keohane, 1984: 136) More specifically, “[t]he 
hegemon seeks to persuade others to confirm to its vision of world order and to defer 
to its leadership.” (Keohane, 1984: 137) More precisely, through creating and 
maintaining international regimes, a hegemon “can abrogate existing rules, prevent 
the adoption of rules that it opposes, or play the dominant role in constructing new 
rules.” (Keohan and Nye, 2001: 38)15 
 
With respect to the provision of security under a hegemonic power structure, it seems 
worth considering Robert Keohane‟s and Joseph Nye‟s observation. According to 
them, “[s]mall states often welcome international regimes as barriers to arbitrary 
abuse of power by the strong. But regimes can be equally valuable to great powers …  
that want to create, but are unable to dictate, the terms of a stable world environment.” 
                                                 
14
 This kind of ru les can be seen from the IAEA safeguards. 
15
 An example of this can be seen from the emergence of a liberal world  economy during the era of Pax 
Britannica and the Pax Americana. The non-proliferation regime can be considered as another example 
of this. 
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(Keohane and Nye, 2001: 290) This implies that under a hegemonic power structure, 
subordinate states accept the international regimes because they believe that 
international regimes may prevent them from being exploited by a hegemon. A 
hegemonic power can also benefit from international regimes in that the maintenance 
of international regimes may grant a constant international environment.  
 
Robert Keohane‟s and Joseph Nye‟s examination seems to be compatible with the 
notion of „the certainty of status quo‟ under a hegemonic power structure. In other 
words, international regimes allow both a hegemon and subordinate states to 
cooperate with each other and this might make them to be secure. In Robert 
Keohane‟s terms, “[i]nternational regimes help to make governments‟ expectations 
consistent with one another. Regimes are developed in part because actors in world 
politics believe that … they will be able to make mutually beneficial agreements that 
would otherwise be difficult or impossible to attain. In other words, regimes are 
valuable to governments where, in their absence, certain mutually beneficial 
agreements would be impossible to consummate.” (Keohane, 1982: 334)  
 
2.2.2.2. Provision of public goods 
 
As discussed above, the theory of hegemonic stability considers public goods as 
international regimes provided by a hegemon. Thus, it seems useful to examine the 
concept of public goods and the security implication of the provision of public goods. 
 
What are public goods in the realm of international relations? 
 
According to Charles Kindleberger, a public good is one “the consumption of which 
by an individual, household, or firm does not reduce the amount available to other 
potential consumers” (Kindleberger, 1981: 243).  In relation to the realm of 
international relations, he regards an open market system as a public good and 
underlines the importance of “maintaining a relatively open market for distress 
goods” as a hegemon‟s responsibility (Kindleberger, 1973: 292). 
 
It is Robert Gilpin who develops the concept of public goods by giving a set of 
examples. Gilpin‟s description of public goods is consistent with that of Charles 
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Kindleberger. According to Gilpin, public goods are such ones which “individual 
states can enjoy … whether or not they contribute to the maintenance of the good .” 
(Gilpin, 1987: 74) 16  Gilpin also discusses a set of public goods in the field of 
international relations. For example, he indicates that an open market system provides 
a fairly competitive environment to all participants. A top currency (reserve currency) 
would be another significant example by Gilpin, because it encourages individual 
states to gain benefits from international commercial exchange. Finally, he points out 
that the provision of international security can be considered as one of public goods 
(Gilpin, 1987).17 
 
Security implications of the provision of public goods 
 
Regarding the security implications of the provision of public goods, it might be 
valuable to look at again Charles Kindleberger‟s work. In a study of the sources of the 
Great Depression, Kindleberger argues that the stability of international political 
economy fundamentally rests on the dominant actor‟s leadership role involved in the 
provision of a variety of public goods (Kindleberger, 1973). In this regard, 
Kindleberger suggests that “for the world economy to be stable, it needs a stabilizer, 
some country that would undertake to provide a market of distress goods, a steady if 
not countercyclical flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism for providing 
liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic” (Kindleberger, 1981: 247). 
 
Kindleberger‟s observation denotes that the provision of public goods is necessary for 
the international system to be stable, that is, the provision of public goods by a 
hegemon contributes to preserving the international peace and security. In 
Kindleberger‟s terms, “the lack of leadership in providing discount facilities, 
anticyclical lending or an open market for goods rendered the system unstable” 
(Kindleberger, 1973: 295). Therefore, hegemonic stability theory emphasises the 
importance of a constant provision of public goods such as an open market policy and 
a top currency by a hegemon. 
                                                 
16
 With respect to the key  features of public goods in the realm of international relat ions, see Snidal 
(1985). 
17
 Bruce Russet also discusses the provision of security as public goods. According to Bruce Russet, 
the US – the existing hegemon – guarantees military  protection for its allies and other neutrals in  order 
to provide the foundation for the success of the world  market system. For details, see Russet (1985: 
222-223). 
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2.2.2.3. Hegemonic leadership 
 
Regarding the provision of security, a hegemonic power structure presupposes the 
existence of hegemonic leadership, which is “powerful enough to maintain the 
essential rules governing interstate relations.” (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 38) This 
section will examine the notion and the components of hegemonic leadership. 
 
The concept of hegemonic leadership 
 
The theory of hegemonic stability builds up the notion of hegemonic leadership with 
respect to the maintenance of a stable international political economy. For example, as 
David Rapkin notes, hegemonic stability theory assumes that the international 
political economy requires “world leadership” (Rapkin, 1990: 3) in relation to the 
provision of public goods.18 
 
According to Charles Kindleberger, „world leadership‟ refers to “a country which is 
prepared, … to set standards of conduct for other countries; and to seek to get others 
to follow them, to take on an undue share of the burdens of the system, and in 
particular to take on its support in adversity by accepting its redundant commodities, 
maintaining a flow of investment capital and discounting its paper.” (Kindleberger, 
1973: 28) In addition to this, Kindleberger argues that the absence of hegemonic 
leadership may result in the collapse of the international economic system 
(Kindleberger, 1973). This is the reason why Kindleberger repeatedly emphasises the 
idea of world leadership by saying that “for the world economy to be stable, it needs a 
stabilizer, some country that would undertake to provide a market of distress goods, a 
steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism for 
providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic” (Kindleberger, 
1981: 247). Thus, according to Kindleberger‟s observation, it seems that hegemonic 
leadership means the capability to provide public goods for a stable international 
political economy. 
 
                                                 
18
 For various strands of the conceptualisation of hegemonic leadership, see Rapkin (1990: 1-19). 
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However, Robert Gilpin‟s work expands the concept of hegemonic leadership by 
connecting it to a hegemon‟s role in building and maintaining international order. He 
claims that the emergence of a new hegemonic power may “resolve the question of 
which state will govern the system, as well as what ideas and values will predominate, 
thereby determining the ethos of succeeding ages.” (Gilpin, 1981: 203) At this stage, 
it seems that hegemonic leadership can be understood as a power which may prevail 
over the global international system including the international political economy.  
 
The components of hegemonic leadership 
 
Hegemonic stability theory firstly perceives hegemonic leadership in conventional 
terms of resources by defining hegemony as “preponderance of material resources” 
consisting of “control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over 
markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods” 
(Keohane, 1984: 32). According to this description, the theory of hegemonic stability 
seems to regard economic capability as a fundamental element for a single dominant 
state to be a hegemon. 
 
However, Gilpin adds another point to explain hegemonic leadership. According to 
Gilpin, economic capability without equivalent political-military power cannot help a 
single dominant state to exercise hegemonic leadership, as the example of Japan in the 
20th century proves. He underlines that in order for a single dominant state to be 
hegemonic in the international system, exclusive economic capability must be 
accompanied by dominant military power (Gilpin, 1981). In this regard, it seems 
noteworthy that Keohane claims that “a hegemonic state must possess enough 
military power to be able to protect the international political economy that it 
dominates from incursions by hostile adversaries” (Keohane, 1984: 39). 
 
In addition to this, the theory of hegemonic stability considers that it is essential to 
have non-material components as well as material ones in order for hegemonic 
leadership to be established and exerted. Gilpin underlines that it is important for a 
hegemon to acquire a reputation as a leader. In Gilpin‟s terms, regarding the control 
over the international system, “the hierarchy of prestige among states”, which “is the 
functional equivalent of the role of authority in domestic politics”, is necessary for the 
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control of the system (Gilpin, 1981: 30). This is because prestige serves as “a moral 
and functional basis” (Gilpin, 1981: 30) to subordinate states to follow the leadership 
of the dominant state. In other words, although the hierarchy of prestige originates 
from a hegemon‟s material resources such as economic and military power, prestige 
refers primarily to “the perceptions of other states with respect to a state‟s capacities 
and its ability and willingness to exercise its power” (Gilpin, 1981: 30-31). 
 
The exercise of hegemonic leadership 
 
With respect to the exercise of hegemonic leadership, it is notable to examine Duncan 
Snidal‟s categorisation. According to Snidal, in a “benevolent leadership”, it is 
difficult for a hegemon to force subordinate states to share the burdens of maintaining 
the international economy. Moreover, it is also hard to solve the free-rider problem. 
Subordinate states can benefit from the existing international order. In contrast to this, 
in the “coercive leadership”, it is possible for a hegemon to drive others to contribute 
to the provision of public goods by using its centralised power (Snidal, 1985). Despite 
differences in exercising their leadership, as Snidal indicates, both leadership models 
need “an interest in providing the public good as well as the capability to do so .” 
(Snidal, 1985: 589)19 
 
This section has reviewed a number of literature in relation to the perception and 
provision of security under a hegemonic power structure. This might have given us a 
tool to analyse empirical cases and therefore be able to lead us to examining the first 
phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The following part will explore empirical 
evidence which seem to be relevant to the analytical framework discussed above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 For details, see Snidal (1985: 588-590). 
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2.3. Empirical Evidence 
 
The previous part has examined key assumptions of the theory of hegemonic stability. 
As mentioned above, this part will test whether major hypotheses of hegemonic 
stability theory can be applicable to explaining the actual process of the first phase of 
the North Korean nuclear crisis. In this regard, it should be acknowledged that this 
part will not explore all issues which have appeared in the first phase of the North 
Korean nuclear crisis. Instead, this part will basically look at the key issues of the first 
phase which seem to be very relevant to an application of an analytical framework. In 
addition, it will also discuss an issue which does not emerge during the first phase, but 
actually retains significance regarding a hegemonic power structure – for example, the 
BDA issue. 
 
2.3.1. The US’s multilateral approach 
 
2.3.1.1. US hegemony and the axis of evil 
 
The US’s perception of WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War era 
 
It seems notable that since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant 
transformation of the US‟s policy on the WMD proliferation issue. During the Cold 
War, the US believed in the possession of WMD as a source of deterrence of major 
war because WMD were considered as “weapons of last resort”. By contrast, in the 
post-Cold War era, the US perceives WMD primarily as “militarily useful weapons of 
choice” for rogue states or terrorists (The White House, September 17, 2002; Council 
on Foreign Relations, December 2002). It is essential at this stage to examine both 
US‟s attitude towards WMD proliferation and its policy options to deal with WMD 
proliferation issue in the post-Cold War era. 
 
During the Bush administrations, the US has perceived the acquisition of WMD by a 
small number of rogue states20 or terrorists as the most serious threat not only against 
                                                 
20
 The US classifies “rogue states” as these states: “1) brutalize their own people and squander their 
national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; 2) d isplay no regard for international law, threaten 
their neighbors, and callously vio late international treaties to which they are party; 3) are determined to 
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US security, but also against global security. US President Bush‟s address at West 
Point clearly demonstrated US perception of the spread of WMD in the post-Cold 
War era. US President Bush said, “[t]he gravest danger to freedom lies at the 
crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological 
and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology – when that occurs, even 
weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. 
Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these 
terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm 
our friends – and we will oppose them with all our power.” (Bush, June 1, 2002).  
 
Based on its own perception of WMD in the post-Cold War era, the US follows 
several policy options to prevent WMD proliferation. Firstly, the US does not deny 
the probability of striking pre-emptively against a significant threat to its national 
security from adversaries possessing WMD. Secondly, in addition to its pre-emptive 
strike policy, the US also indicates that it will make diplomatic efforts to achieve its 
non-proliferation goals. Regarding its diplomatic approaches, the US clarifies that it 
will employ both bilateral and multilateral means. That is, the US points out that its 
non-proliferation diplomacy would be conducted through both persuading states 
capable of WMD not to proliferate their WMD and establishing coalitions to organise 
cooperation for non-proliferation. Thirdly, in order to realise its non-proliferation 
goals, the US suggests that it will support international regimes such as the IAEA 
safeguards, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) which are currently operating. Furthermore, the US asserts 
that it will open the way for new arrangements which will prevent proliferation. 
Finally, the US maintains that sanctions against WMD proliferating states will also be 
an important policy tool for its pursuit of non-proliferation strategy (Council on 
Foreign Relations, December 2002).  
 
In this context, it seems important to remember that a hegemon defines the rules and 
norms to control the international system. The difference of US‟s perception of WMD 
                                                                                                                                            
acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as 
threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; 4) sponsor terroris m around 
the globe; 5) reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands” 
(citation from “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House, 
September 17, 2002). 
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proliferation between the Cold War era and the post-Cold War era indicates that the 
US recognises that security environment of the post-Cold War era is different from 
that of the Cold War era. This means that the US needs to redefine the rules and 
norms to be suitable for controlling the post-Cold War era. Therefore, as discussed 
earlier, the US describes the development of WMD as a threat to global security 
because of the possibility of actual use of WMD by rogue state or terrorists. Moreover, 
it explains its plan to pressure other states to accept its non-proliferation policy as a 
global norm. Eventually, it expresses its willingness to create further procedures 
which might be essential to stop the spread of WMD at the global level. Thus, it 
seems possible to say that the US‟s perception of WMD and its policy options in the 
post-Cold War era might well demonstrate the US‟s status as a rule maker in the 
existing international system. 
 
The US’s perception of North Korea’s nuclear threat and its strategy against North 
Korea 
 
The US‟s policy position towards WMD proliferation led it to identifying North 
Korea‟s nuclear programme as an urgent issue to be solved immediately. The US 
categorised a nuclear threat into three different types - “immediate, potential or 
unexpected” (Global Security, December 31, 2001) contingencies. Immediate 
contingencies refer to “well- recognized current dangers” (Global Security, December 
31, 2001) such as Iraqi aggression in Middle East, a North Korean threat on the 
Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan issue. Potential contingencies mean “plausible, but 
not immediate dangers.” (Global Security, December31, 2001) For example, if a new 
military association against the US or its allies become apparent and it has WMD, this 
can be categorised into potential contingencies. Unexpected contingencies are 
“sudden and unpredicted security challenges.” (Global Security, December31, 2001) 
The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 can be a historical example of this category. A 
sudden regime change which may result in obtaining of existing WMD facilities by a 
new, hostile leadership group can also be an example of unexpected contingencies. 
North Korea, along with Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya21, was viewed as one of the states 
                                                 
21
 Libya is off this list now because Libya agreed to dismantle its nuclear programme in December 
2003.  
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that could be engaged in “immediate, potential, or unexpected” contingencies (Global 
Security, December 31, 2001). 
 
With respect to a nuclear threat from North Korea, the US described it as “immediate 
contingencies.” (Global Security, December 31, 2001) The US‟s classification of 
North Korea‟s nuclear threat basically comes from its view of the North Korean 
regime. US perception of the North Korean regime was clearly demonstrated through  
US President Bush‟s address on the State of the Union in January 2002. 
 
US President Bush stated then that North Korea, Iran, Iraq, along with those who are 
suspected of being their terrorist allies, constitute an “axis of evil” because these 
countries were threatening the US and its allies‟ security with WMD. Bush also 
indicated that these states created a grave and growing danger not only because they 
could use WMD either to blackmail the US or threaten its allies, but also because they 
could support terrorists by offering WMD (Bush, January 29, 2002).  
 
“Axis of evil” is a term which was initiated by US President Bush in his State of the 
Union Address on January 29, 2002. By using the term “axis of evil”, US President 
Bush described states which were suspected of supporting terrorism and seeking 
WMD. In his speech, US President Bush stated that “our [second] goal is to prevent 
regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with 
weapons of mass destruction. … States like these [North Korea, Iran and Iraq], and 
their terrorist allies, constitute and axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the 
world.” (Bush, January 29, 2002) 
 
Reactions from Iran, Iraq and North Korea22 
 
US President Bush‟s announcement of an axis of evil brought about strong opposition 
from countries named as a part of the axis of evil. For example, responding to US 
                                                 
22  Iraq‟s reaction was quite d ifferent from those of Iran and North Korea. Soon after Bush‟s 
characterisation of Iraq as part of the axis of evil, Iraqi government suggested a dialogue with United 
Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to discuss the implementation regarding its WMD programmes. 
This offer was interpreted as an effort by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to initiate international 
opposition to US‟s military action against Iraq (Schmemann with Tyler, February 5, 2002).  
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President Bush‟s description of Iran as part of the axis of evil, the Iranian President 
Khatami asserted that Iran itself had been suffered from terrorism and WMD, and that 
anti-terrorism had been Iran‟s official security strategy (Fathi, February 1, 2002). 
Moreover, the Iranian supreme religious leader Khamenei named the US as “the 
world‟s greatest evil” (Fathi, February 1, 2002). The Iranian leaders claimed that the 
US‟s perception of itself as a ruler of the world threatened Iran‟s national security 
because the US tried to divide the world into followers and opponents in order to 
pressure objectors to its policy (Macfarquhar, February 12, 2002).  
 
In particular, for North Korea, US President Bush‟s speech was regarded as proof of 
the US‟s offensive policy towards itself. North Korea perceived that the US would go 
to war in the Korean Peninsula rather than resume a dialogue with it. According to the 
Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Bush‟s description of North Korea as one of 
the axis of evil proved the US goal “to seize the DPRK by force of arms after 
designating it as the second target of “anti-terrorism war”” (KCNA, February 2, 2002). 
Furthermore, North Korea argued that “his [Bush‟s] outburst is little short of a 
declaration of war against the DPRK, and this may once again bring the military 
situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war” (KCNA, February 2, 2002). 
According to KCNA, the US‟s secret operation plan indicating the possibility of pre-
emptive nuclear strike by the US increased North Korea‟s fear of the US nuclear 
attack on its territory. Responding to the US pre-emptive strategy, North Korea 
emphasised its right to build up military capability for self defence (KCNA, March 13, 
2002). 
 
2.3.1.2. US multilateralism and the North Korean nuclear issue 
 
US consideration of the North Korean nuclear programme as a regional issue 
 
Despite the existence of a bilateral confrontation with North Korea, the US 
persistently maintained its policy position that it regarded the North Korean nuclear 
issue not as a bilateral one, but as a regional one. For instance, the former US 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, reported to the Congress that “it is a regional 
problem and affects more than the United States. It affects China. It affects Russia. It 
affects Japan. It affects South Korea. It affects other nations in the region.” (Powell, 
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February 11, 2003) US President Bush re-emphasised the US perception of the North 
Korean issue as a regional one. He stated that “this is … a regional issue because 
there‟s a lot of countries that have got a direct stake into whether or not North Korea 
has nuclear weapons. We‟ve got a stake as to whether North Korea has a nuclear 
weapon. China … South Korea… Japan … Russia has a stake.” (Bush, March 6, 
2003) Bush also stressed regional nations‟ responsibility along with the US‟s role in 
establishing a multilateral framework to deal with the issue.23 
 
In other words, the US believed that the North Korean nuclear programme is a serious 
threat to regional stability in Northeast Asia as well as to a global security. The US 
assumed that it may result in not only a nuclear arms race, but also a deterioration of 
economic prosperity in the region. Furthermore, the US acknowledged that it was 
essential for the US to act together with regional actors in order to realise a lasting 
resolution for the nuclear issue. 
 
US multilateral approach to the North Korean nuclear issue 
 
The US‟s perception defining the North Korean nuclear issue as a regional one 
implied that the US was eager to deal with the issue through a multila teral context 
rather than a bilateral negotiation with North Korea. Why did the US attempt to set up 
multilateral format to handle the nuclear issue? As mentioned above, the US considers 
the North Korean nuclear programme not only as a threat to US interests, but also as a 
threat to the international community. That is, the US regards the North Korean 
nuclear issue not as a bilateral issue, but as an issue of international and multilateral 
interest. This encouraged the US to establish positive relations with its neighbours and 
allies, to find a resolution to the issue (Armitage, February 4, 2003).  
 
In more detail, the reason for the US pursuit of a multilateral approach is that firstly, it 
assumed that the 1994 Agreed Framework (AF) proved that it was easier for North 
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 In the theoretical literature, multilateralis m refers to “an institutional form that coordinat es relations 
among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.” (Ruggie, 1993: 11) In the 
practice, the term „multilateralis m‟ is one of key notions which hegemony explo its when it supervises 
the international system. This is because, as John Agnew points out, hegemony “involves more than 
simple military and economic coercion and relies on active assent and cooperation.” (Agnew, 2003: 
874) Thus, the US mult ilateralism can be considered as one of hegemonic cooperation under a 
hegemonic power structure (For details, see Agnew, 2003: see also Beeson and Higgot, 2005).  
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Korea to violate its commitments under the AF because it was a bilateral negotiation. 
The US expected that under a multilateral framework including North Korea‟s 
neighbouring states, it would be more difficult for North Korea to step back from its 
commitments because doing so may enforce North Korea to pay more expensive price 
such as further international and regional isolation (Kelly, March 12, 2003). 
 
Secondly, the US perceived that it is difficult for state actors alone to carry out the 
task to disarm North Korea‟s nuclear capabilities, and that would be necessary for 
international institutions such as IAEA and the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) to be involved as important players. In particular, the US demanded that 
North Korea‟s commitments under the NPT should be pursued because it worried that 
“if North Korea gains from its violations, others may conclude that the violation route 
is cost free.” (Kelly, March 12, 2003).  
 
Finally, the US expected that the regional actors in Northeast Asia – China, Japan, 
Russia and South Korea – all agreed on the establishment of a nuclear free Korean 
Peninsula, and that all of North Korea‟s immediate neighbours wanted to solve this 
issue in a peaceful manner through consultation and engagement policy (Kelly, March 
12, 2003). 
 
North Korea’s attitude 
 
At this stage, unlike the US‟s multilateral approach, North Korea persistently 
maintained that the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula should be settled through a 
bilateral negotiation between the US and the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK). While the US conducted its policy review towards the DPRK, North Korea 
tried to pressure the US into implementating its commitments under the 1994 Agreed 
Framework such as diplomatic normalisation between the US and North Korea. 
 
North Korea‟s response to the US policy review was firstly guided by its emphasis on 
the need for US implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea 
stressed that the only way to solve the US concern over its security would be to 
develop the US-North Korea relationship in the direction of reconciliation and 
cooperation. Therefore, North Korea constantly claimed that the US should 
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implement its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework calling for 
simultaneous actions from both sides. For example, North Korea asked the US to 
resume the provision of heavy fuel oil (HFO) and not to delay the construction of 
Light Water Reactor (LWR) for North Korea‟s power generation (KCNA, February 
22, 2001). 
 
North Korea perceived the Bush administration‟s policy review as an initiation of its 
hostile policy towards North Korea. This was because the Bush government 
emphasised that its engagement policy would be different from that of the Clinton 
administration. 24  North Korea regarded the purpose of the Bush administration‟s 
policy review as US hostile policy to disarm North Korea‟s nuclear programme 
without taking necessary steps such as the US-DPRK diplomatic normalisation, which 
were expected under the 1994 Agreed Framework (KCNA, February 22, 2001). 
 
Since North Korea regarded US policy as an attempt to disarm itself rather than as a 
real effort to discuss the nuclear issue, it rejected US proposal for resuming dialogue. 
Instead of accepting the conclusion of the Bush administration‟s policy review, North 
Korea insisted on the implementation of the 1994 AF including the provision of LWR 
to itself.  (KCNA, June 18, 2001). North Korea persistently insisted that a bilateral 
discussion of practical problems related to the implementation of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework would be a starting point for North Korea to consider the resumption of 
the US-North Korea dialogue. North Korea asked the Bush administration to revert to 
the previous US position taken by the Clinton administration (KCNA, June 18, 2001; 
KCNA, October 23, 2001). 
 
What were the reasons for North Korea to hold a bilateral dialogue with the US? 
North Korea pointed out two reasons for it to oppose multilateralisation of the issue. 
Firstly, it indicated that the North Korean nuclear issue emerged as the US unilaterally 
                                                 
24
 In the mid 1990s, the Clinton admin istration attempted to settle down North Korea‟s nuclear 
ambition. In 1994, the US and North Korea adopted the Geneva Agreed Framework, which was 
considered as the complete solution of the North Korean nuclear issue. According to the Agreed 
Framework, in exchange for North Korea‟s abandonment of its nuclear ambit ion, the US promised to 
offer North Korea polit ical and economic advantages such as diplomat ic normalisation between the US 
and North Korea, and the provision of two light water reactors for the purpose of electricity generation. 
Nevertheless, the Bush admin istration was critically sceptical to the effectiveness of the Clinton 
administration‟s engagement policy. This led the Bush admin istration to reviewing its general policy  
towards North Korea (for details, see Yun, 2005).  
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refused to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework and therefore the US should be 
blamed for the nuclear issue. Secondly, it also asserted that the IAEA had been 
operating as a mere political tool of US non-proliferation policy rather than as a fair 
and reliable international institution and therefore there was no evidence to justify a 
multilateral approach to deal with the nuclear issue.  Minju Joson, the North Korean 
News Paper, obviously rejected the idea of “multilateral talks” by saying that “[t]he 
nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is a bilateral issue to be settled between the 
DPRK and the United States from the view-points of its origin, the circumstances of 
its outbreak, its nature and the truth of the present crisis.” (KCNA, February 5, 2003a; 
KCNA, February 5, 2003b). 
 
With rebuffing any kind of multilateral talks, North Korea repeatedly insisted that the 
nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula should be settled through a face to face 
bilateral negotiation between the US and North Korea. The reason for North Korea to 
call for direct talks with the US was that North Korea perceived the US call for 
multilateral talks as a tactic to strengthen the international pressure upon North Korea. 
North Korea, therefore, persistently argued that the best way to solve the nuclear issue 
on the Korean Peninsula must be direct talks between the US and the DPRK to 
conclude a non-aggression treaty (KCNA, February 28, 2003; KCNA, March 18, 
2003; KCNA, March 23, 2003). 
 
2.3.1.3. North Korea‟s nuclear ambition as a threat to the NPT regime 
 
As examined above, the US perceived North Korea‟s nuclear armament not only as a 
threat to its own national security, but also as a threat to global security. The US 
categorised the North Korean nuclear issue as an imperative concern to be settled 
immediately (Global Security, December 31, 2001) and named the North Korean 
regime as one of the axis of evil threatening the world with WMD (Bush, January 29, 
2002). By designating the North Korean nuclear issue as a threat to global security, 
the US successfully positioned the nuclear issue as a threat to the nuclear non-
proliferation regime (NPT regime). In particular, when North Korea‟s covert highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) programme was disclosed, this was considered as a violation 
of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards as well as a breach of the 1994 AF (Bluth, 2005).  
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Following US identification of the North Korean threat as being in breach of the NPT, 
the NPT regime required North Korea to accept its regulation. For example, on 6 
January 2003, IAEA adopted a resolution demanding North Korea to take necessary 
steps for international inspection and to abandon its nuclear programme in a verifiable 
manner (IAEA, 6 January 2003).  
 
North Korea, however, reacted assertively to the international community‟s demand.  
Soon after the IAEA resolution was passed, North Korea declared its withdrawal from 
the NPT. According to a statement of the DPRK government, the IAEA resolution 
deeply hampered its sovereignty. In addition to this, North Korea insisted that the 
IAEA resolution proved that the IAEA was merely a tool to serve US‟s interest, and 
the NPT operationalised US hostile policy towards North Korea and therefore there 
was no reason for North Korea to be bound to the NPT. North Korea announced its 
immediate withdrawal from the NPT, and that it would be free from the binding force 
of the IAEA safeguards against proliferation (KCNA, January 10, 2003). 
 
Where North Korea‟s motives for its withdrawal from the NPT are concerned, it 
seems possible to understand it thus: North Korea tried to have workable options for 
itself in case the 1994 Agreed Framework collapsed and the security circumstances on 
the Korean Peninsula relapsed. In other words, North Korea seemed to leave itself 
either an option which might allow it to restart the nuclear weapons programme or 
another option which might be useful to establishing a new diplomatic negotiation to 
guarantee its regime survival by using the HEU programme (Wit, 2003).  
 
This “hedging strategy” (Wit, 2003) might have been enforced by the Bush 
administration‟s policy review towards North Korea because the Bush 
administration‟s reluctance to normalise diplomatic relations with North Korea made 
North Korea pursue alternatives in case the 1994 AF failed. The withdrawal from the 
NPT allowed North Korea to enjoy a set of opportunities. North Korea could make a 
choice either of seeking the possibility of realising a political solution or going 
nuclear first and then rejoining the negotiating table (Wit, 2003). 
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2.3.2. The establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
 
The centerpiece of the US pressure strategy on the Axis of Evil, and North Korea in 
particular, was the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The Bush administration 
believed that its non-proliferation strategy should refocus on disabling the trade routes 
of nuclear-related materials rather than dealing with proliferators politically. This new 
strategy was considered not as “non-proliferation,” but as “counter-proliferation”. PSI 
was designed to stop trading WMD, their delivery systems and related material 
(Bolton, September 7, 2004). 
 
With respect to the purpose of PSI exercise, the US noted that PSI was designed not 
to point at any particular country, but to target would-be proliferators (Bolton, 
October 27, 2004). Nevertheless, at the same time, the US identified North Korea as a 
proliferator causing an obvious threat to Northeast Asia‟s regional stability and 
asserted that PSI exercise must be an effective control for cutting off any proliferation 
network which included North Korea (Bolton, October 19, 2004).  
 
According to US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, John 
Bolton, it was evident that North Korea was one of the world‟s leading proliferator of 
missiles and nuclear materials to other rogue states. He indicated that rogue states like 
North Korea must understand the message from the PSI exercise: “Get out of the 
proliferation business or risk having your cargoes of terror interdicted, regardless of 
whether you ship them by land, by air, or by sea.” (Bolton, September 7, 2004). 
 
This section will examine the PSI under three headings. First, it will explore the 
overall development of the PSI. It will begin with a background of the development of 
the idea of the PSI. After that, it will make it clear what the PSI is and summarise 
recent developments. Second, it will study the responses of the relevant states in the 
region to the PSI. Third, the implication of the PSI as a non-proliferation measure in 
relation to North Korea will be considered.  
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2.3.2.1. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)  
 
What is the PSI? 
 
The PSI was first announced on 31 May 2003 by US President Bush to stop the 
spread of WMD. He stated in his speech at Krakow in Poland that the US and a 
number of its close allies “have begun working on new agreements to search planes 
and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies” 
(Bush, May 31, 2003). The coalition will be expected “as broadly as possible to keep 
the worlds‟ most destructive weapons away from … shores and out of the hands of … 
common enemies” (Bush, May 31, 2003). 
 
On June 12, 2003, 11 countries met in Madrid, Spain, and agreed to improve 
intelligence sharing and to begin training their militaries to intercept shipments that 
are suspected of carrying WMD and other illegally traded arms. The 11 PSI 
participating countries are the US, the United Kingdom, Spain, Australia, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal (Efron and Demick, June 
12, 2003).25 
 
Purposes of the PSI 
 
The PSI is the outcome of US efforts to develop another engagement to stop the 
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. At the Kananaskis G-8 Summit, 
held June 26-27, 2002, the US and other G-8 leaders agreed to a new partnership to 
block the proliferation of WMD and related materials and technology. In accordance 
with this, they also adopted the principle of preventing terrorists or terrorism 
sponsoring states from obtaining or building up WMD weapons and technology 
(White House, June 26, 2002). The US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, issued in December 2002, also stressed that “[e]ffective 
interdiction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery 
means.” (White House, December 2002, p.2) Thus, in general terms, the objective of 
the PSI is “to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing 
                                                 
25
 More members have joined since 2003. The number of the PSI members is now almost 100.  
 71 
proliferation to or from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.” 
(USINFO) 
 
Besides a common goal, however, there was another motive behind US promotion of 
the PSI in May 2003. It was reported that the PSI was a tough US reaction to the 
December incident in 2002 in which the US and Spain stopped, but later released a 
shipment of 15 Scud missiles headed from North Korea to Yemen, because of the 
absence of the international law to prohibit the shipment (Kralev, June 5, 2003). 
Moreover, it seems obvious that the escalation of nuclear confrontation between the 
US and North Korea in 2003 increased US motivation for the idea of the PSI.  
 
Four days after US President Bush‟s declaration of the new US policy, US Under 
Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, gave more details 
on the idea of the PSI. In his testimony before the House International Relations 
Committee, John Bolton stated that the purpose of the PSI is “to work with other 
concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the 
air, and on land … It envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing 
their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, 
military and other tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD-and missile-
related equipment and technologies.” (Bolton, June 4, 2003) He also added the point 
that “[the U.S.] aim ultimately not just to prevent the spread of WMD, but also to 
eliminate or “roll back” such weapons from rogue states and terrorist group that 
already possess them or are close to doing so.” (Bolton, June 4, 2003) 
 
With respect to the North Korean nuclear programme, John Bolton affirmed that 
“North Korea‟s nuclear weapons ambitions also present a grave threat to regional and 
global security and a major challenge to the international non-proliferation regime.” 
This is because “North Korea‟s uranium enrichment and plutonium programs and its 
failure to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement undermine the non-
proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea‟s international 
obligations.” (Bolton, June 4, 2003) 
 
Furthermore, John Bolton stated that the US should pay attention to the possibilities 
of North Korea‟s producing and then exporting fissile material or weapons to other 
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rogue states and terrorists. He reminded the committee of the episode in December 
2002 and considered the interception of the shipments in early 2003, which was 
suspicious of delivering aluminium tubes likely bound for North Korea‟s nuclear 
weapons programme, as a successful example of coalition efforts (Bolton, June 4, 
2003). 
 
Interdiction Principles 
 
In September 2003, 11 countries agreed to and published the PSI Statement of 
Interdiction Principles. According to a „Statement of Interdiction Principles‟, the PSI 
is described as “a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials 
worldwide.” (USINFO) The principles recommend four specific policies: 1) 
undertaking measures to interdict the transport or transfer o f WMD and related 
materials “to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern”; 2) 
implementation of procedures for information exchange in such cases; 3) participants‟ 
responsibility to build up applicable legal measures; 4) undertaking such actions as 
boarding and searching ships or requiring aircraft in transit to land for inspection 
(USINFO). 
 
Exercises – actual seizure operations 
 
Since the establishment of the PSI, a number of maritime exercises have been 
conducted by the participants. More significantly, there are several examples of actual 
seizure operations under the PSI interdiction principles.  
 
An apparent PSI operation was accomplished in October 2003. The interception of a 
German flagged vessel en route to Libya revealed a shipment of uranium enrichment 
components (Younge, January 2, 2004). This operation of the PSI helped persuade 
Libya to abandon its nuclear ambition in December 2003 (Richardson 2004).  
 
In relation to the North Korean case, it is notable that North Korean ships and aircraft 
have been listed as possible vessels of interest by the US although no individual state 
has been identified as a possible target for the PSI. Even if only indirectly related to 
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the North Korean WMD programme, the capture of North Korea flagged vessel (The 
Bong Su – it was suspected of delivering drugs off the coast of Australia) in May 
2003 was a successful example of the actual seizure operations. Another good 
example might be an interdiction of aluminium components and sodium cyanide in 
early 2003, which were expected for North Korea‟s WMD programme. Bolton 
emphasised that these cases increased the necessity of the idea of the PSI (Bolton, 
June 4, 2003) 
 
2.3.2.2. Responses to the PSI 
 
On the day the established of the PSI was declared by US President Bush, leaders at 
the Evian G-8 Summit announced their commitment to the combat against the threat 
of nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran. They urged North Korea to “visibly, 
verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs.” (White House, 
June 2, 2003) However, it seems more important to examine responses to the PSI of 
the countries concerned in Northeast Asia.  
 
China 
 
Originally China was against the idea of the PSI. In particular, China expressed its 
concern over US proposal to intercept ships suspected of carrying WMD-related 
materials on the high seas. China maintained that a diplomatic approach might be a 
best option to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. It warned that the pre-emptive 
actions through the PSI would generate a serious situation which might lead to 
possible war between countries in the region (Goodenough, July 16, 2003).  
 
China remained reluctant to join the PSI coalition because of its doubt about the 
impact of the measures which the PSI participants would use. On December 4, 2003, 
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, stated that China had “some 
concerns about the legitimacy, effectiveness and possible consequences of the 
interception.” (Liu, December 4, 2003) 
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South Korea 
 
Although the Republic of Korea expressed its approval of the idea, South Korea did 
not take part in PSI meetings. While the US urged that “South Korea should take part 
in the U.S.-led, global non-proliferation efforts to thwart the spread of chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons by intercepting ships,” (Korea Times, August 6, 
2003) South Korea was unwilling to join the PSI exercise because it needed to take 
into account “the unique circumstances on the Korean Peninsula.” (Korea Times, 
August 6, 2003) Instead of taking part in the PSI exercise, South Korea justified its 
reluctance to join the PSI by stating that “we will decide on activities to be taken in 
the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula in accordance with our relevant 
domestic laws, including the South-North Agreement on Maritime Transportation, 
and international law.” (MOFAT, November 15, 2006)  
 
Japan 
 
Japan was the first country in East Asia to participate in the PSI. On June 15, 2003, in 
Madrid the idea of the PSI was approved by eleven nations – the US Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Australia and Japan (Global 
Security, “Proliferation Security Initiative”). Japan‟s Coast Guard contributed to the 
first naval exercises – “Pacific Protector” – conducted under the PSI on September 13, 
2003 (Global Security, “Pacific Protector”).  
 
Japan‟s position is that it seems necessary to contribute to maintaining international 
stability by taking effective measures regarding export and import control of nuclear 
weapons-related materials. In particular, Japan is willing to actively engage into the 
PSI to stop nuclear proliferation in Asia (MOFA, August 2004).  
 
Russia 
 
The Russian Federation had not joined the PSI originally. Russia worried that pre-
emptive actions under the PSI might not be consistent with international legal norms 
ensuring safe passage through high seas and airspace. However, Russia‟s response to 
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the PSI changed. On May 31, 2004, Russia finally joined the US-led Proliferation 
Security Initiative (Boese 2004).  
 
Originally Russia was reluctant to join the PSI because it concerned that the PSI 
would allow US unilateral action against ships and planes without international legal 
authority (Radyuhin, January 31, 2004). However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation stated on 1 June 2004 that “the principles for the Pro liferation 
Security Initiative … correspond to the Russian line in the field of non-proliferation”. 
(Kaliadine, p. 6) The Russian side stated its intention “to make its contribution to  
implementing the PSI with consideration for the compatibility of the actions with the 
rules of international law, for their conformance to national legislation and for 
commonality of non-proliferation interests with their partners.” (Kaliadine, p. 6) 
 
North Korea 
 
In response to the PSI, North Korea interpreted the US-led pre-emptive interdiction as 
a strategy of blockade against it. For example, the KCNA stated that the US campaign 
was an unreasonable barrier of “the routine service of DPRK-flagged trading vessels 
under various pretexts. This hostile act is, in fact, little short of sea blockade against 
the DPRK.” (KCNA, June 18, 2003) 
 
On April 12, 2004, North Korea strongly criticised the PSI, blaming that “[t]he 
"proliferation security initiative" touted by the Bush group only brings to light the 
arbitrary motives of the nuclear warmongers to deter other countries from having 
military deterrents for self-defence and dominate the world with nukes as they 
please.” (KCNA, April 12, 2004) 
 
2.3.2.3. The PSI and International Law 
 
The PSI is the result of US strategy to build up international coalition in order to 
prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The PSI is focused on 
pre-emptive interdiction of ships, aircraft, and vehicles suspected of carrying WMD-
related materials to and from countries of proliferation concern when they enter PSI 
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participating country territories, territorial waters, or airspace (Global Security, 
“Proliferation Security Initiative”).  
 
However, as mentioned before, under current international norms, it is not allowed for 
any state to stop flagged ships in high seas. 26  Under the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the state which grants a ship to sail 
under its flag has the exclusive right to exercise legislative and enforcement 
jurisdiction over its ships on the high seas (UNCLOS 1982).  
 
Thus, the US has attempted to expand application of the PSI interdiction principle to a 
wider range. The US has claimed that it has authority to take interdiction actions on 
the high seas and in international air space based on the right of self-defence 
(Sheridan, July 9, 2003). 
 
In September 2003, US President Bush proposed to the United Nations (UN) that a 
resolution effectively supporting the PSI programme should be passed. On April 28, 
2004, the UNSC accepted the Resolution 1540, which requires all states to take steps 
to prevent the trafficking on WMD and their means of delivery (UNSC Resolution 
1540, April 28, 2004). Nevertheless, the Resolution 1540 could not disregard 
individual state‟s sovereignty. While the UNSC Resolution reaffirms that WMD 
proliferation is a “threat to international peace and security” and asks all states to 
strengthen their commitment to the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, it also 
emphasises that the principal aim of the Resolution is to prevent trafficking by “non-
state actors.” (United Nations Press release SC/8076, April 4, 2004) 
 
2.3.3. The Banco Delta Asia issue 
 
It seems obvious that the US has developed two track tactics in dealing with the North 
Korean nuclear issue. On the dialogue side, the US has utilised a multilateral 
approach to realise the nuclear disarmament of North Korea in a peaceful manner. On 
the pressure side, the US has directly compelled North Korea to accept its demand – 
                                                 
26
 On December 9, 2002, a Spanish warship intercepted the North Korean-owned freighter, So San, 
carrying 15 Scud missiles to Yemen in  the Arabian Sea, but released due to lack of the authority under 
international law (See Peter Speigel, James Harding, and Mark Huband, “US releases cargo ship found 
with 15 Scuds,” Financial Times, December 12, 2002).  
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that is, complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea‟s nuclear 
facilities. 
 
On September 19, 2005, the fourth round of the Six Party Talks delivered a joint 
statement which was supposed to be a guideline on the principles that might 
peacefully end the second North Korean nuclear crisis. 27 Nevertheless, while the Joint 
Statement was being discussed, the US was preparing another tool to pressure North 
Korea. 
 
On 15 September 2005, the US informed the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) 
that BDA should make a choice either to terminate its dealings with North Korea or 
losing access to US financial markets. The US claimed that the crackdown was simply 
due to an ongoing investigation regarding counterfeiting of the US notes by North 
Korea (Unknown, September 15, 2005).28 
 
It may seem that the BDA issue is not very relevant to the North Korean nuclear issue. 
However, the case can be regarded as a remarkable use of the Section 311 of the USA 
(United States of America) Patriot Act to prevent rogue states and state sponsors of 
terrorism from exploiting the international financial system. 29 So, it is necessary to 
examine how the BDA issue has been understood by commentators. This section will 
firstly explore the process of the BDA issue. It will also investigate into North 
Korea‟s reaction. Eventually, the implications of the BDA issue will be considered in 
terms of US hegemony. 
 
From the beginning to the settlement of the BDA issue 
 
Along with the key issue of the North Korean nuclear issue, the first session of the 
fifth round of the Six Party Talks also discussed the BDA issue because North Korea 
claimed that the issue of BDA would make it step back from the Six Party Talks.  
                                                 
27
 For the details of the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, see McCormack, S. (September 19, 
2005). 
28
 The US froze about $24 million North Korean funds in a bank in  Macao due to suspicions of money 
laundering and the counterfeiting of US dollars by North Korea.  
29
 The USA Patriot Act, Section 311 authorises the Treasury Department to designate foreign financial 
institutions that are of primary money laundering concern. For details, see The USA Patriot Act (H.R. 
3162). 
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In relation to the Macao bank issue, the US maintained that this was not an issue for 
the Six Party Talks. However, it tried to justify its position by saying that it was 
normal procedure to inspect the financial transactions of the countries involved in 
manufacturing WMD. It also stated that although the BDA issue was not directly 
related to the nuclear issue, North Korea should stop engaging in illegal activities 
such as money laundering (Hill, November 11, 2005).  
 
While the US insisted that the issue of BDA was not on the agenda of the nuclear 
negotiations, North Korea pointed to the issue of BDA as an obstacle to making 
progress in the talks. The head of the North Korean delegations, Kim Gye-Gwan, 
claimed that the BDA issue should be solved first not only because the financial 
sanctions on DPRK were in defiance of the tenets of the September 19 Joint 
Statement in 2005, but also because it would hamper the achievement of progress that 
the six parties had made in the Joint Statement (China View, November 11, 2005).  
 
The debate over the BDA issue sent the Six Party Talks into a deep freeze. The US 
persistently claimed that it would not discuss the issue of BDA with North Korea 
because there should be talks on the nuclear issue in the six party framework. The US 
asserted that it had the legal right to control other illegal actions such as counterfeiting 
by any actors (McCormack, December 1, 2005). Furthermore, the US denied the 
interrelation between the BDA issue and the nuclear issue. It claimed that they should 
be managed in a separate manner (BBC News, April 13, 2006).  
 
On the other hand, the BDA issue was considered by North Korea as an indicator of 
US violation of the tenets of the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005. In April 2006, 
the head of the North Korean delegations, Kim Kye-Gwan, announced that 
Pyongyang would not rejoin the Six Party Talks until the financial sanctions against 
North Korea were lifted. (BBC News, April 13, 2006). 
 
After a long break in the Six Party Talks, North Korea announced that it had made 
contact with the US and made a decision to return to the nuclear negotiations under 
the condition that the BDA issue would be resolved through a bilateral discussion 
between them within the context of the Six Party Talks (KCNA, November 1, 2006). 
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Prior to the resumption of the second session of the fifth round, the US and North 
Korea had bilateral talks on November 27-28, 2006, in Beijing. During the meetings, 
the US delegation Christopher Hill suggested a list of actions to be performed by 
North Korea, including a lock-down of North Korea‟s nuclear test site, a seal on the 
nuclear reactor in Yongbyun, North Korea‟s permission for an IAEA inspection, and 
its declaration of the details of the entirety of its nuclear-related programmes. In 
exchange for this, the US proposed that it could terminate financial sanctions against 
North Korea, along with the resumption of the provision of heavy fuel oil to North 
Korea would take steps towards diplomatic normalisation between the US and North 
Korea (Gross, January 15, 2007).  
 
During the second session of the fifth round, they also held separate bilateral talks 
alongside the nuclear negotiations to discuss the BDA issue. The US delegation 
headed by the US Treasury Departments deputy assistant secretary for terrorist 
financing and financial crimes, Daniel Glaser, and the North Korean delegation 
headed by the President of the DPRK‟s Foreign Trade Bank, O Kwang Chol, held 
separate meetings to deal with the financial issues resulting from the freezing of North 
Korean financial assets in the BDA in Macao. However, there were no any noticeable 
results from the talks. This was because there were no significant changes in basic 
policy positions of both sides. While the US claimed that the financial issue should be 
dealt with separately from the nuclear issue, North Korea mainta ined that the BDA 
issue was a major obstacle to the progress of the nuclear negotiations (Lague, 
December 19, 2006, The New York Times; China View, December 20, 2006). 
 
At this stage, it seems noteworthy that the US attempted to handle the BDA debate 
through bilateral talks with North Korea. Thus the US gave a demonstration of the 
power of its financial tools to coerce any potential proliferators of WMD or terrorism 
sponsoring regimes. Soon after US accusation of the bank, the BDA immediately 
curtailed its financial connection with North Korea. Furthermore, the US sent 
Treasury Department officials to China, Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, South Korea 
and Vietnam to persuade other banks not to trade with North Korea (Lague and 
Greenless, January 18, 2007). 
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For North Korea, the US allegations of the BDA meant not a mere freeze of its 
account, but this led to their system being unable to meet its foreign exchange needs. 
This was because US accusations not only blocked North Korea from the BDA, but 
also encouraged other financial institutions to cut back their dealings with North 
Korea in order to avoid exclusion from US financial markets. Thus, it became a top 
priority for North Korea to reconnect itself to the international financial system. At 
almost every meeting discussing the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea 
claimed that the US needed to end its financial sanction against itself before progress 
in the nuclear negotiations could be made (Lague and Greenless, January 18, 2007).  
 
As can be seen from the previous discussion, the debate over the financial issue 
caused a long break in the Six Party Talks. This might have led to the US holding 
bilateral meetings with North Korea to handle the BDA issue. 
 
From 16 to 18 January, 2007, in Berlin, Kim Kye-Gwan for North Korea and 
Christopher Hill for the US entered into their first direct dialogues outside the 
framework of the Six Party Talks. Regarding the meaning of the meetings, they gave 
different interpretations. The US viewed these meetings as preparatory talks ahead of 
the resumption of the next round of the Six Party Talks, while North Korea 
considered them to be the bilateral negotiations it had demanded for a long time (BBC 
News, January 19, 2007). During the meetings, the US officials from the Treasury 
Department held their own negotiations with North Korea to discuss the BDA issue. 
However, their interpretations of the outcome were also different. North Korea 
announced that the Berlin meeting took place “in a positive and sincere atmosphere 
and a certain agreement was reached there.” (KCNA, January 19, 2007). The US 
clarified that it would continue to maintain its financial sanctions against North Korea 
unless North Korea abandoned its entire nuclear programme. (Landler and Shanker, 
January 18, 2007, The New York Times). 
 
The first turning point appeared during the third session of the fifth round. As part of 
the agreement of 13 February 2007, it was agreed that North Korea would shut down 
its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and allow IAEA inspections within 60 days if the 
US lifted the BDA financial sanctions (FMPRC, February 13, 2007). 
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From the US side, the US Treasury Department announced its plan for resolving the 
financial dispute over the BDA issue by formally barring US financial institutions 
from dealing with the BDA (Xinhua, March 14, 2007). On 19 March 2007, the US 
accepted a North Korean proposal that would lead to the transfer of the frozen funds 
in BDA into North Korea‟s account at the Bank of China in Beijing (The Department 
of Treasury, March 19, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, North Korea persistently emphasised that it would commit to the 
February 13 agreement only when its funds in the BDA were unfrozen. After his visit 
to Pyongyang in March, 2007, IAEA Chief Mohamed ElBaradei informed that the 
DPRK was willing to accept nuclear inspections, but was waiting for the United 
States to lift its financial sanctions first (Xinhua, March 14, 2007).  On 19 March 
2007, head of the DPRK delegation Kim Kye-Gwan restated that North Korea would 
shut down its Youngbyon reactor if the BDA issue was resolved (Xinhua, March 19, 
2007). 
 
As a result of consultation between the US and North Korea, it was agreed that the 
money would be transferred to a North Korean account at the Bank of China. 
However, the Bank of China was hesitant about accepting the money from the BDA 
and this resulted in delays in transferring the frozen funds to North Korea (Reuters, 
March 22, 2007, The New York Times). The nuclear talks stalled again because North 
Korea refused to discuss the nuclear issue further until it received its money (Kerr, 
April, 2007). 
 
According to the head of Chinese delegation, Wu Dawei, the Bank of China was not 
confident that all the concerns that might be caused by handling the North Korean 
money had been solved. In particular, the Bank of China worried whether there was 
any risk to itself in accepting money from the BDA, which was accused of illegal 
activities by the US (Lague, March 23, 2007).  
 
On April 10, 2007, the Macanese authorities announced that all North Korea-related 
accounts frozen at BDA had been unblocked and therefore the US and other members 
of the Six Party Talks believed the BDA issue to have finally been resolved (Kaufman, 
April 10, 2007). The US expected that North Korea would then move forward to 
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implement its obligation under the February 13 agreement as the BDA issue was 
solved (McCormack, April 14, 2007). 
 
However, North Korea did not consider Macanese authorities‟ announcement as a 
solution to the BDA issue. Although North Korea acknowledged that Macanese 
authorities had unblocked its funds at the BDA, it announced that “[t]he DPRK 
remains unchanged in its will to implement the Feb. 13 agreement and will also move 
when the lifting of the sanction is proved to be a reality.” (KCNA, April 13, 2007). 
 
The situation moved forward as Russia agreed to play a role in transferring the 
unfrozen North Korean funds at the BDA to North Korea. Russia gave the US 
permission to use a private Russian bank to transfer North Korea‟s funds at BDA 
(Parameswaran, June 11, 2007). North Korea was then satisfied with the situation that 
the BDA issue had moved towards its final resolution. It therefore invited the IAEA 
inspectors to discuss “the procedures of the IAEA‟s verification and monitoring of the 
suspension of the operations of nuclear facilities at Nyongbyon under the February 13 
agreement.” (KCNA, June 16, 2007) The IAEA accepted the DPRK‟s invitation to 
discuss measures for verification and monitoring the freeze of the nuclear reactor at 
Yongbyon. (IAEA, June 18, 2007). 
 
Why did Russia get involved? Russia was unsatisfied with the situation that the 
nuclear talks were obstructed due to the delay in resolving the financial dispute 
(Lague, March 23, 2007). Thus, the Russian government made a decision to play a 
role in settling the BDA issue with the condition that the US would not take any 
action against the Russian bank which would be involved in transaction of North 
Korea‟s money (Parameswaran, June 11, 2007). 
 
Eventually, on 25 June, 2007, North Korea declared that the BDA issue was finally 
settled as it was able to use the funds frozen at BDA for its own purposes and so 
announced that it would conduct its part of the February 13 agreement in accordance 
with the principle of “action for action.” North Korea stated that it was prepared for a 
discussion on shutting down its nuclear facilities with the IAEA inspectors in 
Pyongyang (KCNA, June 25, 2007).  
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As the BDA issue was settled, the first step towards the dismantlement of the North 
Korean nuclear programme was begun. According to the IAEA Director General‟s 
report, the IAEA agency team led by Mr. Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General for 
Safeguards, arranged the modalities for monitoring and verification of the shutdown 
of the Yongbyon reactor during their visit to North Korea between 26 and 29 June, 
2007 (IAEA, July 3, 2007). 
 
Implications of the BDA issue 
 
It seems that the BDA issue was not immediately relevant to the nuclear talks. 
Nevertheless, the US was able to utilise the BDA issue as leverage to pressure North 
Korea to accept its demand – the disarmament of the North Korean nuclear capability. 
As discussed earlier, the BDA issue hindered the ongoing nuclear negotiations. Thus, 
apart from the usefulness of US tactic, it is necessary to examine what the purpose of 
the US was in terms of a hegemonic power structure.  
 
As David Lague and Donald Greenlees pointed out, US accusation of the BDA not 
only targeted the disconnection of North Korea‟s business with the Macanese bank, 
but also aimed at isolating North Korea from the US led- international banking system 
(January 18, 2007). So, it seems essential to explore the implications of the BDA 
issue in two different ways. 
 
Firstly, with respect to the BDA issue, it is notable that the US regarded the financial 
sanctions towards North Korea as one of its policy tools to manage all possible 
proliferation threat from North Korea. In particular, the US wanted to prevent North 
Korea from engaging in any kind of WMD materials trade. The US officials clarified 
that the financial dispute over the BDA was aimed at North Korea‟s black-market 
business related to WMD materials (Sanger, October 24, 2005).  
 
Secondly, the BDA issue illustrated the extent of US power which made the US able 
to exercise its financial power might against potential proliferators or states of 
sponsoring terrorism, in this case through cutting off the links between the Macanese 
bank and North Korea (Lague and Greenlees, January 18, 2007). This interpretation is  
much related to hegemonic dominance in the world economy. 
 84 
In reality, a hegemon‟s economic power means the capability to terminate commercial 
interaction. This is because discontinuation of access to trade, finance, or technology 
might be used as leverage for a powerful state to control over other states (Hirschman, 
1945). For a hegemon, its ability to dominate others through the mechanisms of 
market system helps it to maintain the international political economy. Furthermore, 
this also makes it possible for a hegemon to exercise its prevailing status (Gilpin, 
1987, Ch.3). 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the principal objective of this chapter 
was to observe whether the bilateral nuclear confrontation between the US and North 
Korea could be considered as an example that gives an explanation about the way 
global security operates under a hegemonic power structure. The other objective was 
to examine the appropriateness of the hypotheses of hegemonic stability theory in 
understanding the first stage of the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
 
In order to achieve these goals, this chapter looked at the following questions.  
1. Can the concept of security under a hegemonic power structure be applicable 
to an explanation of the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis?  
2. Is it appropriate to rationalise the security implications of the bilateral nuclear 
confrontation between the US and North Korea through the key hypotheses of 
the hegemonic stability theory? 
3. In addition to these, how can the implication of the BDA issue be interpreted 
regarding hegemonic structure? 
 
Therefore, the second part of this chapter examined the basic assumptions of the 
theory of hegemonic stability, based on the questions of what the concept of security 
was under a hegemonic power structure and of how a hegemon provided security to 
subordinate states. Following the shaping of the key hypotheses of hegemonic 
stability theory regarding the perception and provision of security, the subjects and 
cases to be examined were selected. 
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The third part of this chapter examined and analysed the selected cases and subjects as 
a test of the applicability of the notion of security under a hegemonic power structure 
to the actual progress of the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Following 
the analysis of respective cases, this section intends to create a set of ideas as a 
conclusion of this chapter. 
 
With respect to a hegemonic power structure, the literature has shown that firstly, 
historical examples of hegemonic structure such as the Pax Britannica in the 19 th 
century and the Pax Americana in the 20th century describe an international system of 
relative peace and security which were controlled by a predominant state with military 
superiority and economic supremacy.  
 
Secondly, the literature also demonstrates that in order for the structure of the 
international system to be a hegemonic order, there must be a single state which is 
strong enough in terms of both material resources and immaterial components. Put 
differently, to establish the hierarchy of the international system under a hegemonic 
power structure, it is necessary that a stabiliser state exists, which can force other 
states to follow the regulations that it creates based on its own interests and visions. In 
exchange for accepting hegemonic order, subordinate states can enjoy the certainty of 
the status quo being maintained by a hegemon. In other words, subordinate states 
benefit from the certainty of the status quo including a stable international political 
economy by accepting the existing international order. Whereas a hegemon takes 
advantage of its predominant status, subordinate states can avoid risk from the 
uncertainties of change through building up their security relationship with the 
leading power. 
 
Thirdly, regarding the certainty of the status quo, the literature has proved that the 
emergence of an unstable international political economy might threaten the certainty 
of the status quo and that therefore a hegemon needs to preserve the stability of the 
international political economy through the provision of the public goods such as an 
open market policy and reserve currency. 
 
Fourthly, as the literature has shown, a hegemon establishes a set of international 
regimes not only to create and control the international system in accordance with its 
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own interests, but also to encourage other states to contribute to the maintenance of 
the existing international order. By the given definition, regime refers to “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors‟ expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations” 
(Krasner, 1982: 186). This means that a hegemon shapes and defines rules and rights 
to protect the present international order through creating international regimes.  
 
Finally, the literature has described that the predominance of a single state in the 
international system constitutes hegemonic leadership which consists of material (for 
example, raw materials and sources of capital) and immaterial (such as prestige 
among states) factors. Hegemonic leadership may be exercised through either a 
benign model which allows free-riders or a tougher model which may exploit other 
states. 
 
In order to determine whether the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis fitted 
with the perception of security under a hegemonic power structure, the third part of 
this chapter explored key issues of the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
Three cases that have involved the US and North Korea as main actors were selected 
and examined. 
 
To begin with, the US‟s perception of WMD proliferation was examined. The US‟s 
policy position in dealing with the spread of WMD has significantly changed. During 
the Cold War, the US regarded the possession of WMD as an inevitable choice to 
prevent major war. 30  However, in the post-Cold War era, the US perceives the 
proliferation of WMD as a dangerous opportunity because of the probability of the 
use of WMD by terrorists, terrorism sponsoring states and the axes of evil states (Iran, 
Iraq and North Korea). Moreover, the US considers a nuclear threat from North Korea 
as an immediate one. Both the US‟s perception of WMD proliferation in the post-
Cold War era and its view of the North Korean nuclear programme led it to 
identifying North Korea as one of the „axes of evil‟ states because the US considered 
North Korea to be an actual trader in WMD-related materials. 
                                                 
30
 For example, there were a number of wars such as the Korean War and Vietnam War in the Cold 
War era. However, there was not any major war between Great Powers because of the deterrence of 
WMD. 
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The chapter went on to consider the Proliferation Security Initiatives. The PSI was 
first declared on 31 May 2003 by US President Bush. It was the  US‟s concern over 
North Korea‟s proliferation of WMD-related materials that made it establish and 
exercise the PSI. The US‟s experience of having to release North Korea‟s vessel 
carrying Scud missile in December 2002 strongly motivated the US to create a new 
type of international cooperation for preventing WMD proliferation by North Korea. 
Even if the US officially maintained that the PSI did not target any particular actor, 
the US officials stated that the goal of the PSI exercise was to prevent North Korea 
from trading WMD-related materials. A „Statement of Interdiction Principles‟ 
accepted by the participants encourages members of the PSI to supervise ships and 
aircrafts, which are suspected of delivering WMD-related material, in their respective 
territories. 
 
Finally, the Banco Delta Asia issue was investigated. On 15 September 2005, the US 
informed the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia that the BDA should make a choice 
either terminating its dealings with North Korea or losing access to US financial 
markets. Acceding to the US‟s demand, the BDA did freeze North Korea‟s assets in 
the bank. The US claimed that the issue of the BDA was not on the agenda of the 
nuclear talks, but was part of normal procedures to examine illegal transactions. 
Despite the US‟s announcement that the BDA issue was not a relevant part of the 
nuclear talks, the BDA issue significantly hindered the process of the nuclear 
negotiations for a long time because North Korea had stepped back from the nuclear 
talks. North Korea regarded the BDA issue as a US violation of the tenets of the 
September 19 Joint Statement in 2005. 
 
The examination of the empirical evidence suggests that there are a set of features that 
can characterise the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis as an example of a 
hegemonic power structure. Regarding the first hypothesis that a hegemon defines and 
imposes the rules and rights that shape its own behaviour and that of other states, the 
first case, an analysis of the Bush administration‟s perception of WMD, shows how a 
hegemon outlines rules and rights. For example, during the Cold War, the US 
considered the possession of WMD but only for „great powers‟, as an essential 
alternative to prevent major war between the Great Powers. However, in the post-
Cold War era, the US regards WMD as a possible military option by terrorists or 
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terrorism sponsoring states. In this regard, US President Bush designated North Korea, 
Iran and Iraq as the axes of evil and the US announced its pre-emptive strategy to 
handle WMD proliferation concerns. The Bush administration‟s declaration of its pre-
emptive strategy against rogue states and terrorists possessing WMD revealed its 
willingness and capability to control the international system by redefining the rules 
and norms. 
 
In relation to the second hypothesis that a hegemon creates and controls the network 
of political, economic and security relationships in the international system, the 
second case, the establishment and exercises of the Proliferation Security Initiative, 
demonstrates that the US as a hegemon creates and controls security relationships in 
the existing international system. According to a „Statement of Interdiction 
Principles,‟ the participants are expected to inspect vessels and aircrafts in their 
respect territories which are suspected of delivering WMD-related materials. 
Although the US asserted that the PSI focused on would-be proliferators, the US 
officials did not reject the idea that the PSI exercise aimed at stopping North Korea 
from trading WMD-related materials. Thus, it might be possible to say that the PSI 
issue proves the US‟s attempt to organise its subordinates under its hegemonic 
leadership through raising a global security issue of general concern. 
 
Finally, the Banko Delta Asia issue is very relevant to the third hypothesis that a 
hegemon supplies a stable international political economy. The BDA issue shows how 
the international financial system can be used by the leading power to compel 
subordinate states. The US pressured the Macao-based Banko Delta Asia to 
disconnect its financial business with North Korea in order to push North Korea to 
follow its rule. In this case, the US used its financial power to force two different 
actors. In the first place, the US pressured the BDA to make a decision between losing 
its access to US financial markets or terminating its dealings with North Korea. Thus, 
the US effectively expelled North Korea from the international financial system by 
disconnecting North Korea‟s access to the international banking system. Quite apart 
from the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of the US‟s tactic in this case, the BDA 
issue makes it obvious that economic sanction can be considered as one of the policy 
tools by a hegemon to exert its security interests. 
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What are the implications of these findings? First, with respect to the characteristics 
of the bilateral nuclear confrontation between the US and North Korea, it is 
appropriate to consider key assumptions of hegemonic stability theory as a theoretical 
tool to explain their respective perceptions of security under a hegemonic power 
structure. As this chapter has examined, key assumptions of the theory of hegemonic 
stability can be supported by a set of empirical evidence which illustrates key issues 
of the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
 
Moreover, this study demonstrates how the US as a hegemon sets up a security 
agenda and deals with it in the post-Cold War era. As discussed earlier, since the end 
of the Cold War the international security environment has been changed and the 
proliferation of WMD has emerged as a global threat. The US has created a new rule 
and norm to prevent WMD proliferation through indicating the possibility of use of 
WMD by terrorists, terrorism sponsoring states and the axes of evil states. It was the 
US‟s perception that has led the North Korean nuclear crisis to a bilateral 
confrontation at the first stage. 
 
In conclusion, as an answer to the questions explored in the introduction of this 
chapter, it might be possible to say that the notion of security under a hegemonic 
power structure can be used to explain the bilateral nuclear confrontation between the 
US and North Korea. It could also be considered that the key hypotheses of the 
hegemonic stability theory are applicable for explaining the security implications of 
the first phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis.  
 
However, this cannot explain all aspects of the North Korean nuclear crisis. So, it 
seems necessary to further explore different phases of the North Korean nuclear crisis 
through diverse security models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 90 
Chapter 3. A Concert of Powers 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Historical contextualisation of the second phase 
 
The second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis witnessed The United States 
(US) invasion of Iraq. This event led China to playing a proactive role in resolving the 
North Korean nuclear issue. China‟s diplomatic efforts created trilateral talks among 
the US, North Korea and China and this paved the way for coordination and 
consultation of the nuclear issue between the regional powers. Eventually, the six 
party framework including the US, North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and South 
Korea was established through diplomatic consultation.  
 
During the initial stage of the North Korean nuclear issue, Beijing‟s approach was to 
encourage two key actors – the US and North Korea – to negotiate the nuclear issue 
through a bilateral dialogue because it wanted to concentrate on its xiaokang strategy 
which aimed at promoting the economic growth of China. 31 However, the invasion of 
Iraq by the Bush administration encouraged Beijing to mediate the bilateral 
confrontation between the US and North Korea because China feared the breakout of 
war on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing performed a series of shuttle diplomacy 
missions to support initial trilateral talks between the US, North Korea and itself. 
China‟s new policy not only focused on dealing with the North Korean nuclear 
programme, but also intended to pressure the US working within a multilateral 
framework in order to avoid US unilateral action such as a pre-emptive strike on 
North Korean territory (Park, 2005). In other words, an immediate goal for China was 
to prevent the bilateral confrontation between the US and North Korea from 
escalating into a military one as in the same way that had happened in the case of Iraq. 
 
                                                 
31
 „Xiaokang strategy‟ means building a well-off society wherein “a majority of the Chinese population 
is middle class” (Park, 2005: 81) by increasing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In o rder to achieve 
this goal, China sets up three major objectives: “fostering a stable external political and security 
environment necessary for internal economic development; integrating China further into the 
international political and economic order to help secure stable markets … ; and developing broad and 
deep relations with the United States to eliminate the need for excessive military spending.” (Park, 
2005: 81-82) 
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The three-party talks were held on 23-25 April 2003 in Beijing to discuss a solution of 
the North Korean nuclear programme. The participants in the talks presented their 
official positions on the issue. In this sense, the meeting was significant, although no 
progress was made at this meeting. This is because the dialogue itself began to 
provide a diplomatic vehicle with which to control the North Korean nuclear issue 
(Bluth, 2005). 
 
As argued above, China‟s motive for engaging in the North Korean nuclear issue 
came from its fear of a drastic escalation of the bilateral confrontation between the US 
and North Korea which might bring about a war on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the 
second phase saw China‟s dominant role in setting up a multilateral framework to 
deal with the North Korean nuclear issue. For example, in addition to the trilateral 
talks, as an outcome of China‟s shuttle diplomacy, the first round of the Six Party 
Talks among the US, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea was held in 
Beijing on August 27-29, 2003. There was, however, no major breakthrough during 
the first round of the talks. Despite the fact that the first round of the talks provided a 
forum for an exchange of the principal positions of the participants, the six parties 
failed to agree on any kind of a joint statement due to the two major actors‟ very 
different positions. 
 
Nevertheless, compared with the earlier stage of the North Korean nuclear crisis, this 
phase shows at least two significant differences. First, the two principal actors – the 
United States (US) and the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – which 
had been confronting each other, accepted a multilateral format to deal with their 
respective security concerns. Second, this format included all of the major actors in 
the Northeast Asian region – China, Russia, both Koreas and Japan. Instead of further 
escalating the situation by means such as missile launches by North Korea or a pre-
emptive strike by the US against North Korea, the two principal actors decided to 
participate in multilateral talks. This means that both of them agreed that their 
respective security concerns would be adequately considered within a multilateral 
format. In addition to this, the other major actors - China, Japan, Russia and South 
Korea – also agreed to hold multilateral talks to deal with this specific security issue. 
This implied that they would accept potential restrictions through the multilateral 
format when they pursued their respective interests and policies surrounding the 
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second North Korean nuclear programme. Overall, the beginning of the first round of 
the Six Party Talks can be understood as the starting point of cooperation among the 
major actors in the region, at present, to deal with a specific security issue. 
 
Furthermore, it seems significant that the second phase also witnessed an 
intensification of the alliance system within the region, which operated alongside the 
six party framework. After The US invasion of Iraq, China performed a high level 
diplomacy on the North Korean side, while the US has initiated joint pressure against 
North Korea with its traditional allies – Japan and South Korea. 
 
In this regard, it seems true that North Korea could not expect unconditional support 
from its allies – China and Russia. However, where the nuclear issue was concerned, 
both China and Russia had a stake in seeking a diplomatic resolution. Thus, both 
countries were cooperative in dealing with the nuclear issue in so far that they tried to 
overcome obstacles to the negotiations. China conducted a set of shuttle diplomacy 
missions to solve disputes between the US and North Korea when the nuclear 
negotiations seemed stalled.32 Russia also encouraged North Korea to continue the 
nuclear talks, but blamed the US policy positions.33 
 
The evidence of alliance-based activity on the US side is much more evident than on 
the North Korean side though. In the first place, the US and its traditional allies – 
Japan and South Korea – were able to employ the Trilateral Coordination and 
Oversight Group (TCOG) to organise their policy cooperation among them (Boucher, 
November 27, 2001). Moreover, the US persuaded its allies through summit 
diplomacy to share policy options for managing the North Korean issue. As a result of 
this, the idea of complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) was 
supported by the US‟s allies (Embassy of the United States, May 14, 2003; Office of 
the Press Secretary, May 23, 2003). 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Details of this will be discussed in the section 3.3. Empirical Evidence.  
33
 For example, at the initial stage of the Six Party Talks, Chief Russian delegation Losyukov told the 
BBC: “A very  big d istance separates the positions of the DPRK and the USA. There is a perception 
among Russian diplomats that Washington ought to go the extra mile on certain  aspects to solve the 
problem” (BBC News Online, August 29, 2003).  
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The purpose of this chapter 
 
The security implications of the second stage of the North Korean nuclear crisis are 
frequently analysed within the framework of a concert of powers. First of all, it seems 
useful to explore Charles Perry and James Schoff‟s work in 2004 because their work 
offers an in-depth account of the security implications of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis around the possibility of the institutionalisation of the Six Party Talks. 
According to Perry and Schoff, it might be valuable to take into account the long term 
perspectives for the six party framework in tackling the issue of a security guarantee 
for North Korea. Thus, they suggest that “[a] key objective of policy makers in the 
region, therefore, should be to help prepare and equip the six party process with the 
tools it needs to play a constructive role as a guarantor of regional security.” (Perry 
and Schoff, 2004: 11) Perry and Schoff also emphasise the idea that the six party 
process may bring a more stable regional order for Northeast Asia. They raise the 
necessity of concert- like diplomacy to build up regional cooperation for both the 
dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme and North Korea‟s re-
engagement with the international community. Thus, Perry and Schoff conclude that 
“a concerted effort should be made to shore up the mechanism‟s capability in this 
regard.” (2004: 19) 
 
Another distinctive analysis considering the notion of a concert of powers can be seen 
in Jörn Dosch‟s work in 2006. Dosch suggests that it might be useful to conceptualise 
the term „multilateralism‟ in order to understand the six party processes dealing with 
the North Korean nuclear crisis. According to Dosch, the conceptualisation of the 
term multilateralism may provide the prospects for multilateralism as a basis for 
regional order in Northeast Asia (Dosch, 2006). He catergorises multilateralism into 
four different types of cooperation based on “the degree of institutionalization and the 
organization of inter-actor relations”: hegemonic cooperation, guided dialogue 
cooperation, concert-type cooperation, open dialogue cooperation (Dosch, 2006: 5). 
Hegemonic cooperation indicates “a type of multilateralism which is dominated by a 
hegemonic power.” (Dosch, 2006: 5) Concert-type cooperation on the other hand 
implies “policy-coordination among a group of states which perceive the need and 
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believe that they are entitled to create or guarantee order either with regard to the 
overall global system or specific policy areas.” (Dosch, 2006: 5)34 
 
With respect to the application of his concept of multilateralism, Dosch considers the 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), established under the 
tenets of the 1994 Agreed Framework to be an example of concert-type cooperation 
by stating that “KEDO initially resembled a concert-type approach.” (Dosch, 2006: 
12) Moreover, KEDO, which was a subsequent organisation to implement the 1994 
Agreed Framework, failed to make considerable progress, Dosch again focuses on the 
process of the Six Party Talks and concludes that “[t]he six party talks seemed to offer 
a suitable framework for a concert-type multilateralism in the wake of KEDO‟s 
failure … even if the talks are at best the beginning of a process that might take many 
years … until binding agreements come within reach.” (Dosch, 2006: 13)  
 
These discourses lead us to considering the second phase of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis from the perception of a concert of powers system. However, this thesis intends 
to continue its examination of the entirety of the events surrounding the second phase 
of the North Korean nuclear crisis rather than limiting its focus to the Six Party Talks 
as these accounts have done. For example, although these analyses focus on the six 
party framework from the standpoint of a concert of powers, those lack an exploration 
of China‟s role in multilateralising the nuclear issue. Thus, in order to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the security implications of the second phase, it 
seems necessary to consider China‟s role in multilateralising the confrontation 
following the trilateral talks in Beijing in 2003. This is because a consideration of 
China‟s role may lead us to a better and less US-centric understanding of the second 
phase through the analytical lens of a concert of powers. 
 
                                                 
34
 According to Jörn Dosch, „guided dialogue cooperation‟ also refers to “the element of leadership by 
a dominant power of a somehow privileged group of states” (Dosch, 2006: 6). However, unlike 
hegemonic cooperation, the status of the leading power and its interest are less significant than those of 
hegemonic cooperation. The League of Nation might fit in this category. „Open dialogue cooperation‟ 
describes “the wide spectrum of intergovernmental relations which  are neither h ierarch ically o rganized  
nor highly institutionalized.” (Dosch, 2006: 8) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
may also fall into this category. 
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The main focus of this chapter will be an examination of the security implications of 
the multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear crisis from the viewpoint of a 
concert of powers system. Therefore, the central idea of this chapter is to discover 
whether the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis could be considered as a 
reliable case that explains the perception of security within a concert of powers 
system. In other words, this chapter will study the applicability of a concert of powers 
as a security model to describe the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
The appropriateness of the notion of a concert of powers will be examined by 
comparing the key components of a concert of powers system and the concrete 
progression of the multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear issue.  
 
Another important goal is to consider the role that alliance system may have played 
alongside the Six Party Talks from the perspective of a balance of power system. 
Even if the major goal of this chapter is to look at the applicability of a concert of 
powers system, it is also necessary to explore the notion of security provided through 
an alliance system because the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis has 
witnessed interactive cooperation among the traditional allies of both sides, but on the 
US side in particular. In this regard, it seems essential to examine the operation of an 
alliance system within a concert of powers structure.  
 
In order to complete its goals, this chapter will test the following questions.  
1. Considering the concrete progression of the multilateralisation of the North 
Korean nuclear issue, can the perception of security under a concert of powers 
system help us understand the second phase of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis? 
2. What impact did the security guarantees offered by military alliances have on 
the workability of a concert of powers system during the second phase of the 
North Korean nuclear issue? 
3. Can both a concert of powers system and an alliance system work together in 
dealing with a specific security issue? 
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The analytical contribution to the overall thesis 
 
As mentioned above, an examination of the second phase of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis will be the central aim of this chapter. The practical focus of this chapter singles 
out an analysis of the multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear crisis. This 
investigation and its empirical research will be firstly enlightened by the question of 
the applicability of a concert of powers model and its notions of international security. 
 
In order to evaluate the applicability of a concert of powers system to the 
multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear issue, it seems necessary to begin by 
outlining an analytical framework which can be applied to the investigation of the 
second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The main argument of this chapter 
suggests that the multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear issue can be analysed 
through the concept of a concert of powers. Since this chapter will endeavour to 
discover whether the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis contains unique 
aspects which can be understood through the notion of a concert of powers, the 
selected cases and subjects will be studied and questioned as an analysis of the 
applicability of the perception of a concert of powers to the second phase of the North 
Korean nuclear crisis. 
 
Moreover, in relation to an operation of an alliance system alongside the Six Party 
Talks, the analytical framework also needs to explore the notion of security provided 
through an alliance system. Thus, another subject and case to be considered by the 
perception of an alliance system will be selected. This subject and case will be 
explored and analysed as a review of the appropriateness of the security perception of 
an alliance system within a concert of powers. 
 
This chapter will start from an investigation into the implications of a concert of 
powers system. To begin with, the perception of security under a concert of powers 
system will be discussed. Secondly, a consideration of how a concert of powers 
system can provide security to smaller states will be delivered. Then, the notion and 
provision of security under an alliance system will be examined.  
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After building up the analytical framework for this chapter, four issues of the second 
phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis – the trilateral talks and China‟s engagement, 
the establishment of the Six Party Talks, CVID as a norm and cooperation among the 
US‟s traditional allies – will be explored as empirical evidence. From this 
examination, the question of the applicability of a concert of powers system and an 
alliance system to explain the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis will be 
answered. 
 
Its argument 
 
Unlike the first phase which involved a serious bilateral confrontation between the US 
and North Korea, the second phase of the crisis is notable for the multilateralisation of 
the North Korean nuclear crisis. Urging the first stage of this multilateralisation, 
China‟s engagement moved the nuclear issue into trilateral talks. After that, the 
multilateralisation of the nuclear issue has developed further through the six party 
framework. 
 
For the purpose of our investigation into the major features of the multilateralisation 
of the North Korean nuclear issue, a set of hypotheses can be formulated, based on 
findings from the literature, as to how a concert of powers system can operate in 
dealing with security concerns and how an alliance system can be organised within a 
concert of powers system. Firstly, it is assumed that members of a concert of powers 
seek to protect themselves from major war. Secondly, it is argued that a concert of 
powers could promote cooperation among members despite the lack of formal 
institutions because a concert of powers might hold a regular pattern of meetings to 
monitor mutual security concerns. Thirdly, it is hypothesised that a concert of powers 
system does not restrain its role to material aspects such as the maintenance of 
territorial stability, because a modern concert of powers needs to contribute to 
creating norms which may regulate international political affairs. Finally, with respect 
to an alliance system, it is presupposed that an alliance system provides an 
institutionalised security cooperation to help maintain the balance of power. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to look at dynamics which might lead us to a more 
inclusive understanding of the actor‟s security perceptions within a concert of powers 
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and an alliance system during the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
The hypotheses will be, therefore, studied by examining four different issues of the 
second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis: China‟s engagement and trilateral 
talks in Beijing, US multilateralism and the establishment of the Six Party Talks, the 
tenets of September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, and international cooperation among 
the US‟s traditional allies.  
 
First, under a concert of powers system, the participation of members is stimulated by 
anxiety about war and therefore war prevention is at the heart of the great powers‟ 
cooperation (Morgan, 1993). As John Mearsheimer indicates, “[a] concert is an 
arrangement in which great powers that have no incentive to challenge each other 
militarily agree on a set of rules to coordinate their actions with each other … A 
concert is a great power condominium that reflects the underlying balance of power 
among its members. The coordinated balancing that takes place inside a concert does 
not violate great power self- interest.” (1994/95: 35) In other words, a concert of 
powers system makes hegemonic wars highly costly and this helps to discourage great 
powers from attempting a military attack on other members to gain benefits. As a 
result, the great powers are interested in avoiding costly wars among themselves 
(Mearsheimer, 1994/95). After the US war in Iraq, China shifted its policy position 
from „hands-off‟ to „engagement‟ because China did not want war on the Korean 
peninsula. China‟s engagement policy can be considered as a starting point for the 
North Korean nuclear issue being viewed as a common interest among the great 
powers in the Northeast Asian region.  
 
Second, the purpose of a concert of powers is to manage and maintain the status quo. 
Under a concert of powers, it is unlikely that a single state will have a leading status 
because the rest of the members will cooperate with each other to maintain the 
balance of power (Jervis, 1985). The acceptance of the status quo – distribution of 
territory, wealth, power, status – by all great powers is a key element in operating a 
concert of powers successfully (Alagappa, 2003). In relation to maintaining the status 
quo under a concert of powers, it is notable that the US has pursued a multilateral 
approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Moreover, China‟s perception 
of the Six Party Talks as a concert of powers system demonstrates that China wants to 
use the six party framework as a tool to maintain the balance of power among the 
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countries involved. The first round of the Six Party Talks implied the beginning of a 
concert- like diplomacy. 
 
Third, the idea of concert assumes that there exists a reasonably even distribution of 
power, involving the regulation of the relations among the great powers themselves. 
Members of the great power club are considered as being roughly equal both in 
military capability and in diplomatic importance in region (Acharya, 1999). 
Regarding the operation of a concert of powers system, however, it is also important 
to note that a concert of powers does not limit its role to material aspects such as the 
maintenance of territorial stability. Rather, “it has set norms that seek to regulate 
internal as well as external political behaviour” (Zelikow, 1992: 26). With respect to 
the implications of a modern concert of powers, it seems useful to examine the 
process of the Six Party Talks. In particular, an investigation into the tenets of the 
September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 may provide important information of what 
kind of norms has been established through the six party framework. 
 
Finally, as David Lake notes, the main reason for states to form an alliance is to 
achieve aggregation of power because in this context states can deal with threats 
larger than those which each individual state could act alone (Lake, 1996). In an 
alliance, therefore, state leaders attempt to make the alliance more reliable by 
facilitating their motivations to collaborate with allies. These efforts may include for 
example the provision of institutionalised cooperation such as an integrated command 
of military forces, which is designed to increase the credibility of their joint 
commitment (Leeds, 2003b). An operation of an alliance system from the view of the 
balance of power may be seen through an examination of cooperation among the US‟s 
traditional allies. 
 
3.2. An Analytical Framework of a Concert of Powers 
 
The origin of a concert of powers 
 
Prior to considering the notion of security under a concert of powers system, it might 
be useful to look at a historical example of a concert of powers. The origin of a 
concert of powers can be seen in the European Concert in the 19th century. The 
 100 
Concert of Europe was established as an outcome of collaboration among the 
European great powers to maintain the status quo after the close of the Napoleonic 
Wars in 1814. Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, ideological and military 
conflicts in Europe were concluded. The victorious great powers that defeated 
Napoleon‟s ambition to create pan-European hegemony, shared a common view of 
the status quo in order to retain the existing balance of power in Europe. The system 
was successful from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the Crimean War of 1854.   
Almost 40 years of long peace lasted in Europe without major wars among the great 
powers (Acharya, 1999; Zelikow, 1992). 
 
At the time of the creation of the European Concert, the five great powers – Britain, 
Austria, Prussia, Russia and France – decided to participate in the Concert. The 
common interests shared by the members of the Concert were maintaining stability in 
Europe and harmonising relations among themselves. The five great powers were 
expected to respect the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 which 
determined the territorial arrangements after the close of the Napoleonic Wars. In 
other words, members of the European Concert decided “to defend the territorial 
status quo, or to allow change only when they reached a consensus to do so. ” 
(Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 123) 
 
With respect to the maintenance of stability in Europe, the European great powers 
shared the idea that it was in their common interest to cooperate with each other in 
order to prevent major war. In the early 19th century, Napoleonic France encouraged 
the spread of social revolution. The leaders of European powers believed that social 
revolution and war in Europe were interrelated with each other. From their 
perspective, war in Europe was fundamentally triggered by the revolutionary social 
situation and war itself again stimulated the environment for radical social 
transformations. Therefore, the European great powers concluded that it was 
necessary for them to work together for avoiding war because they thought that war 
prevention could allow them to control social revolution (Rosecrance, 1992). 
 
In this regard, the Concert of Europe can be considered as collaboration among the 
great powers to set up “European solutions to European problems” (Elrod, 1976: 162) 
in order to preserve peace at a time of disorder by regulating the international system. 
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This meant that the leaders of European powers accepted the continuation of the 
coalition against Napoleon to preserve the post-Napoleonic war arrangement. Concert 
diplomacy was conducted through a series of repeating conferences among the great 
powers (Elrod, 1992). 
 
According to Richard Elrod, concert diplomacy presumed a set of unwritten rules. 
Firstly, the establishment of the European Concert indicated that other countries 
would be under the sponsorship of the five great powers – Britain, Prussia, Russia, 
Austria and France. Secondly, as a result of this, territorial disputes in Europe were  
resolved by the five great powers. Thirdly, the first priority of the Concert of Europe 
was to secure the states system initiated by the five great powers. Finally, the special 
status of the five great powers must be respected both in pursuing their natio nal 
interests and in maintaining their reputation (Elrod, 1992).35 
 
Despite its role in preserving longtime peace in Europe, nevertheless, the partnership 
of the European Concert was broken up due to a number of factors that hindered the 
operation of the Concert. In the first place, Britain‟s policy of isolation hampered the 
Concert because Britain stepped back from involvement in the issues of the European 
continent. Even if Britain once participated in establishing the coalition against 
Napoleonic France, it did not want to engage in the management of the domestic 
matters of other European countries. Because of Britain‟s withdrawal, it became 
difficult for the Concert to maintain their authority to intervene in political affairs in 
other European countries. In addition to this, the emergence of new ideologies 
resulted in ideological divides between members of the Concert. In the early 1830s, 
France and Britain experienced more liberal transformation than others did, which 
affected state policy respectively.36 This ideologically divided the five great powers 
into two different groups – the liberal two (Britain and France) and the conservative 
three (Russia, Prussia and Austria). The Concert was discouraged by this new 
ideological confrontation. Eventually, the consequences of the revolutions of 1848 in 
France demonstrated that revolution no longer automatically brought about war in 
                                                 
35
 The hidden structure of a concert of powers will be more precisely examined in the following section. 
36
 For details of French revolution in 1830, see Pinkney (1961). For details of the 1832 Reform Act in 
Britain, see Phillips and Wetherell (1995). 
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Europe. The Concert of Europe was terminated because of these three conditions 
(Rosecrance, 1992). 
 
The examination of a historical example gives a basic idea of a concert of powers. 
However, in order to develop an analytical framework, it seems necessary to 
conceptualise a precedent example through a theoretical approach. The following 
section will carry out this task. 
 
3.2.1. Perception of security under a concert of powers 
 
3.2.1.1. Prevention of major war 
 
A concert of powers becomes apparent under a unique situation in which it is 
necessary for a small number of great powers to control their competitive policies in 
order to protect common interests among them (Goldstein, 2003). Under a concert of 
powers, the primary pattern of regulating international relations is to maintain the 
status quo among the great powers. As discussed earlier, the best example we have 
originates from a policy of the status quo under the European Concert between 1815 
and 1848. The status quo after 1815 granted the Concert remarkable legal authority. 
Members of the Concert believed that the Concert would encourage their cooperative 
behaviour rather than stimulate competitive policies among them (Jervis, 1985). 
Under a concert of powers, it is unlikely that a single state is in a dominant position 
because the rest of its members will cooperate with each other to preclude any state 
from prevailing. After determining a peace settlement to stop major war, each 
member of the victorious bloc is anxious about whether its partners build up excessive 
power and also worries about the probability of a creation of a separate coalition. 
These concerns may lead members of a concert of powers to checking and balancing 
against each other in order to sustain the new distribution of power – the status quo 
after the close of the previous major war (Jervis, 1985). 
 
Through the establishment of the new distribution of power, a concert of powers not 
only ensures its favoured division of power, but also creates the principles and norms 
for international or regional order. In particular, with respect to the maintenance of the 
status quo, members of a concert of powers need to set up a dual track arrangement: 
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„one set of rules for the great powers and another for lesser powers‟. Put differently, 
“[a] concert maintains order among great powers through the accommodation of their 
competing interests. It maintains order at large by sitting in judgement of the affairs of 
the other states and taking enforcement action as necessary.” (Alagappa, 2003: 56) 
Thus, the status quo under a concert of powers can be considered to have two 
different security perceptions: „prevention of major war‟ and „maintenance of 
territorial stability‟.  
 
Under a concert of powers, it is a more important security interest for the members to 
cooperatively prevent war rather than individually pursue their particular national 
interests. As Susan Shirk notes, “[t]he primary objective of a concert is to regulate 
relations between the major powers. By sharing information about capabilities and 
intentions, the powers reduce the risk of security dilemmas among themselves. By 
creating norms of cooperation, the powers raise the cost of defection and aggressive 
behaviour.” (Shirk, 1997: 265) 
 
In relation to the prevention of major war, it seems notable that John Mearsheimer 
(1994-95) suggests a set of factors compelling the great powers to make efforts to 
avoid war. According to Mearsheimer, the great powers are well aware of the 
following aspects. Firstly, it is difficult for the great powers to benefit from military 
attacks on others because there should be almost even distribution of power among 
them. Secondly, the great powers have authorities to control the international system 
after ending the previous hegemonic war. This may help them to be interested in 
sustaining the existing status quo. Thirdly, hegemonic war requires both an aspiring 
hegemon and the counter-hegemonic coalition to both pay great costs.37 Therefore, 
the great powers are unlikely to provoke another major war. Finally, the great powers  
tend to cooperate with each other because they have a shared experience in fighting 
against a potential hegemon (Mearsheimer, 1994-95). 
 
In addition to this, a concert of powers tries to avoid an escalation of tension among 
other regional actors by influencing the minor powers. For example, the Concert of 
Europe forced weaker states to come into its spheres of influence (Shirk, 1997). 
                                                 
37
 For the details of the cost of hegemonic war, see Jervis (1985: 60-61). 
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Rosecrance points out that “the strength of the central coalition attracted strength from 
outside. Smaller powers could not balance against the great and instead join them.” 
(Rosecrance, 1992: 73) This is another mechanism for a concert of powers to achieve 
its goal of war prevention. 
 
3.2.1.2. Maintenance of territorial stability 
 
In relation to the perception of security under a concert of powers, it is important to 
note that a concert of powers system endeavours to preserve territorial stability. For 
example, as Zelikow indicates, although the regulation of the international relations 
among the great powers was the primary objective of the Concert of Europe in 19 th 
century, the Concert also had the shared idea of the maintenance of territorial stability 
for other states (Zelikow, 1992). 
 
The European Concert set the rule that there should not be territorial change without 
an endorsement of the great powers. The Concert of Europe consisted only of the five 
great powers – Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and France. Other states could not 
join the Concert because they were not considered as equal partners. While smaller 
powers were excluded from the diplomacy of the Concert, however, the five great 
powers took special responsibility to secure peace in Europe. Richard Elrod denotes 
this point by stating that “the Concert of Europe meant great power tutelage over the 
rest of Europe … Great-power tutelage was obligatory, for only the great powers 
possessed the resources, the prestige, and the vision to contend with the transcendent 
concerns of peace or war, of stability or disorder.” (Elrod, 1976: 163-164) As a result 
of taking on this special responsibility, the rule of maintenance of territorial stability 
became another norm that the great powers should follow. In other words, territorial 
questions in Europe were heavily dependent upon the great powers‟ endorsement. The 
great powers clarified the acceptable and appropriate limits of territorial change to 
deal with a range of unilateral claims from other states. Therefore, the approval of the 
great powers was the only possible approach to rationalise new territorial 
arrangements. That is, “territorial changes in Europe were subject to the sanction of 
the great powers.” (Elrod, 1976: 165) 
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3.2.2. Provision of security under a concert of powers 
 
3.2.2.1. No formal institutions but the promotion of cooperation 
 
With respect to the provision of security by a concert of powers system, it seems 
noteworthy that the European Concert successfully managed security issues in post-
Napoleonic Europe through mutual consultation although it had no formal 
institutional structure. 
 
According to Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, a concert of powers consists of 
a small group of great powers of the day which agrees to cooperate with each other in 
order to prevent an aggressive action by a revisionist state. Despite the absence of 
formal binding commitments, a concert of powers makes decisions through informal 
negotiations and the building of consensus which come from the regular pattern of 
meetings to monitor events and, if necessary, to organise combined actions. “The 
flexibility and informality of a concert allow the structure to retain an ongoing 
undercurrent of balancing behaviour among the major powers … Power politics is not 
completely eliminated; members may turn to internal mobilisation and coalition 
formation to pursue divergent interests. But the cooperative framework of a concert, 
and its members‟ concern about preserving peace, prevent such balancing from 
escalating to overt hostility and conflict.” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 120) 
 
It seems necessary at this stage to examine the hidden structure of a concert of powers 
in order to explain how a concert of powers can provide security without institutional 
formation. Richard Elrod suggests a set of rules for the structure of a concert of 
powers which originates from the conference diplomacy in 19th century Europe. To 
begin with, according to Elrod, there was an agreement among the great powers that a 
group of powers might control security matters over the rest of Europe as their special 
duty. This shared consensus created concert diplomacy by conferences (Elrod, 1976). 
One rule or norm established by the great powers was that territorial boundaries 
should remain stable in the region. Put differently, the great powers‟ endorsement of 
maintaining peace in Europe was an essential factor to establish territorial stability in 
Europe in the 19th century. As Elrod indicates, “[the] insistence of the great powers 
upon reviewing modification in the international order represented another significant 
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deterrence against immoderate international conduct.” (Elrod, 1976: 165) The final 
one was that a distinctive status of the great powers should be respected. This meant 
that the great powers would not be degraded “either in their vital interests or in their 
prestige and honor.” In other words, “the five great powers had the assurance that 
both their legitimate rights and their self-esteem would be respected.” (Elrod, 1967: 
166) 
 
As can be seen from the earlier discussion, cooperation among the great powers runs 
through the heart of a concert of powers. Even though the risk of security dilemmas 
cannot completely be eradicated by the creation of a concert of powers, it is 
noteworthy that a concert of powers promotes cooperative behaviour among major 
powers. Robert Jervis points out that the Concert of Europe was “characterized by an 
unusually high and self-conscious level of cooperation among the major European 
powers. The states did not play the game as hard as they could; they did not take 
advantage of other‟s short-run vulnerabilities … [E]ach state cooperated in the 
expectation that the others would do the same.” (Jervis, 1985: 59)  
 
What was the reason for the great powers‟ cooperation under the European concert? 
In this regard, it seems that Jervis‟s work gives an answer by stating that “statesmen 
believed that they would be more secure if the other major powers were also more 
secure. Others were seen as partners in a joint endeavour as well as rivals, and unless 
there were strong reasons to act to the contrary their important interests were to be 
respected.” (Jervis, 1982: 364) 
 
How can this kind of cooperation be achieved? According to Jervis, in order for a 
concert of powers to be continued, there should be a shared consensus among the 
members of a concert of powers to prevent war. This common interest can be 
accepted because the great powers are aware of the costs of non-cooperation. Any 
potential hegemon may benefit from the tension unless the great powers work 
together. In other words, competitive policies may be reduced because “[t]he very fact 
that each state knows that the others see war as too costly to be a viable option allows 
each to use the common interest of avoiding catastrophe as a lever to extract 
competitive gains.” (Jervis, 1985: 65) 
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Moreover, there should be increased gains from cooperation. Most importantly, the 
continuation of cooperation prevents the re-emergence of a potential hegemon. 
However, a concert of powers may also produce cooperation on different topics such 
as collaboration in trade and mutual efforts to tackle environmental issues. That is, the 
willingness of members of a concert of powers to achieve common goals encourages 
them to implement their international obligations and as a result of this, “each state 
will see added benefits in cooperating because of the expectation that all would gain.” 
(Jervis, 1985: 67) 
 
3.2.2.2. From special responsibility to the creation of norms 
 
With regard to the structure of a concert of powers, it is notable that the idea of a 
concert of powers determines international relations in two different modes. Inside, 
there should be a reasonably even distribution of power, as regards the management 
of the relations among the great powers themselves. Outside, however, a concert of 
powers assumes “great-power tutelage” (Elrod, 1976: 163) over security matters 
involving smaller countries. 
 
The idea of a concert of powers considers members of the great power club to be 
roughly equal both in military capability and in diplomatic importance (Acharya, 
1999). For example, the Concert of Europe underlined the necessity of agreement 
among the great powers when making a decision and this rule created hurdle to stop 
any state from provoking unilateral action. Thus, “[n]o one power could attempt to 
settle a European question by an independent and self- regulated initiative … [T]he 
policies of each were subject to the scrutiny and sanction of all.” (Elrod, 1976: 164) 
These kinds of common efforts to restrain self-determining action by any state 
established a unique pattern of concert diplomacy in dealing with international 
disputes – “conference diplomacy” (Elrod, 1976: 164).  
 
With respect to the management of other regional security issues, the great powe rs 
retained their special rights and responsibility over international affairs. For instance, 
the European Concert created the rule that members of the Concert were responsible 
for maintaining peace in Europe in 19th century. It also assumed that the great powers 
could benefit from special status and privileges over security issues. This is because 
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there was a strong consensus that the 19th century required a special accountability of 
the great powers to preserve the stability of Europe (Elrod, 1976). Unlike members of 
the Concert of Europe, smaller countries “were occasionally consulted when their 
interests were involved, but they possessed few rights and certainly not that of 
equality.” (Elrod, 1976: 163) 
 
It seems important to think about whether the notion of the Concert of Europe in the 
19th century can be applied to the international system nowadays. This is because, as 
Susan Shirk indicates, it is difficult to believe that smaller countries would accept 
„great-power tutelage‟ in the present century. That is, “a twentieth-century concert, 
unlike its earlier antecedent, would not be able to provide security for all nations, big 
or small. Instead, it would establish a norm that the powers would not intervene 
militarily in conflicts among the less powerful states.” (Shirk, 1997: 266) 
 
Susan Shirk‟s idea emphasises the importance of a normative element of a concert of 
powers system. She believes that a concert of powers system functions not only by 
material power, but also normative forces. In relation to the interaction of material 
and normative powers, it is notable that the Concert of Europe also operated on the 
basis of common values. According to Henry Kissinger, the European Concert 
“occurred partly because the equilibrium was designed so well that is co uld only be 
overthrown by an effort of a magnitude too difficult to mount. But the most important 
reason was that the Continental countries were knit together by a sense of shared 
values. There was not only a physical equilibrium, but a moral one. Power and justice 
were in substantial harmony.” (Kissinger, 1994: 79) Thus, it might be possible to say 
that a modern concert of powers needs to establish norms that contribute to its proper 
operation as the Concert of Europe did.  
 
However, despite its contribution to an analysis, the examination of a concert of 
powers is not sufficient to explain all key issues of the second phase of the North 
Korean nuclear crisis. For example, as noted earlier, the second phase witnessed a 
significant involvement of the US side allies. This means that an alliance system has 
been operating alongside a concert of powers. 
 
 109 
In this regard, it seems noteworthy that there was a conflict between the European 
Concert in the 19th century and a secret alliance pursued by German chancellor Otto 
von Bismarck. As Martin Wight indicates, the Concert of Europe was “in its origin 
and essence a common agreement on the principle of the balance of power. ” (1978: 
174) However, in the late 19th century, a secret alliance contributed to making the 
European Concert function ineffectively.  
 
As part of Otto von Bismarck‟s foreign policy, on October 7, 1879 the Dual Alliance 
between Germany and Austria-Hungry, which was a secret defensive alliance, was 
created. The Dual Alliance assured the other party‟s assistance in case of an attack to 
one party by Russia and at least a neutral stance in case of strike by another power. 
This alliance was transformed into the Triple Alliance by Italy joining in May 1882 
(Conybeare and Sandler, 1990). The Triple Alliance encouraged other European 
powers to form the Triple Entente in response, which consisted of France, Russia and 
the UK (Weitsman, 2003). 
 
The establishment of these alliance systems divided the European powers into two 
blocs and eventually led them to World War I.  This implies that an alliance system 
could not co-exist with a concert of powers in Europe in the 19th century. 
Nevertheless, as examined in the introduction of this chapter, the second phase saw an 
operation of an alliance system within the six party framework. Thus, it seems 
inevitable to consider an alliance system as another tool to investigate the features of 
the second phase. The following section will explore the notion of an alliance system 
in order to establish the analytical framework for the examination of the residence of 
an alliance system within a concert- like framework. 
 
3.2.3. Balance of Power and an alliance system 
 
3.2.3.1. The origin of an alliance system 
 
Balance of power can be understood as “the equivalent of the distribution of power” 
(Claude, 1962: 16) However, from a structural perspective of the international system, 
the balance of power system is considered as “a collection of states, autonomous units 
of power and policy, involved in such intimacy of interrelationship as to make 
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reciprocal impact feasible, if not unavoidable; it lacks an overall political organ of 
supervision and control, capable of ordering the relationships which exist among these 
units.” (Claude, 1962: 42) 
 
Inis Claude indicates that states actors make an attempt to develop their power not 
only by their own resources, but also by bonding themselves with the power of others. 
This is because it is difficult for small countries to balance against their powerful 
neighbours. The only possible option for them is to place themselves in a group of 
states which is supported by a major power (Claude, 1962). 
 
With respect to the basic assumption of a balance of power theory, it is also 
significant to consider Kenneth Waltz‟s conceptualisation thereof. According to Waltz, 
states are “unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a 
maximum, drive for universal domination.” (Waltz, 1979: 118) Thus, state actors tend 
to pursue twofold goals. Firstly, they attempt to develop their internal capabilit ies 
such as economic growth, military force and national strategy. Secondly, they also 
make an effort to strengthen their external power by building up an alliance (Waltz, 
1979). Thus, it seems possible to say, as Inis Claude states, that “[t]he balance of 
power system is aptly characterized as an alliance system.” (Claude, 1962: 89)  
 
Modern alliances essentially emerged from the bipolar structure during the Cold War 
for the purpose of deterrence against the opposite polarity. For instance, Western 
European countries created an alliance system in form of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) with the US in order to prevent the spread of communism by 
the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). On the other hand, Eastern 
European countries combined with the former USSR and established the Warsaw Pact 
to resist potential threat by US-led coalition (Shen, 2004). 
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3.2.3.2. Perception of security under an alliance system 
 
Common interests: shared perception of threat 
 
An alliance system can be formulated from either state actors‟ commitment to defend 
“shared values and ideas” (Tertrais, 2004: 136) or “an analysis of costs and benefits” 
(Tertrais, 2004: 136). In any case, an alliance is created by nations that have common 
interests. The common interest shared by members of an alliance is typically a 
negative one such as “fear of other state.” (Waltz, 1979: 166) 
 
In relation to the reason for establishing an alliance, it seems significant to consider 
Michael Sheehan‟s assumption. According to Sheehan, “[s]tates join alliances to 
protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a 
threat. To ally with the dominant power means placing one‟s trust in its continued 
benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate 
their allies in order to avoid being dominated by those who can.” (Sheehan, 1996: 55)  
 
Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, in order for states to form an alliance, there should 
be a common view of threat. For example, as can be seen from the NATO case during 
the Cold War, whereas the US was not regarded as threatening power by Western 
European states, the former USSR was seen as a potential threat after World War II 
(Sheehan, 1996). 
 
Thus, a shared perception of threat leads states to try to counterbalance the power of 
their adversaries. States try to find partners who can help them by joining their 
capabilities together. This means that the basic proposition of an alliance is merely 
“the balancing of power with power.” (Sheehan, 1996: 56) Put differently, an alliance 
system is the outcome of an attempt by states to aggregate their own resources with 
the capacity of other coalitions as a response against an outside threat (Sheehan, 1996).  
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3.2.3.3. Provision of security under an alliance system 
 
There are two central incentives that encourage states to join alliances. First, an 
alliance system can guarantee security of its members by generating “signals of 
intention” (Leeds, 2003b: 805), which inform the willingness of allies to intervene in 
the event of any challenge from adversaries. Second, an alliance system can function 
as “the institutionalized security cooperation” (Leeds, 2003b: 805) that may result in 
the aggregation of power to guarantee the defence of members (Leeds, 2003b). 
 
Signals of Intention 
 
One important role of an alliance system is to send signals to both its members and 
rivals in relation to state leaders‟ intentions. By doing so, state actors believe that they 
can achieve their goal of preventing military conflict because potential competitors 
might be discouraged from provoking aggressive actions rather than challenge the 
strength of allies (Leeds, 2003b). 
 
Signals of intention operate in two directions. In the first place, as earlier examined, 
such signals give potential adversaries a sign that the allies may aggregate their 
resources in order to defeat any outside threat. Moreover, the willingness of the 
collaborators to deter threats from aggressive states encourages each nation to be 
more cooperative within an alliance system (Morrow, 1994). In short, as James 
Morrow indicates, “[a]lliances could operate as signals of common interests among 
allies.” (Morrow, 1994: 271) 
 
Regarding signals of intention, on the other hand, it should also be recognised that 
specialisation of forces in the form of an alliance system may cause an unexpected 
outcome. Alliances provide information on their future behaviour not only to allies, 
but also to adversaries. These signals may initiate hostilities of enemies. Thus, it 
seems significant that an alliance system has two contradictory effects in playing its 
role. While an alliance system acts as a counter-balancer to deter aggressors and 
prevent war, it may also provoke aggressive military activities from outside (Leeds, 
2003a). 
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The Institutionalised Security Cooperation 
 
Another important reason for states to form an alliance is to achieve the aggregation 
of power because in this context states can “counter threats larger than each 
individually.” (Lake, 1996: 4) In exchange for this, members of an alliance may 
endure the restraint on their freedom of action. In David Lake‟s terms, under an 
alliance system, “states pool resources in pursuit of some common objective while 
retaining complete rights of residual control.” (Lake, 1996: 8) 
 
According to Brett Leeds, an alliance system can provide its members with “the 
attraction of economies of scale and the benefits of coordination in the provision of 
security.” (Leeds, 2003b: 807) Put differently, the expectation of assistance from 
allies in the event of war may allow each state to transfer its defence budgets to other 
sections such as welfare spending or promotion of economic growth. This is because 
states can reduce some portion of their military burdens by joining cooperative arms 
programmes. Moreover, the aggregation of power may provide parties with strategic 
benefits such as the integration of sea power and land power. Thus, “[w]ith 
coordination, the joint forces are likely to be a more formidable adversary than they 
would absent joint planning.” (Leeds, 2003b: 807) 
 
However, it should also be noted that there exists a question of credibility of 
commitment by allies because as David Lake indicates, “[o]pportunistic actors do not 
honor contracts out of a sense of obligation but press fo r individual advantages 
whenever possible.” (Lake, 1996: 13) In an alliance, therefore, state leaders attempt to 
make the alliance more reliable by facilitating their motivations to collaborate with 
others. These efforts can be characterised as „the institutionalised security 
cooperation‟. In this regard, it seems noteworthy to look at Brett Leeds‟s observation. 
According to Leeds, alliance agreements can provide a set of means such as the 
provision of station troops for other members and joint military exercises to 
encourage members‟ participation (Leeds, 2003b). Leeds concludes that “[a]lliances 
can change the incentives of state leaders to participate in conflicts on behalf of their 
allies, and when necessary, state leaders may turn to provisions for inst itutionalizing 
military collaboration to increase the credibility of their joint commitment.” (Leeds, 
2003b: 808) 
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With respect to „the institutionalised security cooperation‟, it is necessary for the 
parties to create certain safeguards to ensure mutual compliance in the event of 
conflicts. Thus, it is common to make such regulations as “(1) actions designed to 
modify opportunity costs (sanctions for failing to perform the required actions, the 
exchange of hostage, side-payments), (2) specialised governance structure (s) to 
which to refer and resolve disputes, and (3) regularities that support and signal 
continuity intentions.” (Lake, 1996: 10)38 
 
This section has discussed basic assumptions of the notion of a concert of powers and 
the concept of an alliance system. The following section will explore empirical 
evidence on substantial examples for the central hypotheses that a concert of powers 
and an alliance system are valuable models for understanding the second phase of the 
North Korean nuclear crisis. 
 
3.3. Empirical Evidence 
 
3.3.1. China’s proactive engagement policy 
 
In relation to the North Korean nuclear issue, the US‟s hard- line policy option was to 
resolve this issue through military action like it did in Iraq. However, China, a great 
power in Northeast Asia, did not want to engage in a war situation. Instead, China was 
eager to solve the nuclear issue in a diplomatic way. This motivation made China 
change its policy position from a hands-off attitude to a policy of engagement. This 
situation could be interpreted as a great power‟s effort to avoid major war among 
them. The following section will look at China‟s motivation for its commitment to 
handling the nuclear issue and observe the implications of the trilateral talks among 
China, the US and North Korea. 
 
3.3.1.1. US Policy Position – A Consideration of Military Options 
 
With an affirmation that its nuclear activity would only be used for the purpose of 
electricity generation, on 5 February 2003, North Korea declared that it had restarted 
operation of its nuclear facilities (KCNA, February 5, 2003). However, the US 
                                                 
38
 For more details, see Williamson (1985: 32-35). 
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believed that North Korea‟s nuclear activity – plutonium reprocessing – could be used 
to produce at least half a dozen nuclear bombs within months. This was a turning 
point that led the US to considering military options against North Korea. The Bush 
administration warned North Korea that despite its priority policy to seek a peaceful 
solution, the US would conduct a military attack on North Korea unless North Korea 
did not stop its nuclear activities (French, The New York Times, February 6, 2003; 
Dao, The New York Times, February 7, 2003). For example, in testimony before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said “No 
options have been taken off the table. The options of sanctions, the option of 
additional political moves, no military option‟s been taken off the table, although we 
have no intention of attacking North Korea as a nation” (Dao, The New York Times, 
February 7, 2003). 
 
It was war in Iraq in 2003 that actually increased the probability of war on the Korean 
Peninsula. Following The US invasion of Iraq, the US officials publicly stated that 
North Korea would be the next target of the US‟s pre-emptive strike strategy. For 
instance, Under Secretary of State John Bolton asserted that “rogue states like North 
Korea should take a lesson from the events in Iraq.” (Wines, The New York Times, 
April 12, 2003) 
 
The US attack on Iraq and its description of North Korea as the next target helped 
China to shift its policy approach from a hands-off stance to an engagement strategy. 
Thus, it seems necessary at this stage to observe changes in China‟s policy position. 
 
3.3.1.2. China‟s Engagement 
 
China’s original position on the North Korean nuclear issue 
 
At the initial stage, Beijing‟s approach to the North Korean nuclear issue was to 
encourage two key actors – the US and North Korea – to negotiate the issue through a 
bilateral dialogue. According to the Chinese news agency Xinhuanet, on 6 March 
2003 – it was just before The US invasion of Iraq – Chinese Foreign Minister Tang 
Jiaxuan testified that “China‟s basic stance on the DPRK nuclear issue is that the 
Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized and peace and stability on the peninsula be 
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maintained, underlining that the most effective means to resolve the issue is to realize 
the direct dialogue between the DPRK and the United States.” (Xinhuanet, March 6, 
2003) 
 
What were the motivations for China‟s hands-off position? China‟s original position 
not only derived from its perception of the origin of the bilateral nuclear confrontation, 
but also came from its national security strategy.  
 
First of all, China perceived that despite its international and regional aspects related 
to the security of Northeast Asia and the Nuclear Non-proliferation regime (NPT 
regime), the central part of the nuclear issue was the bilateral relationship between the 
US and North Korea. This was because from China‟s perspective, the nuclear issue 
was caused by the slow or non- implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework 
between the two actors. Therefore, China underlined that the best way to handle the 
nuclear issue would be direct bilateral dialogues and negotiations between two 
countries as the US was the only origin of North Korea‟s fear of insecurity. (Sha, 
March 14, 2003) 
 
Another important reason was that China did not want to see any military operation 
on the Korean Peninsula. This was because it wanted to concentrate on its national 
strategy, which aimed at promoting its own economic growth. According to „China‟s 
National Defense in 2002‟, China regarded „building a well-off society‟ as one of its 
strategic goals in the 21st century. It seems clear that it was necessary for China to 
preserve a peaceful international environment in order to avoid any unstable events 
around its borders (China‟s National Defense 2002).  
 
Thus, as Sha Zukang indicates, China‟s policy position at this stage could be 
categorised under the term “two oppositions and one preservation”. Firstly, China 
strongly expressed its opposition to North Korea‟s nuclear armament by advising that 
nuclear weapons could not guarantee North Korea‟s security. Secondly, China was 
also opposed to any provocation of war on the Korean Peninsula and underscored that 
the nuclear issue should be managed through dialogues and negotiations. Finally, 
China made it clear that its priority security objective was the maintenance of peace 
and stability on the Korean peninsula. China clearly announced that it was essential in 
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its own interest to maintain a peaceful and stable security environment in the Korean 
Peninsula in order to achieve its well-off society strategy (Sha, March 14, 2003). 
 
War in Iraq and change in China’s policy position 
 
While China pushed two key actors – the US and North Korea – to consult on the 
nuclear issue through direct bilateral negotiations, China also put pressure on North 
Korea to stop its nuclear development. This was because as argued before, China did 
not want to see a nuclear-armed North Korea. 
 
For instance, in February 2003, China warned Pyongyang that North Korea could lose 
China‟s assistance in protecting North Korea from international economic sanctions 
unless it stopped its antagonistic actions regarding the nuclear issue. During the same 
month, Beijing temporarily cut off oil supplies to North Korea to express its 
frustration with North Korea‟s nuclear activity (Global Security Newswire, March 28, 
2003). 
 
However, after the US invasion of Iraq, the political climate of the nuclear issue 
changed and this resulted in an alteration of China‟s policy position towards the North 
Korean nuclear issue. The invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration pushed Beijing 
to make diplomatic efforts in order to mediate the issue of a rapidly escalating nuclear 
confrontation between the US and North Korea.  
 
In order to achieve the idea of xiaokang which pursues a rapid economic growth in 
China, it is necessary for China to maintain stability around its borders because an 
unstable security environment might seriously impede the flow of capital into the 
country.  In order to make this goal happen China needs to see three key conditions 
fulfilled: “fostering a stable external political and security environment necessary for 
internal economic development; integrating China further into the international 
political and economic order to help secure stable markets, as exemplified by its 
active participation in multilateral institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the World Trade 
Organization; and developing broad and deep relations with the United States to 
eliminate the need for excessive military spending.”  (Park, 2005: 81-82) 
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US military action in Iraq certainly increased China‟s fear of a war in the Korean 
Peninsula. China was deeply afraid of any military conflict in the Korean peninsula 
happening as it was in Iraq. This means that China‟s concern about North Korea being 
next on US hit list led China to a proactive engagement policy to prevent war in the 
Northeast Asian region. As mentioned above, the maintenance of peace and stability 
on the Korean Peninsula has been one of the most important national interests of 
China. In Samuel Kim‟s terms “China‟s greatest priority has been peace and stability 
on the Korean peninsula, which is a key contributor to peace and stability within 
China.” (Kim, 2004: 162) 
 
3.3.1.3. Trilateral Talks in Beijing 
 
The three party talks involving the US, China and the DPRK were held on 23-25 
April 2003 in Beijing to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue. As discussed 
beforehand, the war in Iraq provided an important background for the three party talks 
being set up. Nevertheless, it seems that the most significant implication of the three 
party talks was the multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear issue in terms of 
establishing a foundation stone for a multilateral negotiation framework. In this regard, 
it seems necessary to consider the US ‟s policy perceptions of what was happening and 
those of North Korea. 
 
Motivations of each actor in the three party talks 
 
With respect to the US‟s stance, it is notable that the US has persistently argued that 
the North Korean nuclear issue was a regional issue. For instance, on 6 March 2003 
US President Bush stated that “this is … a regional issue because there‟s a lot of 
countries that have got a direct stake into whether or not North Korea has nuclear 
weapons.” (Bush, March 6, 2003) He also stressed the regional nations‟ responsibility 
along with the US to establish a multilateral framework to deal with the nuclear issue. 
In other words, the US perceived the North Korean nuclear programme not only as a 
threat to the US‟s national security, but also as a threat to global security. That is, the 
US regarded the North Korean nuclear issue not as a bilateral issue, but as an issue of 
international and multilateral interest (Armitage, February 4, 2003).  
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Along with the US‟s multilateral approach, it is worthy observing the US‟s perception 
of China as a strategic partner in the post-Cold War era. This investigation might give 
another important explanation to why the US accepted China‟s proactive engagement 
policy in dealing with the nuclear issue. In relation to regional stability in Northeast 
Asia, the US believed that it was crucial to support China‟s integration into the 
international community (Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2001). Despite 
many differences with China – for example, the Taiwan issue and human rights issues 
– , the US regards its relationship with China as a “vital and complex part” (Grossman, 
June 1, 2001) of its national interests in the region. The US no longer considers China 
as an enemy. Rather, it perceives that China would be a partner on some issues and a 
competitor for influence in Northeast Asia on other issues. For example, according to 
James Kelly, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the Secretary of 
State testified that “China is a competitor and a potential regional rival, but also a 
trading partner willing to cooperate in the areas, such as Korea, where our strategic 
interests overlap. China is all of these things, but China is not an enemy and our 
challenge is to keep it that way.” (Kelly, June 12, 2001) US perception of its 
relationship with China leads it to seek cooperation with China in pursuit of its 
national interests regarding peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.  
 
On the other hand, North Korea‟s original position was to establish bilateral talks 
between the US and North Korea in order to handle the nuclear issue and therefore it 
strongly resisted the US‟s suggestion to build up a multilateral framework. This was 
because North Korea supposed that “[t]hrough the multilateral talks the US seeks to 
convince the international community that the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula 
is an international issue and shift all the blames for the crisis onto the DPRK in a bid 
to charge it with “nuclear weapons development,” garner the international 
community‟s support and create favourable conditions for its military attack on the 
DPRK.” (KCNA, March 26, 2003) 
 
Nevertheless, it seems that US‟s invasion of Iraq and China‟s proactive engagement 
policy resulted in North Korea‟s acceptance of the multilateralisation of the nuclear 
issue. On April 12, 2003, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK issued a 
statement that “[t]he DPRK‟s call for direct talks is aimed to confirm whether the U.S. 
has a political willingness to drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK or not … If the 
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U.S is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a settlement of the 
nuclear issue, the DPRK will not stick to any particular dialogue format.” (KCNA, 
April 12, 2003) 
 
For China, as discussed before, its immediate goal was to prevent escalating tensions 
between the US and North Korea from developing a military confrontation as it was 
in the case of Iraq. With respect to its role in dealing with the North Korean case, 
China expressed its hope that the stability of the Korean Peninsula should be 
sustained and declared that it would continue to make an effort to settle the nuclear 
issue through a peaceful dialogue (FMPRC, April 24, 2003). According to China‟s 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao, “China‟s goal is very clear, which is to 
maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. China will continue to work to 
this end.” (Liu, April 25, 2003) 
 
Thus, it might be possible to conclude that US multilateralism, China‟s proactive 
engagement policy and North Korea‟s flexibility on dialogue format jo intly initiated 
the three party talks among the US, China and the DPRK, which resulted in the 
multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear issue.  
 
Discussions in the three party talks 
 
During the Three Party Talks, the North Korean side claimed that it already possessed 
nuclear bombs, and that it was prepared to test, and export nuclear materials unless 
the US responded to the DPRK‟s demands (Sanger, The New York Times, April 25, 
2003).  North Korea suggested a proposal denoting four steps of simultaneous actions 
to realise an eventual dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programmes. 
According to North Korea‟s proposal, as the first step, the provision of heavy fuel oil 
(HFO) to North Korea should be resumed in exchange for North Korea‟s official 
declaration of its willingness to abandon its ambition for nuclear armament. The 
second step would be an examination of North Korea‟s nuclear facilities under the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. However, in return for this, 
the US should provide North Korea with security guarantee by signing in a non-
aggression treaty. In the third step, other issues such as a diplomatic normalisation 
between the US and North Korea should be established in exchange for North Korea‟s 
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acceptance of international restrictions on its missile programmes. For the final step, 
North Korea would completely dismantle its nuclear weapons programme if the 
construction of the Light Water Reactor (LWR) for electricity generation was done 
(Bluth, 2005). 
 
The North Korean proposal was not accepted by the US. The head of the US 
delegation, James Kelly, repeatedly emphasised the basic policy option that “only 
after complete, irreversible and verifiable (CVID) disarmament would any political 
and economic agreements be possible.” (Bluth, 2005: 101). 
 
Regarding the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme, no substantial 
progress was made during the three party talks. Nevertheless, the participants 
presented their official positions on the nuclear issue. Each player expressed its 
respective perceptions of the nuclear issue as well as their mutual concerns over 
security. In this sense, the meeting was significant because the dialogue itself 
provided a diplomatic vehicle for controlling the North Korean nuclear issue within a 
multilateral framework (FMPRC, April 24, 2003). 
 
3.3.2. The establishment of the Six Party Talks 
 
As discussed above, a concert of powers system operates without establishing any 
formal institutions. Rather, a concert of powers checks and balances me mbers‟ 
interests and activities through the regular pattern of meetings. After the termination 
of the three party talks in April 2003, the six countries – the US, North Korea, China, 
Russia, Japan and South Korea – agreed to create a multilateral forum to deal with the 
North Korean nuclear issue. This was another significant step towards a concert-like 
diplomacy. Thus, this section will examine the establishment of the Six Party Talks 
and three important actors‟ – the US, North Korea and China – perception of the Six 
Party Talks. 
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3.3.2.1. Between the three party talks and the Six Party Talks  
 
US strategy after trilateral talks – a ‘dialogue and pressure’ strategy 
 
Since trilateral talks in Beijing in April 2003, US „dialogue and pressure‟ strategy 
began to take shape. On the „dialogue side‟, the US continued to underline its 
willingness for a diplomatic solution through a multilateral format including other 
regional actors. This was because the US recognised that all regional actors had strong 
interests in a peaceful, nuclear-free Korean Peninsula (Office of the Press Secretary, 
May 23, 2003; Olsen, July 24, 2003) 
 
On the „pressure side‟, the US escalated military and diplomatic actions to isolate 
North Korea. US President Bush had several summit meetings with  President Roh of 
South Korea, Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan, and President Hu of China to obtain 
public support for the US‟s approach that North Korea must dismantle its nuclear 
programmes “completely, verifiably and irreversibly” (Office of the Press Secretary, 
May 23, 2003; TCOG, June 13, 2003) 
 
North Korea’s Reaction against US strategy after the Trilateral Meeting 
 
Responding to the US‟s diplomatic and military pressure, North Korea reacted with a 
mixture of warnings, counter-escalations and caution. North Korea repeatedly warned 
that it would mobilise all its potentials to strengthen a physical deterrent force, and 
that US hostile policy towards North Korea compelled itself not only to build up a 
necessary deterrent force, but also to put it into practice (KCNA, May 5, 2003; KCNA, 
May 11, 2003). 
 
In relation to the lesson from Iraq case, North Korea emphasised the idea that it would 
be essential for a nation to build up a strong military deterrent force in order to protect 
its own security. The most serious concern of North Korea was the probability of a 
nuclear attack by the US. Washington‟s policy position that “all options are not taken 
off the table” generated and reinforced North Korea‟s fear of a nuclear war on the 
Korean Peninsula. This, in return, caused counter-escalation from North Korea such 
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as an emphasis on the need to counteract against the US nuclear threat (KCNA, May 
12, 2003; KCNA, May 27, 2003). 
 
On the other hand, North Korea persistently expressed its desire to solve the nuclear 
issue in a peaceful manner. North Korea repeatedly stated that it wanted to settle the 
issue through dialogue without sticking to a particular format. A letter to president of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sent by the DPRK Foreign Minister 
Paek Nam Sun stated that “[e]ither in view of the history of the nuclear issue on the 
Korean Peninsula, the complexity of its composition or from the viewpoint of the 
responsibility to resolve it, it will be reasonable that the issue is solved through an 
organic combination of all necessary forms of talks. It is the stand of the government 
of the DPRK that bilateral, tripartite and multilateral or any other forms of talks 
proposed by the concerned parties and other countries concerned should be held in an 
appropriate order.” (KCNA, May 31, 2003; KCNA, June 28, 2003) 
 
However, North Korea strongly resisted the US demand that it should abandon its 
nuclear programme first before the resumption of any kind of talks. North Korea 
perceived that US insistence on the North‟s unilateral disarmament first must be 
independent from a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue. Instead it highlighted its 
right to possess a nuclear deterrent force as a self-defensive measure, as well as that 
the nuclear confrontation between the US and North Korea should be settled through 
simultaneous actions (KCNA, June 2, 2003; KCNA, July 16, 2003; July 21, 2003).  
 
At this stage it seems necessary to think about the reasons why North Korea changed 
it policy position from insisting only bilateral talks with the US to accepting a   
multilateral format. According to statements issued by a spokesman for the Foreign 
Ministry of the DPRK, the US and North Korea agreed to have bilateral talks within 
the six party talks framework (KCNA, August 1, 2003; KCNA, August 4, 2003). This 
might allow North Korea to expect that it could bilaterally discuss the nuclear issue 
with the US when necessary. Moreover, it seems clear that North Korea also wanted 
to use a multilateral format in order to strengthen its voice as the US did. For example, 
regarding the US‟s hard- line policy, North Korea succeeded in getting China‟s 
support in compelling the US to give up its hostile policy towards North Korea 
(KCNA, August 8, 2003). In other words, the six party forum gave North Korea 
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opportunities not only to have a bilateral negotiation of the nuclear issue, but also to 
have its voice heard by the US. 
 
3.3.2.2. The first round of the Six Party Talks: the beginning of a concert-like 
diplomacy 
 
In August 2003, a multilateral framework to solve the second North Korean nuclear 
issue – the Six Party Talks – was eventually born. The first round of the Six Party 
Talks was held in Beijing on August 27-29. There was, however, no major 
breakthrough during the first round of the talks. This was largely because two major 
actors – the US and the DPRK – stood on very different ground. 
 
US Policy Position at the First Round of the Six Party Talks 
 
US dialogue strategy resulted in its acceptance of the Six Party Talks. Nevertheless, it 
still maintained its original policy position demanding “complete, verifiable and 
irreversible” dismantle of North Korea‟s nuclear programme. 39 During his keynote 
speech, the head of the US delegation, James Kelly, insisted that the first step to a 
resolution of the nuclear issue should be the DPRK‟s abandonment of its nuclear 
weapons programme. Kelly authorised that the US had no intention to strike the 
DPRK, but did not mention specifics regarding a non-aggression treaty. Kelly 
emphasised the need for the DPRK to end its nuclear weapons programme completely, 
verifiably and irreversibly. He maintained further that the DPRK should immediately 
rejoin the NPT and accept the international inspections under the IAEA safeguards. If 
the DPRK surrendered its nuclear aspirations, he also suggested, the international 
community including the US would offer comprehensive economic assistance to the 
DPRK (Kwak, 2004). 
 
                                                 
39 According to James Kelly‟s clarification, „complete‟ refers to the dismantlement of North Korea‟s 
entire nuclear programme, including its uranium enrichment programme as well as its pluto nium 
programme and its existing nuclear weapons. „Verifiab le‟ means a certification of the d ismantlement, 
not by the international community but by North Korea itself as the Libya cases  demonstrates. 
„Irreversible‟ implies that once North Korea‟s nuclear programmes are dismantled, it must be never 
reconstituted (Kelly 2004a). 
 
 125 
On the sidelines of formal talks, the head of the US delegation, James Kelly, and the 
DPRK‟s chief delegate, K im Yong- il, had an informal bilateral meeting. During this 
meeting, James Kelly promised North Korea that the US would not invade the North 
Korean territory, but rejected the DPRK‟s demand for the establishment of a non-
aggression treaty. In response to Ke lly‟s rejection of a non-aggression treaty, Kim 
Yong-il said that North Korea would formally declare its nuclear status by both 
conducting a nuclear test and testing a warhead delivery system such as a missile (The 
New York Times, August 29, 2003; Washington Post, August 29, 2003). 
 
North Korea’s Position at the First Round 
 
After an announcement of holding the Six Party Talks, North Korea issued a 
statement clarifying its stand on the talks. According to the statement, firstly, North 
Korea demanded the US to change its hostile policy towards the DPRK because it 
regarded US unilateral provocation such as listing North Korea as part of “an axis of 
evil” as a fundamental reason for the re-emergence of the nuclear issue. Secondly, 
North Korea believed only when a non-aggression treaty between the US and North 
Korea was concluded, a solution of the nuclear issue could be realised. Thirdly, North 
Korea also stated that an “earlier inspection” of the nuclear facilities was unacceptable 
before a solution to the issue was concluded (KCNA, August 13, 2003).  
 
The DPRK‟s principled stand on the nuclear issue was repeatedly expressed in 
keynote speech at the first round of the Six Party Talks, made by the DPRK chief 
delegate Kim Yong- il. In his speech, Kim Yong- il said that “[t]he denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula is the general goal of the DPRK. It is not our goal to have 
nuclear weapons.” (KCNA, August 29, 2003) However, he also pointed out that the 
US should give up its hostile policy towards North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue 
in a peaceful manner. As another important component for the settlement of the 
nuclear issue, a conclusion of a non-aggression treaty was underlined. Finally, it was 
emphasised that simultaneous implementation should be guaranteed for solving the 
nuclear issue. A package solution taking of simultaneous steps by both sides would 
include that firstly the US should continue HFO shipments to North Korea and 
expand its food aid for the North Korean; in exchange for this, the DPRK will declare 
its willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. Second, the US should 
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conclude a non-aggression treaty with the DPRK and offer North Korea compensation 
for the loss of electricity resulted from the delay in construction of LWRs; in 
exchange for this, North Korea would permit inspection and monitoring on its nuclear 
facilities and materials. Third, diplomatic normalisations should be set up between the 
US and the DPRK, and between Japan and the DPRK; in exchange for this, North 
Korea will sort out the missile issue. Fourth, the US should help the Light Water 
Reactors (LWRs) construction; when the LWRs project is completed, North Korea 
will eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons programme (KCNA, August 29, 2003).  
 
China’s perception of the Six Party Talks 
 
As examined above, from Chinese side, the maintenance of stability on the Korean 
Peninsula is one of the most crucial interests of its national security. This is because 
security environment of the Korean Peninsula does not only influence peace of the 
Northeast Asian region, but also directly involves China‟s security concerns. As a 
result of this, China‟s first priority regarding the Korean Peninsula issue has been 
preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and this position is still 
the starting point of China in dealing with the nuclear issue. According to China‟s 
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the establishment of a nuclear- free Korean Peninsula 
would be the basic position of China on the issue. At the same time, he pointed o ut 
that North Korea‟s security concerns should also be tackled through peaceful dialogue 
in order to achieve a stable environment on the Korean Peninsula (Wang, August 26, 
2003). 
 
China carried out shuttle diplomacy to promote the Six Party Talks process. For 
example, in preparation for the talks, Wang Yi, Head of the Chinese delegation, held 
individual pre-conferences with Alexander Lusyukov, James Kelly, Yi Su-hyok and 
Mitoji Yabunaka, heads of Russian, American, South Korean and Japanese 
delegations during August 2003 (World News Connections, August 26, 2003).  
 
With respect to the characteristic of the Six Party Talks framework, China clearly 
stated that it considered the Six Party Talks framework as a concert of powers system. 
According to Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement, Chinese Foreign Minister Li 
Zhaoxing said that „concerted efforts‟ made by various parties, resulted in holding the 
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Six Party Talks (Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement, August 27, 2003). China also 
emphasised that it would be necessary for relevant parties to continue to make 
„concerted efforts‟ in order to reach at a peaceful resolutions of the nuclear issue 
(Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement, August 29, 2003a). 
 
More specifically, Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan listed three implications of 
the Six Party Talks regarding its way of dealing with security matters. First, despite 
being complicated conflicts among different nations, a desirable solution can be 
created through dialogue and this would be the best way to address regiona l security 
issues. Second, it is essential to build mutual trust when tackling disputes. In order to 
build mutual trust, state actors should respect each other with equality, give up the use 
of force, and avoid doing comments and actions that might escalate tension. Third, 
although there may be disagreement between the positions of different parties, joint 
efforts could produce a meeting point of their respective interests (Chinese Foreign 
Ministry Statement, August 29, 2003b). 
 
Regarding the progress of the Six Party Talks, China believed that US policy towards 
North Korea was the main obstacle to the talks. On September 1, 2003, China‟s Vice 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi described the US as the “main problem” in the Six Party 
Talks and asked the US to consider North Korea‟s security concerns in order to 
promote the Six Party Talks (Kahn, September 2, 2003). 40 
 
On the other hand, China made high-profile diplomatic efforts to convince North 
Korea to accept a new round of the talks. According to media reports, during his visit 
to Pyongyang in late October 2003, Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People‟s Congress, promised the provision of economic 
aid, including fuel oil and food, as an incentive for North Korea to accept a new round 
of the talks (Reuters, 2003). The DPRK and the Chinese side discussed the nuclear 
issue and agreed in principle to continue the course of further Six Party Talks (KCNA, 
October 30, 2003). In late December, China‟s Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi and 
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju met in Pyongyang. According to 
                                                 
40
 Wang‟s remarks echoed those of chief Russian delegation Losyukov. Losyukov told the BBC: “A 
very big distance separates the positions of the DPRK and the USA. There is a perception among 
Russian diplomats that Washington ought to go the extra mile on certain aspects to solve the problem” 
(“In quotes-N. Korea talks end,” BBC News Online, August 29, 2003).  
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the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), both sides agreed that it might be 
essential to hold a next round of the talks in order to develop the process of dialogue 
dealing with the nuclear issue (KCNA, December 28, 2003).  
 
3.3.2.3. Multilateral cooperation without formal institutionalisation 
 
Compared with the earlier stage of the nuclear issue, this phase shows at least two 
significant differences. Firstly, the two principal actors – the US and the DPRK – 
which had been confronting each other accepted a multilateral format to deal with 
their respective security concerns. In the first place, they agreed to the 
multilateralisation of the nuclear issue by contributing to the three party talks among 
the US, North Korea and China. Moreover, they eventually took part in the 
establishment of the Six Party Talks which has been initiating the nuclear negotiations. 
Secondly, the six party framework allowed all of the major actors in the Northeast 
Asian region to have a seat in dealing with this particular security issue in the region.  
 
Thus, with respect to the implications of the second phase, it seems important to 
understand that a multilateral approach was generally accepted among the involved 
countries. In other words, instead of undertaking further escalations such as missile 
launches by North Korea or pre-emptive strike against North Korea by the US – the 
two principal actors decided to take part in a multilateral format. This means that both 
of them agreed that their respective security concerns would be consulted within the 
format. In addition to this, other major actors - China, Japan, Russia and South Korea 
– also agreed on holding multilateral talks to deal with a specific security issue. This 
implies that they would accept the conclusions of the format when they considered 
their own policy position surrounding the second North Korean nuclear programme.  
 
Despite the absence of any formal institutionalisation, it seems obvious that the three 
party talks and the Six Party Talks operated as an engine to solve a common security 
concern. The multilateralisation of the nuclear issue encouraged cooperation among 
regional actors in Northeast Asia and eventually let them make diplomatic efforts to 
exclude warlike solution. These processes map onto one of the central assumption of a 
concert of powers system. Put differently, the second phase shows the hidden 
structure of a concert of powers system – that is, no formal institution but the 
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promotion of cooperation among the involved countries. Overall, the second phase 
can be understood as the starting point of a concert- like diplomacy among the major 
actors in the region to deal with a specific security issue.  
 
3.3.3. The creation of norms: Multilateralism and the idea of CVID 
 
3.3.3.1. Multilateralism as a norm 
 
As argued earlier, a multilateral approach was initiated by the US‟s policy perception 
of how best to deal with North Korea‟s nuclear programme. After the US‟s invasion 
of Iraq, China supported a multilateral approach and North Korea also accepted a 
discussion of its nuclear programme within a multilateral framework. Eventually the 
Six Party Talks were established and „multilateralism‟ has gone through the whole 
process of the Six Party Talks. Thus, it seems reasonable to consider multilateralism 
as one of norms which has been created through the Six Party Talks. This section will 
explore the issue of how multilateralism has been created and operated in relation to 
the Six Party Talks. 
 
The US’s perception of multilateralism 
 
With respect to a solution of the North Korean nuclear issue, the US strongly and 
persistently supported a multilateral approach. The US has underlined its willingness 
for a diplomatic solution through a multilateral format including other regional actors. 
Thus, the US called for other countries‟ participation in ending North Korea‟s nuclear 
programme from the initial stage of the nuclear issue. This was because the US 
believed that international pressure coming from a multilateral framework would 
make North Korea recognise that its nuclear weapons programmes were unacceptable 
among neighbouring countries. Therefore, the US regarded the six party format as the 
best tool to help North Korea to abandon its nuclear capability (Kelly, 2004a). 
 
As the first Bush administration did, the second Bush administration persistently ruled 
out bilateral negotiations between the US and North Korea. The US reemphasised that 
the maintenance of a multilateral forum would be the US‟s solid position because a 
nuclear- free Korean Peninsula was not only in the US‟s interest, but also in the 
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interests of Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia. The US pointed out that it would 
carry out the Six Party Talks diplomatically and multilaterally because the nuclear 
issue was not an issue between North Korea and the US, but an issue for the 
neighbouring countries around North Korea (Rice, March 20, 2005).  
 
The US‟s multilateral approach was repeatedly reaffirmed. On April 28, 2005, US  
President Bush pointed to the uselessness of a bilateral approach. He suggested that it 
would be better to incorporate four other nations – South Korea, Japan, China, and 
Russia – into a „consortium‟ to handle the nuclear issue because this might allow to 
communicate the same message to North Korea with a tougher voice (Bush, April 28, 
2005). 
 
On May 26, 2005, Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, stated that the North Korean 
nuclear issue was not about a bilateral confrontation between the US and North Korea, 
but about what would be the security interests of both the US and neighbouring 
countries because “a nuclear North Korea is not a problem for the United States alone, 
it is a problem for all of North Korea's neighbors as well.” (Rice, May 26, 2005) She 
indicated that although the Six Party Talks made little progress, the actual outcome of 
the six party process might be that it placed the nuclear issue into a multilateral 
framework (Rice, May 26, 2005). 
 
North Korea’s response to a multilateral approach  
 
Following the trilateral talks in Beijing on 23-25 April 2003, North Korea publically 
announced its position that it wanted to solve the nuclear issue in a peaceful manner. 
North Korea repeatedly stated that the nuclear issue should be settled through 
dialogue without sticking to a particular format of dialogue (KCNA, May 31, 2003). 
A letter to the president of the UNSC sent by the DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam 
Sun testified that “[e]ither in view of the history of the nuclear issue on the Korean 
Peninsula, the complexity of its composition or from the viewpoint of the 
responsibility to resolve it, it will be reasonable that the issue is solved through an 
organic combination of all necessary forms of talks. It is the stand of the government 
of the DPRK that bilateral, tripartite and multilateral or any other forms of talks 
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proposed by the concerned parties and other countries concerned should be held in an 
appropriate order.” (KCNA, June 28, 2003) 
 
Multilateralism as a norm 
 
With respect to the view point of multilateralism as a norm, it seems worth examining 
the conclusions of each round of the Six Party Talks because those might show what 
kinds of consensus were shared among the countries involved. In particular, the 
chairman‟s statement for the second round and three joint statements 41  could be 
considered as good texts for this.  
 
The second round of the Six Party Talks was held in Beijing from 25 th to 28th of 
February, 2004. China issued a chairman‟s statement on the closing day of the 
meeting. According to the chairman‟s statement, “the Parties enhanced their 
understanding of each other‟s positions … through dialogue in a spirit of mutual 
respect and consultations on an equal basis.” (FMPRC, February 28, 2004) The 
parties agreed to hold the third round of the talks before the end of June 2004, and 
they also decided to set up a working group to arrange the next round of meetings 
(FMPRC, February 28, 2004). 
 
Although North Korea stated that US stance calling for CVID put a big obstacle in the 
way of the talks (KCNA, February 29, 2004), 42  other major actors considered the 
second round of the talks as a good starting point for encouraging a multilateral 
approach with regard to the North Korean nuclear issue. For example, the US 
announced that “[t]he multilateral process is off to a very good start. The false notion 
that North Korean nuclear weapons are the unique concern of the United States is all 
                                                 
41
 The Six Party Talks generated three joint statements: Joint Statement of the Fourth Round, issued on 
September 19, 2005 (September 19 Joint Statement in 2005), Joint Statement of the Fifth Round, 
issued on February 13, 2007 (February 13 Joint Statement in  2007) and Jo int Statement of Sixth Round, 
issued on October 3, 2007 (October 3 Joint Statement in 2007). 
42 In his introductory remarks during the second round of the talks, The US delegation, James Kelly 
reemphasised the US‟s orig inal policy position. First, the six party forum was the best option to achieve 
a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula and thereby will contribute to promoting peace and stability 
on the Korean Peninsula. This was not only because all six parties were stakeholders in this issue, but 
also because checking the proliferation of WMD was crucial to defending the international community. 
Second, CVID –  the complete, verifiab le and irreversible d ismantlement o f North Korea‟s entire 
nuclear programmes – remained US policy. Th is must be achieved first before any kind of concession 
such as a multilateral security assurance and diplomatic normalisation, is given to the DPRK (Kelly  
2004b). 
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but gone. Our goal – complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of North Korean 
nuclear programs – has been dubbed by the South Koreans “CVID,” and that acronym 
and the important goal it represents has been accepted by all but the North Koreans, 
And with each of the countries having large and direct interest in the issue, the 
process is unusually well focused. ” (Kelly, 2004c)  
 
On the other hand, China also supported the outcomes of the second round of the talks 
as a meaningful achievement of a multilateral approach. According to Chinese Vice 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi, as the parties had a serious and positive attitude, the 
meeting signalled the talks would continue as a multilateral framework. In this regard, 
it is significant that Chinese vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that it was 
essential for the parties to make „concerted efforts‟ in three important areas in order to 
improve mutual understandings among them. According to Wang Yi, first, key 
perspectives of essential issues and resolutions suggested during the talks should be 
thoroughly examined by all the parties. Second, in order to prepare for the next round 
of talks, a working group should be set up as early as possible. Third, words or actions 
that might escalate tensions should be prevented to sustain a cooperative environment 
for the process of the talks (Wang, 2004). 
 
More importantly, it seems necessary to look at the tenets of the joint statements 
which were issued during the six party negotiations because those joint statements 
significantly emphasise the importance of multilateral efforts in dealing with the 
North Korean nuclear issue. Firstly, the second session of the fourth round o f the talks 
was held on between 13 September and 19 September 2005 in Beijing and eventually 
produced a joint statement supposed to be a guideline for the principles that would 
peacefully end the second North Korean nuclear crisis since October 2002. According 
to the joint statement issued on September 19, 2005 (September 19 Joint Statement  of 
the Six Party Talks, September 19, 2005),43 all parties involved agreed on setting up a 
verifiable nuclear- free Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. They also promised to 
make “joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia” and to take 
“coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner 
in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action”.” (The 
                                                 
43
 For the details, see the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005. 
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September 19 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, September 19, 2005) The most 
interesting point might be that the Joint Statement signed up by all participants was 
issued. Although most of the key elements of the Joint Statement were repeatedly 
discussed during the previous rounds of the talks, it was significant in that all parties 
involved reached a formal agreement. 44 
 
The third session of the fifth round of the talks, which was held in Beijing from 8 to 
13 February, 2007, also issued an agreement of „Initial Actions for the 
Implementation of the Joint Statement‟ (February 13 Joint Statement of the Sxi Party 
Talks, February 13, 2007). This agreement was designed to indicate initial steps for 
dismantling North Korea‟s nuclear weapons programme. 45 According to the February 
13 Joint Statement in 2007, the six parties re-announced the importance of 
multilateral efforts by stating that “[t]he parties agreed to take coordinated steps to 
implement the Joint statement in a phases manner in line with the principle of “action 
for action”.” (The February 13 Joint statement of the Six Party Talks, February 13, 
2007)46 
 
On October 3, 2007, the second session of the sixth round of the talks released an 
agreement of “Second-Phase Actions for Implementation of the Joint Statement” 
(October 3 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, October 3, 2007). In specific terms, 
this agreement was designed to identify disabling process of the North Korean nuclear 
facilities However, in general, the October 3 Joint Statement in 2007 can also be seen 
as a successful product of a multilateral coordination as previous ones were. 47 
 
3.3.3.2. CVID as a non-proliferation norm 
 
Along with multilateralism, there seems to be another important norm which has been 
initiated through the Six Party Talks. The Bush administration has persistently 
                                                 
44
 It seems notable that The US regarded the September 19 Jo int Statement  in 2005 as one of the best 
cases of multilateral negotiations in the Northeast Asian region (Hill, September 19, 2005a). 
45
 For details, see the February 13 Joint statement in 2007. 
46
 Regard ing the implication of this agreement, The US emphasised that the February 13 agreement 
was the result of a successful mult ilateral dip lomacy. The US perceived that the agreement brought all 
of North Korea‟s neighbours as well as The US, and this might place all six parties on guarantors of the 
agreement (Rice, February 13, 2007).  
47
 For details, see the October 3 Jo int Statement in 2007. 
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reaffirmed that the North Korean nuclear issue should be solved in a way of 
“complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID)”. Moreover, the US 
made significant diplomatic efforts to obtain support for their CVID policy from other 
parties. This section will examine the question of how the notion of CVID has been 
perceived among the parties involved.  
 
The US’s policy perception of CVID 
 
As discussed above, since the revelation of the North Korean nuclear programme in 
2002, the “complete, verifiable and irreversible” dismantlement of North Korea‟s 
nuclear programme (CVID) has been at the centre of US policy and this stance has 
gone through the whole process of the Six Party Talks. For example, in his keynote 
speech of the first round of the talks, the head of the US delegation, James Kelly, 
insisted that the first step to a resolution of the nuclear issue should be the DPRK‟s 
abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme. He emphasised the need for the 
DPRK to end its nuclear weapons programme “completely, verifiably and 
irreversibly.” (Kwak, 2004) 
 
The US repeatedly clarified its basic principle of CVID. In preparing for the second 
round of the talks, James Kelly announced that the only acceptable solutions for the 
nuclear issue would be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of 
North Korea‟s nuclear programmes (Kelly 2004a). From time to time, the US‟s 
perception of CVID has been interpreted in different words. For example, Stephen G. 
Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, announced that the US‟s 
demand should be “the permanent, thorough and transparent dismantlement of North 
Korea‟s nuclear program.” (Rademaker, March 10, 2005) In his opening statement of 
the first session of the fourth round, the head of the US delegation, Christopher Hill, 
asked North Korea to abandon its nuclear programmes “permanently, fully and 
verifiably.” (Hill, July 26, 2005) 
 
Nevertheless, the concrete meaning of CVID can be seen from James Kelly‟s 
definition. According to James Kelly‟s clarification, „complete‟ refers to the 
dismantlement of North Korea‟s entire nuclear programme, including its uranium 
enrichment programme as well as its plutonium programme and its existing nuclear 
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weapons. „Verifiable‟ means a certification of the dismantlement, not by the 
international community, but by North Korea itself as the Libyan case48 demonstrated. 
„Irreversible‟ implies that once North Korea‟s nuclear programmes are dismantled, 
they must be never reconstituted (Kelly 2004a). 
 
Other involved countries’ perception of CVID 
 
With respect to the spread of the CVID idea, it seems useful to examine the US‟s 
diplomatic efforts to persuade other involved countries to accept its CVID approach. 
In addition, it is also necessary to explore the tenets of the joint statements – 
September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 – because 
the idea of CVID has been embedded in those agreements.  
 
Regarding diplomatic efforts, US President Bush had several summit meetings with 
President Roh of South Korea, Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan, and President Hu of 
China to obtain public support for US approach that North Korea must dismantle its 
nuclear programmes “completely, verifiably and irreversibly”. For example, after the 
US-South Korea summit on May 14, 2003, US President Bush and the President of 
ROK Roh issued a joint statement. According to this agreement, “[b]oth leaders 
reiterated their strong commitment to work for the complete, verifiable and 
irreversible elimination of North Korea‟s nuclear weapons program through peaceful 
means based on international cooperation.” (Embassy of the United States, May 14, 
2003) Japan also supported the US‟s idea of the CVID. After the summit between US 
President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in May 2003, Bush announced 
that “[o]n the threat from North Korea‟s nuclear program, the Prime Minister and I 
[Bush] see the problem exactly the same way. We will not tolerate nuclear weapons in 
North Korea … We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible elimination of North Korea‟s nuclear weapons program.” (Office of the 
Press Secretary, May 23, 2003) Eventually, the US, Japan and South Korea 
announced their support of the idea of the CVID together. During the Trilateral 
Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting on June 13, 2003, they agreed 
“to continue to seek a complete, verifiable, and irreversible end to North Korea‟s 
                                                 
48
 In December 2003, the Libyan government announced the dismantlement of its nuclear and chemical 
weapons programmes without any precondition and concessions (Braun and Chiba, 2004).  
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nuclear weapons program through peaceful, diplomatic means.” (Boucher, June 13, 
2003) 
 
On the other hand, it can be seen from the readings of the joint statements of the Six 
Party Talks how all of the involved countries perceive the idea of the CVID. In the 
first place, according to the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, “[t]he Six Parties 
unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party talks is the verifiable 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.” (The September 19 
Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, September 19, 2005) Moreover, the February 
13 Joint Statement in 2007 announced that “[t]he DPRK will shut down and seal for 
the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the 
reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct a ll necessary 
monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.” (The February 
13 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, February 13, 2007) 
 
Nevertheless, it seems notable that the joint statements did not use the term “a 
complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement”. This is because North Korea 
strongly resisted the CVID concept.  Thus, it is necessary to explore North Korea‟s 
perception of the idea of CVID. 
 
North Korea’s response to the idea of CVID 
 
North Korea has persistently denied accepting the idea of CVID because it perceived 
US policy position as an attempt to disarm itself. In particular, during the third round 
of the talks, 49  North Korea suggested its concrete proposals regarding its nuclear 
programme. According to KCNA, “[t]he DPRK delegation at the talks clarified 
details concerning its nuclear freeze on the premise that the U.S. withdraws its 
demand for CVID. North Korea‟s proposal made it clear that the DPRK would freeze 
all the facilities related to nuclear weapons and products churned out by their 
operation, refrain from producing more nukes, transferring and testing them and the 
freeze would be the first start that would lead to the ultimate dismantlement of the 
nuclear weapons program.” (KCNA, June 28, 2004).  
                                                 
49
 The third round of the Six Party Talks took place from June 23 to 26, 2004 in Beijing. 
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In this proposal, however, North Korea limited the scope of the nuclear freeze by 
stating that it would dismantle only those facilities related to developing nuclear 
weapons such as 5 mega-watt nuclear reactor at the Yongbyeon complex. North 
Korea also claimed its need to have a civil nuclear programme for the purpose of 
electricity generation (Kelly, 2004d).  
 
Whilst North Korea maintained its right to have a peaceful nuclear programme, the 
US was persistently opposed to North Korea‟s demands to develop nuclear energy 
and have a Light Water Reactor (LWR) for power generation. The US insisted that 
North Korea‟s energy needs should be met through conventional means (Hill 2005, 
August 7). With respect to the issue of the LWR, the US pointed out that it had 
concerns about the probability for LWR to be used for nuclear arms production by 
North Korea as the Yongbyon research reactor had been. The US indicated that it 
would be possible to produce nuclear bombs from LWR although this would involve 
a technically difficult process (Online News Hour, 2005). 
 
Different views regarding the scope of the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear 
facilities remained unresolved despite the issue of the September 19 Joint Statement 
in 2005. During the first session of the fourth round, while the US urged a complete 
elimination of all nuclear programmes including nuclear power generation, North 
Korea continued to support its right to a civilian nuclear programme for the purposes 
of power generation. In addition, North Korea maintained that the construction of 
light water reactors (LWRs), as promised in the 1994 Agreed Framework should be 
carried on. However, the US refused the resumption of LWR construction and 
suggested that the issue of nuclear energy might be discussed sometime in the future 
(Koo, 2006). At the end of the fourth round of the talks, in his closing statement, the 
head of the US delegation, Christopher Hill, clarified US original position by saying 
that all benefits, including the construction of LWRs, that North Korea would get, 
could be realised after North Korea had dismantled all nuclear weapons and 
programmes completely, verifiably and irreversibly (Hill, September 19, 2005b). 
 
On the other hand, North Korea asked the US to provide LWRs as an evidence of US 
commitment to confidence-building. North Korea insisted that the provision of LWR 
would be the only possible way to prove the US‟s good intention towards North 
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Korea. North Korea announced that the Joint Statement made it clear that North 
Korea would rejoin the NPT and IAEA safeguards only when the issue of LWR was 
solved first (KCNA, September 20, 2005). 
 
3.3.4. The role of an alliance system 
 
It seems notable that unlike the European Concert in the 19th century which had 
witnessed a conflict with an alliance system, the Six Party Talks processes 
demonstrated that an alliance system could play a role as a part of a concert of powers. 
For example, the US‟ allies contributed to creating norms such as multilateralism and 
the notion of CVID which applied to dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. 
Thus, it might be necessary to observe the topic of how an alliance system has 
operated in relation to the nuclear issue.  
 
3.3.4.1. North Korea‟s allies 
 
North Korea-China alliance and North Korea-Russia alliance in the post-Cold War 
era 
 
It seems obvious that North Korea‟s security environment has deteriorated since the 
end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant that North 
Korea lost its traditional international sponsors both in economic and military fields. 
Moreover, North Korea could no longer regard China as a reliable ally not only 
because China pursued a capitalist way for its economic development, but also 
because it was determined to normalise diplomatic relationship with South Korea. 
Thus, North Korea perceived that its Cold War allies granted less protective security 
assurances (Zhang and Brown, 2000). 
 
After the Yeltsin administration‟s disengagement from North Korea, 50   China 
remained the only country which sustained a formal military alliance with North 
                                                 
50
 In 1996, Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and North 
Korea was expired. Art icle 1 of the treaty stated that “Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer 
armed attack by any State or coalit ion of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other 
Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its 
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Korea.51 Nevertheless, China interpreted its military involvement in the defence of 
North Korea to be operative only if the attack is unprovoked because China had much 
more important strategic goals than its alliance commitment (Kim, 2001; Kerr, 2005). 
 
Russia wanted to maintain power over security affairs in the Korean Peninsula and 
this encouraged Russia to build up balanced relations with both North and South 
Korea after the end of Cold War. Russia normalised diplomatic relations with South 
Korea in September 1990 and expected to be a participant in dealing with 
international affairs over the stability of the Korean Peninsula in cooperation with the 
other powers such as the US, Japan, and China (Buszynski, 2000). 
 
The Six Party Talks and North Korea’s traditional allies 
 
As discussed above, China and Russia did not tightly ally themselves with North 
Korea as they had done during the Cold war. Thus, it seems clear that there was little 
prospect for North Korea to expect unconditional backup from its traditional allies in 
relation to the nuclear issue. 
 
As David Kerr indicates, China and Russia regarded the North Korean nuclear issue 
as basically a bilateral issue between the US and North Korea. However, China‟s 
policy goal to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula and Russia‟s interest in 
involvement in the peninsula brought them to the international negotiation table (Kerr, 
2005). In February 2003, China and Russia released a joint statement on North Korea 
with an announcement that “[i]n a sincere desire to promote and strengthen peace and 
stability in the Asia-Pacific Region, China and Russia jointly called for all relevant 
parties to make all necessary efforts to seek a peaceful and just resolution of the 
problem of Korean Peninsula.” (Text of Sino-Russia communiqué on North Korea, 
February 27, 2003) 
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3.3.4.2. The US‟s allies 
 
The US-ROK alliance and the US-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War era 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula has remained a legacy of the 
Cold War. Thus, the rationale of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and 
South Korea remains comprehensible and consistent: “to deter aggression from the 
North” (Cossa, 2000: 6). This is because as the US perceives, “[t]he situation on the 
Korean peninsula will likely remain volatile and unpredictable … North Korea is 
believed to have a sizable stockpile of chemical weapons … the North can still inflict 
considerable damage against the South and threaten its neighbors. Combined US-
ROK forces remain vigilant.” (The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-
Pacific Region, 1998: 23) 
 
On the other hand, with respect to a bilateral alliance with Japan, the US maintains 
that “[a]s our most important bilateral alliance in the region, the U.S.-Japan 
partnership in particular will remain critical to U.S. and regional interests – as 
important to Asia‟s future as it has been to its past. The United States sees no 
substitute for this historic relationship as the region prepares to address old and new 
challenges into a new century … The United States and Japan will continue building a 
global partnership based on our shared values, mutual interests and complementary 
capabilities.” (The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 
1998: 61) 
 
The US‟s perception shows that the significance of its bilateral alliance with 
traditional allies is still constant despite the termination of the Cold War confrontation. 
Nevertheless, besides the importance of the bilateral alliance between the US and its 
traditional allies, in relation to North Korea‟s nuclear threat it seems more important 
to examine both how the US and its traditional allies – South Korea and Japan – 
figure out North Korea‟s nuclear threat and how they organise their cooperation as 
allies. 
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The US-ROK-Japan trilateral alliance against North Korea’s threat 
 
Since the first nuclear crisis in 1994, the Clinton administration has examined the 
appropriateness of its policy towards North Korea. The US emphasised that North 
Korea‟s nuclear programme might be one of the most critical challenges threatening 
the US‟s national security. In dealing with North Korea‟s nuclear threat, the former 
US Secretary of Defense, William Perry, pointed out in his report on US policy 
towards North Korea that “No U.S. po licy toward the DPRK will succeed if the ROK 
and Japan do not actively support it and cooperate in its implementation. 52 Securing 
such trilateral coordination should be possible, since the interests of the three parties, 
while not identical, overlap in significant and definable ways.” (Perry, October 12, 
1999) 
 
Consequently, the Clinton administration established the Trilateral Coordination and 
Oversight Group (TCOG) to improve trilateral cooperation between the US, South 
Korea, and Japan. According to Ralph Cossa, “[w]hile the extent of cooperation and 
degree of harmony may at times be overstated, there is no question that through the 
TCOG process the three countries have more successfully managed their respective, 
somewhat differing views on the potentially contentious issue of how best to deal 
with North Korea.” (Cossa, 2000: 11) 
 
In this regard, it might be possible to say that the establishment of the TCOG might be 
the starting point to facilitate an „institutionalised cooperation‟ among the US‟s allies 
in the region. This is because the TCOG has been an important mechanism to smooth 
over differences in perception and approach to engagement with North Korea, 
although the key interests of the states are not totally identical.  
 
Regarding the second North Korean nuclear crisis, the TCOG has operated as a key 
tool to achieve coordinated steps among the US, South Korea, and Japan. For example,  
at the final stage of the Bush administration‟s policy review towards North Korea, the 
US positively evaluated the importance of the TCOG meeting. Immediately after the 
TCOG meeting in Honolulu on May 26, 2001, the US Assistant Secretary of State for 
                                                 
52
 This implementation refers to the Agreed Framework of 1994.  
 142 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly, announced that “[t]he three delegations 
also reiterated the importance of continued close consultation and coordination of 
policy toward North Korea on the range of issues, including missiles, weapons of 
mass destruction, and humanitarian affairs. In this regard, the three delegations 
expressed the shared hope that North Korea would take steps to address the concerns 
of the international community.” (Kelly, May 26, 2001).  
 
At this stage, the TCOG meeting focused on compelling North Korea to commit to 
the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. According to the joint press 
statement of the TCOG meeting issued on November 27, 2001, The US, Japan, and 
South Korea restated “their commitment to steady implementation of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework and called on North Korea to take steps to address the concerns of the 
international community.” (Boucher, November 27, 2001) 
 
However, since the public revelation of the North Korean highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) nuclear programme in October 2002, the role of the TCOG has been related to 
the spread of the idea of CVID. North Korea‟s HEU programme considered by the 
three countries as a serious violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), IAEA safeguards agreement, and the South-North 
Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Thus, through the 
TCOG meeting they concluded that North Korea should “dismantle this [HEU] 
program in a prompt and verifiable manner.” (Boucher, November 9, 2002) Another 
TCOG meeting reemphasised the idea that “North Korea‟s relations with the entire 
international community hinge on its taking prompt and verifiable action to 
completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program and come into full compliance 
with its international nuclear commitments.” (Boucher, January 7, 2003) Eventually, 
the TCOG agreed to “continue to seek a complete, verifiable, and irreversible end to 
North Korea‟s nuclear weapons program through peaceful, diplomatic means.” 
(Boucher, June 13, 2003) 
 
On the other hand, the US encouraged its traditional allies through summit diplomacy 
to share the idea of CVID. US President Bush had several summit meetings with 
President Roh of South Korea and Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan to discuss how to 
deal with North Korea‟s nuclear ambition.  
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On May 14, 2003, President Bush of the US and President Roh of the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) held a summit meeting in Washington. They discussed a number of 
bilateral issues such as the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and the US Forces 
Korea.53 However, regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, they restated that they 
would not accept a nuclear armed North Korea. Moreover, both leaders underlined 
their commitment “to work for the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of 
North Korea‟s nuclear weapons program through peaceful means based on 
international cooperation.” (Embassy of the United States, May 14, 2003) The US-
ROK alliance reaffirmed this principle through the following summit meeting in 
Bangkok on October 20, 2003. According to a „Joint Statement Between the United 
States and the Republic of Korea‟, both leaders re-emphasised “the importance of the 
Six Party talks for achieving the goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible 
elimination of North Korea‟s nuclear weapons programs.” (Embassy of the United 
States, October 20, 2003) 
 
The US also perceived that Japan‟s cooperation was necessary for a successful and 
comprehensive resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. In the summit meeting 
held in Texas on May 23, 2003, President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi 
accomplished the same conclusion as Bush and Roh d id. They announced that “[w]e 
will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea … We will not settle for anything 
less than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North Korea‟s 
nuclear weapons program.” (Office of the Press Secretary, May 23, 2003) 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
As observed in the introduction of this chapter, the basic goal of this chapter was to 
examine whether the multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear crisis could be 
regarded as an example which provides insights of international security under a 
concert of powers system. Another goal was to explore the role of an alliance system 
in relation to the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis.  
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With the purpose of completing these objectives, this chapter investigated the 
subsequent questions. 
1. Can the notion of security under a concert of powers system be relevant to a 
description of the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis?  
2. Is it appropriate to understand the multilateralisation of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis through the security implications of a concert of powers system? 
3. Does the notion of security under an alliance system help in explaining the 
second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis? 
 
The second part of this chapter primarily observed the security implications of a 
concert of powers system, based on the questions of what the perception of security 
was under a concert of powers system and how the system granted security to other 
states. In addition to this, the concept and provision of security under an alliance 
system were explored as another useful conceptualisation related to the second phase 
of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Following the outlining key implications of each 
system regarding the concept and provision of security, the topics and cases were 
selected. 
 
The third part looked and evaluated particular cases and topics as an assessment of the 
applicability of the perception of security both under a concert of powers system and 
under an alliance system to the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
Following the examinations of the cases, this section was presented to build a set of 
ideas as a conclusion of this chapter.  
 
With respect to a concert of powers system, the literature has revealed that firstly, a 
concert of powers system emerges where it is essential for a small group of great 
powers to cooperate with each other in order to preserve shared interests among them. 
This implies that under a concert of powers, international affairs are principally 
handled through the prospect of the status quo among the great powers. In other 
words, a concert of powers system assumes that it is a more crucial security interest 
for the members to avoid war through cooperation than to seek to pursue specific 
national interests individually. In this regard, Susan Shirk notes that “[t]he primary 
objective of a concert is to regulate relations between the major powers. By sharing 
information about capabilities and intentions, the powers reduce the risk of security 
 145 
dilemmas among themselves. By creating norms of cooperation, the powers raise the 
cost of defection and aggressive behaviour.” (Shirk, 1997: 265)  
 
Secondly, the literature also shows that a concert of powers system can successfully 
control security issues without any formal institutional structure. As can be seen from 
the historical example of Europe in the 19th century, despite the lack of a formal 
agreement of commitments, a concert of powers system regulated international affairs 
through informal negotiations and the establishment of consensus which originated 
from the regular pattern of meetings to observe security issues. During the era of the 
European Concert in the 19th century, there was a compromise among the great 
powers so that they might control security matters over the rest o f Europe, this 
initiated concert diplomacy by holding conferences.  
 
Thirdly, it has been discussed that the Concert of Europe in 19 th century supposed 
“great-power tutelage” (Elrod, 1976: 163) over international affairs involving smaller 
states. However, it is difficult to imagine that smaller countries would agree to the 
idea of „great-power tutelage‟ in the present century. Thus, it seems important to note 
Shirk‟s claim that “a twentieth-century concert, unlike its earlier antecedent, would 
not be able to provide security for all nations, big or small. Instead, it would establish 
a norm that the powers would not intervene militarily in conflicts among the less 
powerful states.” (Shirk, 1997: 266) Put differently, in order for a modern concert of 
powers to be operative, it is necessary to create norms as the Concert of Europe did.  
 
Fourthly, the literature of an alliance system has demonstrated that alliances are 
established by states that share common interests, which is usually a negative one 
such as “fear of other states” (Waltz, 1979: 166). With respect to the provision of 
security, an alliance system assumes that it can avoid military conflict by 
demonstrating its willingness to defeat any aggressors. More importantly, an alliance 
system supposes that it can achieve the aggregation of power through 
“institutionalized security cooperation” (Leeds, 2003b: 805).  
 
In order to evaluate whether the second phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis 
provides evidence related to the perception of security under a concert of powers and 
under an alliance system, the third part of this chapter looked at the second phase of 
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the nuclear negotiations. Four cases which seem to be relevant to the hypotheses of 
this chapter were chosen and investigated.  
 
First of all, China‟s engagement was examined. Regarding the North Korean nuclear 
issue, China‟s original policy position was to support the US and North Korea to have 
bilateral dialogue to discuss the nuclear issue. China considered that the nature of the 
nuclear issue was a bilateral issue between two actors because it perceived that the 
nuclear issue originated from the slow or non- implementation of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework between the US and North Korea. Nevertheless, after The US invasion of 
Iraq, China changed its policy position. China made proactive diplomatic efforts – for 
example, holding the trilateral talks in Beijing – to mediate nuclear confrontation 
between the two because China recognised that war on the Korean Peninsula was not 
consistent with its national interest. 
 
Secondly, the establishment of the Six Party Talks framework was selected as an 
example of indicating the beginning of a concert- like diplomacy. Since trilateral talks 
started in April 2003, the US and North Korea persistently maintained their original 
stance. However, the second phase eventually witnessed the formation of the six party 
framework including the two main actors and all of the regionally involved countries 
in Northeast Asia – China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. The first round of the  Six 
Party Talks was held in Beijing on August 27-29, 2003. Although the outcome of the 
first round was not fruitful, the first round could be considered as a good opportunity 
for participants to gain mutual understanding of their respective policy positio n 
regarding the nuclear issue. 
 
After that, the idea of CVID was discussed to describe the assumption that a modern 
concert contributes to the creation of norms. The US has persistently tried to set up a 
multilateral framework in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis. In this regard, 
the US has underlined the idea that the nuclear issue was a regional issue. More 
importantly, the US has tried to spread the idea of CVID among the participants 
involved. In his keynote speech of the first round of the S ix Party Talks, the US 
delegation James Kelly, emphasised that North Korea should abandon its nuclear 
programme „completely, verifiably and irreversibly‟. The idea of CVID has been 
supported by other countries involved. Through several times of summit meetings, 
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South Korea, Japan, Russia and China have shared the same voice – „a complete, 
verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea‟s nuclear programme‟.  
 
Finally, with respect to an alliance system, both the North Korean allies and the US 
allies were examined. Since the termination of the Cold War, North Korea‟s 
traditional allies have moved away from the North Korean side. China and Russia 
tried to normalise diplomatic relations with South Korea and this weakened the North 
Korean alliance system. On the other hand, the US strengthened relationship with its 
traditional allies. In the first place, despite the end of the Cold War, the US has re-
emphasised the importance of its bilateral relationship with Japan and South Korea. In 
addition, the US organised the US-ROK-Japan trilateral coordination against North 
Korea‟s threat not only through summit meetings, but also through the TCOG 
meetings. 
 
The assessment of a set of empirical evidence implies that the second phase of the 
North Korean nuclear crisis can be categorised into a concert of powers system, but 
that some features of the second phase need to be understood through the notion of 
alliance from the perspective of balance of power. With regard to the first assumption 
that members of a concert of powers seek to protect themselves from major war, the 
first instance, China‟s engagement in the North Korean nuclear issue, demonstrates its 
wish to avoid war on the Korean Peninsula. The US‟s invasion of Iraq increased 
China‟s fear of war and this allowed China to change its policy position. Originally, 
China did not want to be involved in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue 
because of its national strategy to develop its economic capability. However, war in 
Iraq in 2003 helped China to mediate nuclear confrontation between the US and North 
Korea. Eventually, China‟s diplomatic efforts and combination of two major actors‟ 
interests created the Three Party Talks, which were held in Beijing in April, 2003. 
This was the starting point for the Six Party Talks to be established. Therefore, 
China‟s engagement policy can be understood as a great power wishing to prevent 
war. 
 
The second assumption that a concert of powers promotes cooperation among states 
without any formal institutions could be examined through the second instance. The 
Six Party Talks were initiated and this frame has actually operated as a tool to monitor 
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and to consult the North Korean nuclear issue. Although there were recessions 
between rounds, the six party framework has acted as a conference to produce 
agreement on the nuclear issue. Each round of the Six Party Talks issued Chairman‟s 
statements, which indicated what kinds of arrangement have been achieved among the 
parties involved. In particular, the fourth round, the fifth round and the sixth round 
issued joint statements which informed what could be done to make progress in 
dealing with the nuclear issue.54 Thus, the establishment of the six party framework 
and the holding of several rounds of the Six Party Talks could be categorised as a 
concert- like diplomacy. 
 
With regard to the third hypothesis that a concert of powers contributes to creating 
norms, the third instance, the spread of the idea of CVID, shows that the Six Party 
Talks have actually played a role in establishing „the complete, verifiable, irreversible 
dismantlement of North Korea‟s nuclear programme‟ as a norm shared among the 
countries involved other than North Korea. Since the initial stage of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis US policy has focused on the achievement of CVID. The US repeatedly 
maintained that the need for North Korea to stop its nuclear ambition „completely, 
verifiably and irreversibly‟. Through its summit diplomacy and TCOG meetings, the 
US persuaded its traditional allies – South Korea and Japan – as well as China and 
Russia to back up its policy goal of CVID. 
 
Finally, in relation to an alliance system, it seems that the TCOG meetings are 
especially relevant to the fourth hypothesis that an alliance system works through the 
provision of institutionalised security cooperation. The TCOG meetings prove how 
the US and its traditional allies establish security cooperation among themselves 
regarding the nuclear issue. TCOG was born by the US‟s initiative to handle the 
North Korean nuclear issue. The US perceived that it might be difficult for itself to 
successfully manage the nuclear issue without its traditional allies‟ cooperation. The 
TCOG meetings have contributed to mediating differing views on how to deal with 
North Korea through expanding the idea of CVID. Hence it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the TCOG meetings have played a significant part in institutionalising 
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security cooperation among the US, South Korea, and Japan with respect to the 
nuclear issue. 
 
What are the implications of these findings? Firstly, with regard to the characteristic 
of the multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear crisis, it seems appropriate to 
consider the main hypotheses of a concert of powers system as a key instrument to 
understand the main features of the second phase. As this chapter has observed, major 
assumptions of a concert of powers system could be verified by a set of evidence 
which demonstrates an entire figure of the second phase of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis. 
 
At this stage, it seems necessary to distinguish the notion of a concert of powers from 
the term multilateralism. Put differently, although a concert of powers system takes a 
form of multilateralism, a concert of powers is not simply identical to multilateralism. 
Rather, it seems reasonable to say that a concert of powers can be regarded as a 
specific type of multilateral security management.  
 
In this regard, it seems worth considering Brian Job‟s work from 1997. According to 
Job, whereas multilateralism can be seen in many areas of international relations, a 
concert of powers system seems to be a particular form of multilateral cooperation in 
relation to organising security. Job defines multilateralism as “a form of state practice 
that accords with certain principles and that involves the development of norms, 
collective identities, and institutions (formal and informal) concerning cooperation 
and conflict management over extended periods of time.” (Job, 1997: 167) However, 
he also gives an explicit explanation of a concert of powers by describing that “[a] 
concert involves major-power management of the global or regional system according 
to generalized principles of conduct acceptable and applicable to this subset of key 
players. The requirements are that the major powers (1) do not view each other 
individually or in coalition as imminently threatening, (2) accept for the foreseeable 
future the status quo vis-à-vis their own sovereignty and security interests, and (3) 
agree not to attack each other and to come to the assistance of one attacked. ” (Job, 
1997: 173-174)  
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Brian Job‟s conceptualisation seems to be very relevant to an examination of the 
notion of a concert of powers which has been discussed in this chapter. For example, 
as the literature shows, a concert of powers assumes a set of specific principles in 
relation to managing security issues such as great-power tutelage, prevention of major 
war among great powers and maintenance of territorial stability for smaller powers  
(Rosecrance 1992; Elrod 1992). Therefore, in general terms, a concert of powers can 
be considered as a specialised form of multilateral security management which grants 
great powers‟ special status and responsibilities regarding organising security order.  
 
With respect to the North Korean nuclear issue, as mentioned before, the 
multilateralisation of the nuclear issue was firstly initiated by the US. The Bush 
administration attempted to establish a multilateral framework to deal with the North 
Korean case by underlining that the nuclear issue was not a bilateral issue between the 
US and North Korea, but a regional one which might disrupt other regional actors‟ – 
such as China‟s, Russia‟s and Japan‟s – security interests (Powell, February 11, 2003; 
Bush, March 6, 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, it was difficult for the Bush administration to direct multilateral 
cooperation among regional actors in accordance with its exclusive hegemonic 
leadership. This is mainly because other great powers‟ participation in the nuclear 
negotiation essentially affected the outlining of a multilateral framework to manage 
the nuclear issue. For example, China‟s engagement policy largely contributed to 
establishing a concert- like cooperation in dealing with the North Korean case  
(Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement, August 27, 2003). Moreover, Russia‟s 
involvement might be interpreted as its counter-balancing action against the 
emergence of China and the US‟s unilateral initiative in the region in the post-Cold 
War era (Buszynski, 2000; Text of Sino-Russia communiqué on North Korea, 
February 27, 2003). Therefore, it seems possible to say that due to the intervention by 
other great powers such as China and Russia, the US‟s multilateral approach became 
embedded into a concert of powers system. 
 
Secondly, this investigation expresses that an alliance system has actually operated in 
order to counterweight North Korea‟s threat. As examined earlier, it seemed that the 
end of the Cold War weakened the importance of military alliance systems. Thus, on 
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the one hand, as can be seen from the disappearance of North Korea‟s allies, 
traditional alliance systems have become less important compared to the Cold War era. 
On the other hand, however, as the TCOG case demonstrates, the maintenance of 
traditional allies and the enhancement of cooperation among the allies take an 
imperative role in balancing against new threats such as North Korea‟s nuclear 
ambition. 
 
In conclusion, as a solution of the questions asked in the introduction of this chapter, 
it might be reasonable to state that the concept of a concert of powers system can be 
applied to the multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear crisis. An alliance 
system can be applied to explaining some aspect of the second phase from the 
perspective of balance of powers.  
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Chapter 4. Collective Security 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Historical contextualisation of the third phase 
 
Despite the long journey of the Six Party Talks, the six parties failed to prevent North 
Korea conducting a nuclear bomb test. The third phase of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis saw a nuclear bomb test by North Korea and tough reactions against it from the 
international community, represented by the United Nations (UN).  
 
North Korea launched seven missiles into the East Sea (Sea of Japan) on 5 July 2006, 
including a long range missile which was capable of reaching at US territory. This 
made the situation worse by reminding the international community of North Korea‟s 
capabilities to attack its adversaries with missile warheads.  On 15 July 2006, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1695, which 
condemned North Korea‟s missile launches. Resolution 1695 announced the 
prohibition of any trade of missile-related materials with North Korea (UNSC 
Resolution 1695, July 15, 2006). 
 
However, North Korea further escalated tensions. On 9 October 2006, the Korean 
Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that an underground nuclear test was 
conducted successfully. North Korea restated that the United States (US) nuclear 
threat and pressure against North Korea led it to possessing nuclear weapons in order 
to defend its sovereignty (KCNA, October 9, 2006). 
 
Soon after North Korea‟s nuclear test, US President Bush issued a statement pointing 
out that North Korea‟s nuclear test helped only to escalate tensions as well as that the 
US would consider a proliferation of nuclear-related materials by North Korea as a 
serious threat to itself. According to Bush‟s statement, five nations – the US, China, 
South Korea, Japan, and Russia – reaffirmed their commitment to the denuclearisation 
of the Korean Peninsula. He also restated that none of the five parties would accept a 
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nuclear-armed North Korea, and that this topic would immediately be transferred to 
the UNSC (Bush, October 9, 2006). 
 
On 14 October 2006, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1718 which included three key 
points. Firstly, the UNSC Resolution 1718 asked North Korea to end all ballistic 
missile programmes and nuclear activities. Secondly, it also required all member 
states of the UN to stop buying and selling nuclear-related materials with North Korea. 
Finally, the resolution called for diplomatic efforts by all member states to help the 
continuation of the Six Party Talks (UNSC Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006)  
 
Compared with the earlier stages of the North Korean nuclear crisis, the third phase 
saw considerable reaction from the international community outside the Six Party 
Talks. The UN‟s engagement in the North Korean nuclear issue can be understood as 
a joint action at the global level to deal with this security issue. It seems helpful to 
examine the third phase through the lens of collective security.  
 
The purpose of this chapter 
 
In relation to the security implication of the third phase of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis, there have been few studies only which understand the characteristics of the 
third phase as an example of collective security. However, the third phase witnessed 
the United Nations‟ engagement in the nuclear issue soon after North Korea‟s missile 
launches and nuclear bomb test, and therefore, in order to get a full comprehension of 
the third phase, it seems essential to think about the United Nations‟ role in dealing 
with the North Korean nuclear issue.  
 
According to Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, the United Nations can be 
regarded as an example of a collective security organisation (Kupchan and Kupchan, 
1991). Thus, this chapter will employ the concept of collective security as a key tool 
to interpret the major features of the third phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis 
because it seems that this phase contains a set of critical stories which can best be 
understood from the perspective of collective security.  
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The central focus of this chapter will be an exploration of the security implications of 
the engagement of the United Nations in the North Korean nuclear crisis from the 
perspective of collective security. The applicability of the perception of collective 
security will be observed through evaluating the basic assumptions of collective 
security and the actual process of the third phase which shows the United Nations‟ 
involvement. 
 
In order to realise these goals, this chapter will examine the following questions.  
1. Do the principal assumptions of collective security apply the security 
implications of the third phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis?  
2. Considering the engagement of the United Nations in the North Korean 
nuclear issue, can the notion of a collective security regime apply to the third 
phase? 
3. Moreover, can the nuclear non-proliferation regime (NPT regime) be 
considered as a collective security regime in explaining the security 
implication of the third phase? 
 
The analytical contribution to the overall thesis 
 
The methodological motivation of this chapter is to give an analysis of the United 
Nations‟ involvement in the North Korean nuclear crisis. This examination and its 
empirical exploration will be informed by the question of the validity of the key 
assumptions of collective security and its concept of international security.  
 
For the purpose of considering the appropriateness of collective security for the 
United Nations‟ engagement in the North Korean nuclear issue, it seems crucial to 
begin with sketching out an analytical framework which can be used to study the third 
phase. Thus, the key issue of this chapter is the question of whether the United 
Nations‟ engagement can be categorised and explained through the perception of a 
collective security regime. 
 
In the first place, the notion of security in a collective security system will be 
examined. After that, the question of how collective security can deliver security to 
states will be discussed. Secondly, the topics and cases to be examined by the notion 
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of collective security will be chosen because this chapter will ask the question of 
whether the third phase has features which can be best appreciated through the 
perception of collective security. To accomplish this goal, three key issues of the third 
phase – North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test, the UN‟s engagement in the North Korean 
nuclear issue, the NPT regime and the North Korean case – will be dealt with as 
empirical evidence. Finally, the selected cases will be explored and questioned as a 
test of the appropriateness of collective security to the third phase of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis. From this investigation, the question of the applicability of collective 
security will be concluded. 
 
Its argument 
 
Unlike the first phase which showed a bilateral confrontation between the US and 
North Korea and the second phase when the North Korean nuclear issue was 
multilateralised in the Six Party Talks, the third phase saw the United Nations‟ 
engagement in the nuclear issue. Thus, it seems necessary to set up a set of 
hypotheses in order to examine the central events of the third phase. Several 
hypotheses can be drawn from the literature as to how the notion of collective security 
can control security matters. First, it is supposed that collective security finds its 
measure in the simple doctrine of „one for all and all for one‟. Second, it is 
hypothesised that collective security moderates the uncertainties  of coalition 
formation and, as a result, it bolsters deterrence against aggressor states. Third, under 
collective security, cooperation might be facilitated through regimes which can be 
formalised in institutions and organisations (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991). 
 
In more detail, firstly, collective security basically assumes the principle of all against 
one. This means, according to Arnold Wolfers, “collective security is directed against 
any and every country anywhere that commits an act of aggression, allies and friends 
included.” (Wolfers, 1962: 183) In relation to the emergence of the motto of all 
against one, Kenneth Thompson underlines that since the 20th century a clash in one 
place has affected the stability of other places because the international system has 
become more interdependent (Thompson, 1953). In this regard, it is notable that Inis 
Claude suggests a set of concepts: “the indivisibility of peace” (Claude, 2006: 293) 
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and the “impartiality of collective security” (Claude, 2006: 296).55 Immediately after 
North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test, the United Nations organised international pressure 
against North Korea by adopting the UNSC Resolution 1718. This can be categorised 
as an operation of collective security based on the principle of „one for all and all for 
one‟. 
 
Secondly, collective security provides more effective balancing against aggressors. In 
Inis Claude‟s terms, “[t]he situation envisaged by collective security is marked not 
only by the wide distribution of power among states and the possibility of the near-
monopolisation of power by the community, but also by the general reduction of 
power, as embodied in military instruments. That is to say, collective security is based 
upon the assumption of partial disarmament.”(Claude, 2006: 300) Moreover, 
collective security supposes “the certainty of collective action” (Claude, 2006: 294). 
Regarding stability under collective security, it seems reasonable to consider the 
whole process of the Six Party Talks as an example of utilising collective efforts to 
enhance a stable international system. 
 
Thirdly, collective security facilitates cooperation through regimes which can be 
formalised in institutions and organisations. With respect to the North Korean nuclear 
crisis, it seems necessary to examine both the UN‟s engagement and the role of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. The UN has been considered as a collective security 
organisation since the end of World War II. And the NPT regime has committed 
signatory states to three obligations which can be considered as the body of nuclear 
non-proliferation norms: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy; nuclear disarmament (Simpson, 1994; Simpson, 2004). Thus, the 
UNSC Resolution and North Korea‟s reaction to the international community‟s 
pressure will be examined in relation to the notion of collective security regime.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55
 For details, see Claude (2006: 293-297). 
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4.2. An Analytical Framework of Collective Security  
 
The origin of collective security 
 
The idea of collective security assumes that the security dilemma of states can best be 
managed not through national self-help or a balance of power system, but through the 
institutionalisation of joint actions, whereby each nation agrees to join in mutual 
commitments against those who threaten the territorial integrity or political 
independence of others. Its central oath is the words „all for one and one for all‟ 
(Evans and Newnham, 1990). The motto of „all for one and one for all‟ implies that 
aggressive action by any state against any state will cause joint action from all other 
states (Claude, 2006). 
 
Collective security came into view in the beginning of the twentieth century as a 
system to complement the old pattern of regular conferences among the powers, 
referred to as a concert of powers. As Evan Luard suggests, the old system had 
several defects as a way of resolving international conflicts. Firstly, it invited only a 
particular group of powers and there the old system was not sufficient enough to 
prevent war. This was because the operation of a concert of powers was dependent on 
the interests of major powers. Thus, it was necessary to establish the regular 
conference which might be much more institutionalised than that of the Concert had 
been. In other words, “[t]he states participating would have to make a formal 
commitment to maintain the peace and to submit their disputes to collective decision.” 
(Luard, 1992: 454) Secondly, there was requirement for the new system to be more 
representative than the old one had been. The Concert of Europe was initiated by an 
ad hoc-group of major powers. There was little room for small states to have their 
interests considered. Furthermore, the spread of democratic ideology brought about 
the idea that the new system must be more democratic in a broad sense. Thirdly, the 
Concert had an informal and ad hoc structure. There was a demand that the new 
system should be established with formal mechanisms such as its own constitution 
and a standard course of action (Luard, 1992). 
 
The first historical example of a collective security organisation might be the League 
of Nations, which was formally established as a result of the Versailles Treaty in 
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1919-1920. Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations declared the idea of 
collective security by stating that “[a]ny war or threat of war, whether immediately 
affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of 
concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be 
deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.” (The Covenant of the 
League of Nations, December 1924) In order to achieve this goal, the League of 
Nations obliged members to join collective economic and diplomatic sanctions 
against an aggressor.56 However, as Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan indicate, 
the Covenant was uncertain about the issue of collective military action against an 
aggressor. Article 10 of the Covenant indicated members‟ obligation in case of 
aggression, but it did not require members to take action automatically with military 
force (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991).57 
 
The lack of guarantee of joint military action might be one of the key reasons which 
resulted in the failure of the League of Nations. 58 Despite the existence of Article 8, 
which required members to reduce “armaments to the lowest point consistent with 
national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations” 
(The Covenant of the League of Nations, December 1924), the League of Nations 
failed in its objective of disarmament. For example, the 1930s witnessed a military 
build-up by Germany, Italy and Japan which eventually brought about the Second 
World War (Birn, 1974). 
 
Another case of collective security organisation could be found in the UN. The UN 
was formally established in 1945 after the end of the Second World War, as a 
successor to the League of Nations. Article 1.1 of the UN Charter clearly declares that 
it pursues the notion of collective security. 59 However, unlike the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, the UN Charter suggests the possibility of collective military 
                                                 
56
 For details, see Article 16 of the Covenant. 
57
 Article 10 of the Covenant announced that “The Members of the League undertake to  respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all 
Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such 
aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.” (The 
Covenant of the League of Nations , December 1924) There was no concrete mention about joint 
military actions. 
58
 For details, see Birn (1974).  
59
 Article 1.1 of the UN Charter points to the necessity of taking “effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace.” For details, see the Charter of the United Nations  (June 
26, 1945). 
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action. Article 42 of the UN Charter gives permission for the UN Security Council to 
take military action when necessary. Furthermore, Article 43.1 requires members “to 
make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special 
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities … necessary for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” (The Charter of the United 
Nations, June 26, 1945) 
 
With respect to the role of the UN as a collective security organisation, it seems 
controversial whether the UN has operated successfully or not. On the one hand, there 
is a sceptical viewpoint which describes the UN as an unsuccessful example of the 
realisation of the idea of collective security. Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan 
consider the UN as having failed the challenge of meeting the conditions of the 
concept of collective security just as the League of Nations had in the past (Kupchan 
and Kupchan, 1991). On the other hand, there is another perspective which attempts 
to justify the importance of the UN as an international security regime in the post-
Cold War era. In his work in 1994-1995, Albert Legault gives an important 
explanation of the significance of the UN as collective security regime in post-Cold 
War international politics.60 
 
Even if none of the international organisations could be seen as a successful example 
of collective security, it seems clear that collective security has been considered as a 
significant tool to tackle international conflicts since the beginning of the 20th 
century.61 Thus, the following section will examine the notion of collective security 
through conceptualising its basic assumptions and this may lead us to building up an 
analytical framework for examining the third phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60
 The following section will discuss this issue in more detail.  
61
 With respect to the provision of deterrence by collective security, it is notable that there are critics 
asserting that collective security will not be able to provide successful deterrence against an aggressor 
as the previous attempts have not been successful. However, it seems better to leave critics of 
collective security with other scholars . Instead this chapter will focus on examin ing the applicability of 
the notion of collective security into the third phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis . For the details 
of critics of collective security, see Herz (1959); see Birn (1974); see also Aron and Smith (1954).  
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4.2.1. Perception of security under collective security 
 
4.2.1.1. The precondition of collective security: what makes collective security 
possible? 
 
In order to have a better understanding of its perceptions of security, it seems worthy 
looking at the principal conditions for collective security to be practical. What are the 
basic requirements for collective security to become apparent and to function 
beneficially? 
 
The first condition: distribution of power 
 
The first condition can be summarised by the assumption that “no single state can be 
so powerful that even the most robust opposing coalition would be unable to marshal 
preponderant force against it. Put differently, all states in the system must be 
vulnerable to collective sanctions.” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 124) In other 
words, collective security presumes a considerably even distribution of power. This is 
because, as Andrew Butfoy indicates, it is beneficial to maintain a balance of power 
among the most powerful states in order to make international sanctions efficient 
(Butfoy, 1993). 
 
The value of collective security comes from “the universality of economic 
vulnerability” (Claude, 2006: 300) in the international system. According to Inis 
Claude, a collective security system presumes interdependence among states in 
maintaining peace and therefore that the imposition of isolation can be a practical 
method to compel states to accept the idea of collective security. In other words, 
collective security presumes that every single state is easily subject to the threat of 
organised force and it considers economic sanctions as its primary option of response 
(Claude, 2006). 
 
The second condition: legitimacy 
 
With respect to the legitimacy of collective security, it seems valuable to consider 
“the universality of membership” (Claude, 2006: 298). The “generality” of collective 
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security originates from its key feature that “collective security knows no “probable 
aggressor” but assumes that any state may become an aggressor.” (Claude, 2006: 298) 
This characteristic implies that every state can be the source of threat to other states, 
and that it is essential to open the door in order to embrace all states in a collective 
security system. 
 
In this regard, it might be understood that “collective enforcement could be made 
automatic, instantaneous, and preponderant” (Thompson, 1953: 760) because the 
generality of its membership may allow all states to put together their resources in an 
international organisation, which will operate when a particular threat appears 
(Thompson, 1953). 
 
The third condition: organisation 
 
Collective security supposes that the certainty of joint commitment could be 
guaranteed through an institutionalisation of the notion of collective security. With 
respect to the assurance of collective forces, it seems notable that collective security 
expects major powers to play a role. For example, in relation to the operation of the 
UN, Kenneth Thompson underlines the idea that “[i]t is essential to collec tive security 
in a world of unequal powers that at least the major powers enjoy a minimum of 
political solidarity and moral community … The effectiveness of the United Nations 
and of the Security Council in particular was predicated upon the unanimity of the 
five great powers.” (Thompson, 1953: 762) 
 
Therefore, as Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan suggest, „a minimum of 
political solidarity and moral community‟ may allow state actors to behave according 
to the notion that “the others share the value they place on mutual security and 
cooperation” (Jervis, 1982: 176-178) rather than paying attention to short-term gain 
(Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991).  
 
4.2.1.2. All against one 
 
With respect to the main tenets of collective security, it seems worth considering 
Kenneth Thompson‟s description. As Thompson indicates, “[t]he rock bottom 
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principle upon which collective security is founded provides that an attack on any one 
state will be regarded as an attack on all states. It finds its measure in the simple 
doctrine of “one for all and all for one.” (Thompson, 1953: 755)  
 
According to Thompson, changes in the structure of the international system require 
the emergence of the idea of collective security. In other words, while in the 18th and 
19th centuries conflicts among states could be restricted within a particular region 
under the great powers‟ supervision, since the 20th century a clash in one place has 
affected the stability of other places because the international system has become 
more interdependent. Thus, Thompson emphasises the necessity of collective security 
by pointing out that “[a] disturbance at one point upsets the equilibrium at all other 
points, and the adjustment of a single conflict restores the foundations of harmony at 
other points throughout the world.” (Thompson, 1953: 755) 
 
Inis Claude developed the notion of collective security by categorising it as having 
three significant assumptions: indivisibility of peace, the certainty of collective action, 
and impartiality. In Claude‟s terms, the perception of collective security is firstly 
classified as the “indivisibility of peace.” (Claude, 2006: 293) Claude notes that the 
basic assumption of collective security is that “the fabric of human society has 
become so tightly woven that a breach anywhere threatens disintegration 
everywhere.” (Claude, 2006: 293) As a result of this, a victory by an aggressive 
power in one case will result in the destabilisation of the rest of the world as it might 
challenge the principle of peace (Claude, 2006).62 
 
In relation to the effective operation of collective security, Claude underlines the 
importance of “the certainty of collective action.” (Claude, 2006: 294) According to 
Claude, in case states are targets of an attack, it is not sufficient enough to allow states 
to have mere the expectation of joint action that may not be realized, but it is 
necessary to organise a practical response. In other words, collective security will be 
unsuccessful in completing its objective if its warning of joint commitment could be 
considered as a bluff by potential aggressors. Thus, “[t]he theory of collective security 
is replete with absolutes, of which none is more basic than the requirement of 
                                                 
62
 Inis Claude‟s perspective is very close to that of Thompson in that he points to a domino effect of an 
aggression. 
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certainty.” (Claude, 2006: 295) In order to ensure „the certainty of collective action‟, 
it is necessary for participants of the system to agree that they will accept restrictions 
on their self-determination of action in case their joint commitment is required. Thus, 
the states which take part in establishing collective security must announce how the y 
intend to implement their commitments through the precise conditions of a 
multilateral treaty (Claude, 2006).  
 
Finally, Claude puts in “impartiality” (Claude, 2006: 296) as another key element that 
the notion of collective security presumes. As the motto of „all for one, one for all‟ 
demonstrates, collective security is planned to protect “the integrity of the anonymous 
victim of attack by the anonymous aggressor.” (Claude, 2006: 296) In this regard, “it 
[collective security] is no respecter of states, but an instrument to be directed against 
any aggressor, on behalf of any violated state.” (Claude, 2006: 296) This explanation 
underlines a considerable difference between a balance of power system and 
collective security. In Claude‟s terms, “in the former, collaborative activity is directed 
against undue power, as such, while in the latter it is turned against aggressive policy, 
whether that policy be pursued by a giant which threatens to grow to earth-shaking 
proportions or by a pygmy which has scant prospect of becoming a major factor in 
world politics.” (Claude, 2006: 296) 
 
4.2.2. Provision of security through a collective security system 
 
4.2.2.1. Collective security and international regimes63 
 
With respect to the provision of security in a collective security system, it seems 
notable that collective security can be understood as “a regime designed to sustain a 
particular status quo.” (Bennett and Lepgold, 1993: 215) In this regard, it might be 
useful to look at Inis Claude‟s examination because Calude‟s analysis seems to be 
very relevant to the notion of international regimes. According to Claude, “collective 
security requires the creation of a legal and structural apparatus capable of giving 
                                                 
63
 Reg ime theory was already discussed in chapter 2 with respect to the role of a hegemon. However, it 
seems that the notion of collective security is profoundly interrelated to the format ion and the 
maintenance of international regimes (Bennett and Lepgold, 1993). Thus, it  is inevitable to re -examine 
regime theory in depth at this stage in order to make a comprehensive understanding of a collective 
security system. 
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institutional expression to its basic principles. This involves the legal establishment of 
the prohibition of aggression, the commitment of states to collaborate in the 
suppression of aggression, and the endowment of an international organization with 
authority to determine when and against what state sanctions are to be initiated, to 
decide upon the nature of the inhibitory measures, to evoke the performance of duties 
to which states have committed themselves, and to plan and direct the joint action 
which it deems necessary for the implementation of collective security.” (Claude, 
2006: 301) 
 
Reflecting Stephen Krasner‟s definition of a regime, which refers to “sets of implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors‟ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 
1983: 2), Inis Claude‟s analysis seems to suppose norms (such as prohibition of 
aggression), rules (such as cooperation to deter aggression) and decision-making 
procedures (such as judgment of measures) of collective security. This leads us to an 
investigation into the relations between collective security and international regimes. 
However, the definition of international regimes can diverge amongst scholars and 
therefore this section will start by defining the notion of international regimes. 
 
Defining international regimes 
 
Regime analysis can be categorised into three different perceptions: a broad definition 
of regime, a more restricted definition, and a middle ground between two (Haggard 
and Simmons, 1987). This section will examine these three approaches to build up an 
appropriate definition of a regime which might be used for an analysis of collective 
security regimes. 
 
A broad definition focuses on „patterned behaviour‟ in international relations. For 
example, in relation to the role of a regime, Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins 
emphasise that “[r]egimes constrain and regularize the behavior of participants, affect 
which issues among protagonists move on and off agendas, determine which activities 
are legitimized or condemned, and influence whether, when, and how conflicts are 
resolved.” (Puchala and Hopkins, 1982: 246) According to them, regimes have a set 
of characteristics such as subjectivity, decision-making procedures, principles, norms 
 165 
and practical actors. 64  However, among these features, they consider „patterned 
behavior‟ as the most significant factor which defines the notion of regime. Thus, 
Puchala and Hopkins determine that “a regime exists in every substantive issue-area 
in international relations where there is discernibly patterned behavior. Where there is 
regularity in behavior some kinds of principles, norms or rules must exist to account 
for it.” (Puchala and Hopkins, 1982: 247) 
 
A more restricted approach defines regimes as “multilateral agreements among states 
which aim to regulate national actions within an issue-area.” (Haggard and Simmons, 
1987: 495) In this regard, it seems notable to examine Oran Young‟s work. According 
to Young, although “they may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizational 
arrangements,” (Young, 1980: 333) “[r]egimes are social institutions governing the 
actions of those interested in specifiable activities (or meaningful sets of activities). 
As such, they are recognised patterns of practice around which expectations 
converge.” (Young, 1980: 332) Eventually, he defines regimes as mutual 
arrangements in the international system. He suggests that “[i]nternational regimes … 
are more specialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or 
geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the members of 
international society.” (Young, 1989: 13) 
 
Finally, a middle ground can be seen in Stephen Krasner‟s work. Stephen Krasner, on 
the one hand, points out that the existence of a regime is a necessary condition for 
patterned behaviour to be sustained. However, he does not suggest that a regime 
simply refers to a patterned behavior. Rather, he highlights the significance of 
inextricable relations between regime and patterned behaviour (Krasner, 1983). On 
the other hand, Stephen Krasner points out that “[r]egimes must be understood as 
something more than temporary arrangements that change with every shift in power 
or interests.” (Krasner, 1983: 2) Thus, he defines regimes as “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors‟ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” (Krasner, 
1983: 2) Regarding the basic elements of a regime, he adds that “[p]rinciples are 
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in 
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 For details, see Puchala and Hopkins (1982).  
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terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice.” (Krasner, 1983: 2) 
 
It seems arguable that a broad definition overvalues normative factors in the 
international system and makes it difficult to distinguish regularised patterns of 
behaviour from rules for action. Moreover, a broad definition makes it hard to explain 
how regimes operate in shaping state actors‟ behaviour because a broad definition 
differentiates regimes from patterned behaviour itself (Haggard and Simmons, 1987). 
A more restricted approach also has disadvantage in describing international politics 
because it underestimates the normative aspect in defining regimes. In this regard, it 
seems also necessary to make it clear that regimes should be distinguished from the 
notion of “institutions”, the central element of which is “the conjunction of 
convergent expectation and patterns of behavior or practice.” (Young, 1983: 94) Thus, 
it seems reasonable to occupy the middle ground in order to avoid the problems which 
may be caused by leaning towards either broader or narrower perspective.  
 
Following from the definition, regimes should be neither “short-term expressions of 
rational self- interest” (Smith, 1987: 256) nor “institutions” (Young, 1983: 94). In 
Krasner‟s terms, “it is the infusion of behavior with principles and norms that 
distinguishes regime governed activity in the international system from more 
conventional activity guided exclusively by narrow calculations of interest.” (Kra sner, 
1983: 3) He also indicates that since principles and norms are “the basic defining 
characteristics of a regime” (Krasner, 1983: 3), a regime‟s rules and procedures 
should be “consistent with the same principles and norms” (Krasner, 1983: 3).  
 
Collective security regime 
 
It was Robert Jervis who introduced the concept of regime into the study of security. 
According to him, a security regime refers to “those principles, rules, and norms that 
permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will 
reciprocate.” (Jervis, 1982: 357) However, in relation to the relevance of the concept 
of regime to the analysis of international security disputes, it may be more informative 
to observe Janice Stein‟s work in 1985. According to Stein, the notion of regime 
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might be valuable “both as an explanation and as instrument of conflict management 
in the field of international security.” (Stein, 1985: 602) Stein suggests a set of 
advantages in exploiting the concept of security regime in examining international 
conflict management, such as the increase in exchanging information and the 
probability of mutual understanding of different perceptions among stake-holders 
(Stein, 1985). She concludes that “it [the concept of regime] usefully contributes not 
only to an understanding of the dynamics but also to the development of strategies of 
conflict management.” (Stein, 1985: 626) 
 
Moreover, in relation to collective security regime,  it is also valuable to look at Albert 
Legault‟s discussion on regime theory and collective security. Legault underlines the 
importance of regime theory for understanding collective security. He adds the idea 
that “[r]egime theory makes it possible to explain the organization and dynamics of 
the collective system for managing and settling disputes because it assumes that states 
behave rationally and have mutual interests which induce them to co-ordinate their 
policies.” (Legault, 1994-5: 77) 
 
As examined above, a traditional understanding of collective security assumes that 
states regard an attack on one as an attack on all and this perception leads states to 
organise joint actions (Thompson, 1953). However, Legault claims that it is necessary 
to broaden the understanding of collective security in order to examine an operation 
of contemporary collective security regime because the motto of „all for one, one for 
all‟ is “an ideal that presupposes perfect co-operation among countries and has thus 
never really existed.” (Legault, 1994-5: 75) 
 
Legault continues that it seems essential to describe collective security as something 
“to encompass not only collective enforcement actions but also methods for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes,” (Legault, 1994-5: 76) because international conflict 
management requires “the prevention, limitation, and resolution of conflict.” (Legault, 
1994-5: 76) Therefore, he concludes that collective security could be defined as “the 
set of norms, rules, and methods that states agree to adopt to ensure peace and 
international security.” (Legault, 1994-5: 76) 
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With respect to the main actors in a regime, unlike traditional regime theory which 
considers states as the key actors, Albert Legault suggests that “international 
organizations have their own role in collective security and are therefore principal 
actors in collective security regimes: it is through them that countries establish the 
operating procedures of the system.” (1994-5: 80) For example, the UNSC plays a 
key role “in executing rules and procedures, for it is responsible for putting the norms 
and principles of the current collective security regime into practice.” (Legault, 1994-
5: 80) 
 
The research has already examined the issue of international regimes in chapter 2. 
This section returns to this concept. The reason why the research re-examines regime 
theory is that the discussions on international regimes in a collective security system 
reveal quite different features when compared with regime theory in a hegemonic 
power structure. That is, there are substantial differences between a hegemonic power 
structure and a collective security system in relation to explanations offered for the 
emergence and maintenance of international regimes and the identification of major 
actors in international regimes. In the first place, while under a hegemonic power 
structure it is argued that international regimes are created and sustained by a single 
dominant power (hegemon), theorists working within the framework of collective 
security presume that international regimes can be established and maintained through 
international cooperation. Moreover, theorists drawing on a hegemonic power 
structure consider states to be the main actor of international regimes. However, their 
counterparts using collective security presuppose that non-state actors and 
international organisastions such as the UN can be key actors in international regimes. 
 
Collective security and the UN Charter 
 
At this stage, it seems necessary to examine the UN Charter from the perspective of 
collective security. This is because the UN has achieved the status of a collective 
security organisation since the failure of the League of Nations. As discussed earlier, 
the UN was conceptualised during World War II for the purpose of organising 
collective action against aggression in the future. In relation to this, it seems that the 
UN Charter suggests a context for collective security regime including a range of 
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means to maintain international peace and security from economic sanctions to the 
UN military forces (Butfoy, 1993). 
 
Regarding the implementation of collective security in the UN, the UN Charter makes 
the UNSC the key player. For example, Article 39 of the UN Charter provides the 
UNSC with authority to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and … decide what measures shall be taken …” (The 
Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945) Article 41 also gives the UNSC the 
power to determine a series of possible measures other than military force to manage 
international conflict.65 More importantly, the UN Charter assumes the possibility of 
direct military action by the UN. Article 43.1 states that “[a]ll members of the United  
Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, 
undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance 
with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security.” (The Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945) 
 
Collective security and the NPT regime 
 
Given the definition of a regime outlined above, the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
(the NPT regime) can be understood as a set of principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures in relation to nuclear non-proliferation. Moreover, in terms of its 
universality, the NPT regime can be considered as another important example of 
collective security regimes.66 
 
The NPT regime supposes that international peace and security would be considerably 
threatened by the spread of nuclear capabilities throughout the world. The assumption 
is that nuclear weapons can drastically exaggerate tensions, even if they do not trigger 
actual conflict because they possess boundless destructive potential. Thus, the general 
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 Article 41 of the UN Charter announces that “the Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed  force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions … These may  
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations … and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.” (the UN Charter , 26 June 1945) 
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 Nuclear weapons are indiscriminate and widespread in their effect and therefore the NPT attempts to 
control all nuclear weapons around the world (for details, see The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons). 
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principle of the NPT regime is that the appropriate option for nuclear-armed states is 
to dissuade others from attempting to obtain nuclear weapons while progressively 
disarming themselves (Smith, 1987). 
 
The NPT regime based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has sustained 
commitments in three distinct areas of nuclear activities which can be considered as 
the body of the nuclear non-proliferation norms: the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons; the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear disarmament. Firstly, those 
states possessing nuclear capabilities including nuclear devices and technology do not 
relocate them to the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Secondly, the NNWS do not 
endeavour to attain nuclear weapons. In return, they have the right to develop nuclear 
energy programme for peaceful uses. Lastly, the persistent possession of nuclear 
weapons by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) generates a logical contradiction to the 
nuclear non-proliferation norm. In order to deal with this problem, the NWS are 
responsible for the accomplishment of general and complete nuclear disarmament  
(Simpson, 1994; Simpson, 2004). 
 
With respect to the operation of the non-proliferation norms, rules and decision-
making procedures of the NPT regime has been institutionalised into a set of formal 
compliance arrangements: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards; the export control guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and 
the NPT review conferences. First, the IAEA has responsibilities for inspections into 
clandestine nuclear activities such as diversions of fissile materials from declared uses 
and the existence of undeclared materials of facilities. Undeclared nuclear activities 
will be regarded seriously by the IAEA Board of Governors, who may employ their 
own measure – for example, constraining access to technical assistance for nuclear 
energy programme – to ensure NPT compliance. If it seems to be unable to resolve 
the dispute, then the matter will be reported to the UN Security Council for further 
action (Howlett and Simpson, 2000; Simpson, 1994). Second, the NSG guidelines 
outline the obligation of the NWS to apply licensing procedures to components of 
nuclear resources and dual-use technology which could be utilised for military 
purposes. The main reason for doing so is to prevent prospective proliferators from 
accessing these facilities (Simpson, 1994). Finally, the regular pattern of conferences 
every five years to review the operations of the NPT also plays a key role in ensuring 
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the compliance of the parties with the NPT: those NWS parties which have a long 
term responsibility to dismantle completely their nuclear arsenals and the NNWS 
which recognise immediate obligations not to attain nuclear components for military 
purposes (Howlett and Simpson, 2000).  
 
4.2.2.2. More effective balancing against aggressors 
 
Collective security assumes that it can provide a more balanced security environment 
than other security system can. In relation to this point, it seems useful to examine 
Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan‟s discussion.  
 
According to Kupchan and Kupchan, firstly, collective security makes it easier to 
identify an aggressor. Under collective security, it would be very unlikely for states to 
build up strong offensive force without being checked by others because collective 
security organisations increase transparency and persuade states to preserve 
reasonably low level of military resources. Under these circumstances, a substantial 
increase in military resources might inevitably be regarded as an intention of hostile 
action which may result in the formation of an opposing coalition (Kupchan and 
Kupchan, 1991). In short, “[e]asier identification of aggressor states makes for more 
timely and effective deterrence.” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 127)  
 
Secondly, collective security bolsters deterrence through increasing the certainties of 
joint action. Unlike a situation under anarchy, which allows an aggressor to be 
sceptical about whether an opposing coalition will be developed and about the 
military capability of that coalition, collective security not only enhances the 
probability that joint action will come into being, but also implies that an aggressor 
will be faced with a preponderant force rather than a roughly equal power. These facts 
may stop an aggressor from provoking conflict based on miscalculation of the 
resources of the opposing coalition (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991). Thus, Kupchan 
and Kupchan assume that “[b]y increasing both the likelihood that a balancing 
coalition will emerge and the likelihood that this coalition will possess preponderant 
military strength, collective security more effectively deters and resists aggression 
than balancing under anarchy.” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 126)  
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Finally, in international politics, state actors tend to attempt to build up deterrence by 
increasing “a reputation for resolve” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 134) because as 
Robert Johnson observes, “[t]o deter, it is necessary that threats of retaliation be 
credible, that is, believable.” (Johnson, 1985/86: 40-41) The security dilemma can be 
stimulated by „demonstrating resolve‟ because such actions might be interpreted by 
others as hostile policy against their central security interests. 67 However, collective 
security reduces the need to strengthen „a reputation for resolve‟ by decreasing the 
uncertainty of the commitment. Thus, Kupchan and Kupchan (1991) point out that 
collective security might provide the most reliable deterrence because collective 
security enhances the notion that an aggressor should confront with the formation of 
opposing coalition against itself. 
 
The following section offers an investigation of empirical evidence which might 
evaluate the applicability of an analytical framework discussed above. The third phase 
of the North Korean nuclear crisis will be used to accomplish this task. 
 
4.3. Empirical Evidence 
 
4.3.1. North Korea’s provocative actions 
 
The third phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis saw North Korea‟s missile 
launches and a nuclear bomb test. These provocative actions immediately resulted in 
the international community‟s sanctions against North Korea, which was mainly 
represented by the resolutions of the UNSC. 
 
As discussed above, the concept of collective security can be understood as a security 
arrangement in which all states combine forces to provide security for all by joint 
actions against an aggressor because “an attack on any one state will be regarded as 
an attack on all states” (Thompson, 1953: 755). The UN has been considered as an 
organisation, which reflects a principle of collective security. In fact, the Charter of 
the UN, in Article 1, describes its purposes as “[t]o maintain international peace and 
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
                                                 
67
 The defin ition of security dilemma used here is “many of the means  by which a state tries to increase 
its security decrease the security of others.” (Jervis, 1978: 169)  
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removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace.” (Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945) 
 
In other words, the UN‟s engagement in the North Korean nuclear crisis made the 
confrontation move onto a new stage, which needed to be examined through the 
principal tenet of collective security, „one for all and all for one‟. This section will 
examine the significance of the UN‟s engagement in the North Korean nuclear issue 
from the perspective of collective security.  
 
North Korea’s missile launches and nuclear bomb test 
 
The North Korean nuclear issue took a turn for the worse when North Korea launched 
seven missiles into the East Sea (Sea of Japan) on July 5, 2006. This missile launches 
included one of long-range missiles which could eventually be capable of reaching the 
US. Although the long-range Taepodong II missile failed to perform properly, it was 
enough to remind the international community that the DPRK already possessed 
capabilities to attack its adversaries with missile warheads (BBC News, July 5, 2006). 
 
Regarding its missile launches, the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
claimed that they were an exercise of its legal right as an independent state, and that 
they were not a violation of international agreements such as the DPRK-Japan 
Pyongyang Declaration68 and the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005. Furthermore, 
it claimed that the missile launches were irrelevant to the nuclear issue and therefore it 
would continue to commit itself to the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 to 
achieve the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula in a diplomatic way (KCNA, July 
6, 2006).69 
                                                 
68
 “The DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declarat ion” was issued on September 17, 2002 soon after the 
summit  meeting  between Kim Jong Il, Chairman  of the Nat ional Defence Commission of the 
Democratic People 's Republic o f Korea, and Junich iro Koizumi, Japanese prime min ister. In  the 
DPRK-Pyongyang Declaration North Korea stated that it would continue its moratorium on missile 
tests beyond 2003 (KCNA, September 17, 2002). 
69
 Immediately after North Korea‟s missile launches, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1695 condemning 
North Korea‟s provocation. This will be examined in the following section in terms of collective 
security regime. 
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However, it seems obvious that North Korea‟s missile launches were not a mere 
routine military exercise. It was a prelude to North Korea‟s declaration of its nuclear 
armament because a nuclear bomb test followed on behind. 
 
Responding to the international community‟s pressure such as the UNSC Resolution 
1695 on 15 July 2006, North Korea further escalated tensions. On 3 October 2006, the 
DPRK announced that a nuclear test would be conducted in the future for the purpose 
of a developing nuclear deterrent for self-defence. According to the statement issued 
by the DPRK Foreign Ministry, US hostility towards North Korea caused the DPRK 
to carry out a nuclear test as an essential step for its self-defence. The statement 
claimed that “[t]he DPRK's nuclear weapons will serve as reliable war deterrent for 
protecting the supreme interests of the state and the security of the Korean nation 
from US threat of aggression and averting a new war and firmly safeguarding peace 
and stability on the Korean peninsula under any circumstances.” (KCNA, October 3, 
2006) 
 
North Korea also clarified that its policy stance to realise a nuclear- free Korean 
Peninsula through a peaceful diplomacy would not change. Nevertheless, it 
emphasised that this could not be achieved through its unilateral disarmament. North 
Korea announced that “[t]he ultimate goal of the DPRK is not a "denuclearization" to 
be followed by its unilateral disarmament but one aimed at settling the hostile 
relations between the DPRK and the U.S. and removing the very source of all nuclear 
threats from the Korean Peninsula and its vicinity.” (KCNA, October 3, 2006) 
 
On 9 October 2006, the KCNA reported that an underground nuclear test had been 
conducted successfully. The KCNA announcement emphasised that its achievement 
of nuclear power would enhance North Korean self-defence capability, and that this 
would increase the stability of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and 
in the Northeast Asian region (KCNA, October 9, 2006). Moreover, North Korea 
reemphasised that the US nuclear threat towards and pressure on North Korea led it to 
conclude it needed nuclear weapons to defend its sovereignty, and reaffirmed that it 
would implement its commitment to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula 
through dialogue and negotiations (KCNA, October 11, 2006).  
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North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test was a deep shock to other countries. All of the other 
parties expressed their serious concern over North Korea‟s nuclear armament. 
Furthermore, the UNSC adopted another resolution – the UNSC resolution 1718 – 
condemning North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test.70 
 
US response to the North Korean nuclear bomb test 
 
Soon after North Korea‟s nuclear test, US President Bush issued a statement on that 
event. According to US President Bush‟s statement, the US perceived that North 
Korea‟s “provocative act” constitutes “a threat to international peace and security” 
(Bush, October 9, 2006). Thus, he pointed out that “[t]he transfer of nuclear weapons 
or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave 
threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the 
consequences of such action.” (Bush, October 9, 2006) 
 
With respect to how to deal with this issue, US President Bush announced that this 
topic would be transferred to the UNSC. He stated that “[w]e – [leaders of China, 
South Korea, Russia, Japan, and the US] – reaffirmed our commitment to a nuclear-
free Korean Peninsula, and all of us agreed that the proclaimed actions taken by North 
Korea are unacceptable and deserve an immediate response by the United Nations 
Security Council.” (Bush, October 9, 2006) 
 
Nevertheless, the US did not want to enter a scenario where North Korea‟s nuclear 
bomb test would trigger military conflicts between the US and North Korea. Instead, 
the US attempted to manage this issue by organising collective action against North 
Korea. For example, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, stated that the US did 
not intend to invade or attack North Korea (The New York Times, October 10, 2006). 
On 11 October 2006, US President Bush re-clarified that US stance on solving this 
nuclear confrontation in a diplomatic way remained unchanged. However, he 
emphasised that “[the US] will work with the United Nations” (Bush, October 11, 
2006) in order to disarm North Korea‟s nuclear capability. For the reason of 
maintaining diplomatic approaches, Bush asserted that a strong diplomatic hand with 
                                                 
70
 The UNSC Resolution 1718 will also be explored in the following section through the lens of 
collective security. 
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others would create a stronger voice to demand North Korea‟s disarmament (Bush, 
October 11, 2006). 
 
In relation to the reason why the US decided to transfer this issue to the UNSC, it 
seems useful to look at Scott Snyder‟s observation in 2007. According to Snyder, the 
Bush administration was in a difficult position in dealing with the issue of North 
Korea‟s nuclear test. This was because a passive approach might encourage North 
Korea to follow the „Pakistan model‟ of obtaining an international status as a nuclear-
weapon state, while a more proactive stance would result in a unilateral action by the 
US alone which might be contradictory to the US‟s multilateral approach. Therefore, 
“[e]nhanced promotion of a combination of diplomatic cooperation and firmer 
collective pressure with other parties in the region was thus the only opt ion available.” 
(Snyder, 2007: 35) 
 
China’s Diplomacy 
 
When North Korea announced that it would conduct a nuclear test, China asked North 
Korea to show “calm and restraint” on the nuclear bomb test and also required all 
parties involved not to take actions that might result in military conflicts (China View, 
October 4, 2006). However, immediately after North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test on 9 
October 2006, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement on North Korea‟s 
nuclear bomb test. The statement claimed that North Korea‟s nuclear test disregarded 
the international community‟s concern and expressed China‟s strong opposition to it. 
Moreover, China insisted that North Korea should come back to the six party 
processes by way of implementing its commitment to the denuclearisation of the 
Korean Peninsula. China also demanded all parties involved to keep seeking a 
diplomatic solution of the issue because all parties involved had common interests in 
maintaining peace and stability in the region (China View, October 10, 2006). 
 
North Korea‟s nuclear test accelerated diplomatic actions by China because as 
discussed in the previous chapter, China wanted to bring the situation under control. 
China consulted on the nuclear test by North Korea with the US. On 9 October 2006, 
Chinese President Hu Jintao held talks with US President Bush over the telephone. He 
reminded Bush of the Chinese Foreign Ministry statement requiring North Korea not 
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to further escalate tensions while claiming all parties involved need to maintain the 
policy of a diplomatic approach to the nuclear issue (China View, October 9, 2006).  
 
In addition to this, with respect to the bilateral relationship between China and North 
Korea, China announced that it remained unchanged in its policy on building good 
relations with North Korea despite North Korea‟s nuclear test. Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, announced that “[i]n dealing with the bilateral ties, 
we stick to two principles: first, the development of the ties should serve the common 
interests of both sides; second, it should be conducive to the peace, stability and 
development of Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.” (China View, October 10, 
2006) He added that “China is resolutely opposed to solving the Korean Peninsula 
nuclear issue by means of war … We sincerely hope that the DPRK can enjoy peace, 
stability, development and prosperity.” (China View, October 10, 2006) 
 
Other parties’ responses 
Russia demanded that North Korea took immediate steps to abandon its nuclear 
testing programme. According to a statement by the Foreign Ministry, the test was 
“fraught with a threat to peace, security and stability in the region and with 
undermining of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.” (MFAR, October 9, 2006) It 
also urged that North Korea should rejoin the NPT and return to the Six Party Talks. 
Russia pointed out that these recommendations would be Russia‟s official stance 
when the UNSC discussed the issue (MFAR, October 9, 2006).  
South Korea also perceived the nuclear test as a serious threa t to its national security. 
The South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun, announced that “[t]his – [North Korea‟s 
nuclear bomb test] – is a grave threat to peace, not only on the Korean Peninsula but 
in the region.” (McLaren, October 9, 2006) South Korea also stated that the issue of 
North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test should be transferred to the UN. 
Two days before the North Korean nuclear bomb test, Japan announced that “a 
nuclear test … would pose a grave threat to the peace and security of not only Japan 
but also Northeast Asia and the international community. … Thus Japan immediately 
raised this issue in the Council, and acting as the President of the Council, worked 
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closely with other countries and in an effort to express the collective will of the 
Council members.” (MOFA, October 7, 2006)71 
All of the other parties revealed their concerns about a nuclear-armed North Korea. 
Moreover, most of them agreed to transfer this issue to the UNSC. In terms of 
collective security, these responses could be considered as a demonstration of the 
motto of all against one. 
Quite apart from five parties‟ responses, it was apparent that the UN began to engage 
in the North Korean nuclear issue. In addition to the UNSC Resolution 1695, 
condemning North Korea‟s missile launches, the UNSC adopted a new resolution – 
Resolution 1718 – which aimed at encouraging collective sanctions against North 
Korea. This made the North Korean nuclear issue move onto a different stage. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, collective security carries out its role through 
international security regime. Thus, at this stage, it seems necessary to explore these 
from the perspective of collective security regime.  
4.3.2. Collective security regime and the Six Party Talks 
 
As discussed earlier, collective security expects the operation of international regimes. 
In other words, collective security suggests that international regimes can play a 
significant role in realising the notion of collective security. Thus, Albert Legault 
indicates that regime theory might be useful to describe mechanisms of collective 
security to deal with international disputes because it supposes rational state actors 
and the existence of mutual interests among states (Legault, 1994-5). 
 
In relation to the North Korean nuclear issue, the third phase saw that the UN, the 
NPT regime and the Six Party Talks have taken key roles in organising collective 
actions against North Korea. Thus, it seems sound to examine the role of these 
structures from the perspective of collective security regimes. This section will deal 
with the question of how these frameworks have run as international regimes to 
implement the perception of collective security.  
 
                                                 
71
 At that point, Japan was a non-permanent member of the UNSC. 
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4.3.2.1. The United Nations as a collective security organisation 
 
As Inis Claude notes, collective security assumes the establishment of an official and 
institutional organisation which may encourage states to commit themselves to a joint 
action against aggressive actors (Claude, 2006). Since the end of the Second World 
War, the UN has been considered as a collective security organisation which aims at 
preventing major war based on the UN Charter that has taken a role as a collective 
security regime.72 This section will explore how the UN has engaged in organising 
collective sanctions against North Korea. 
 
North Korea’s missile launches and the UNSC Resolution 1695 
 
As a collective security regime, the UN Charter describes general principles and 
norms through its Articles. For example, according to Article 1.1, the UN takes 
“effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” 
in order to “maintain international peace and security.” Thus, as Albert Legault 
indicates, with respect to the UN‟s involvement in international affairs, it seems 
notable that the UN‟s intervention has been happened when the issue could be 
regarded as a threat to the world peace and international security (Legault, 1994-5). 
Moreover, “[w]hen the Security Council [UNSC] intervenes in a situation that is 
likely to pose a threat to peace and international security, it exercises a perfectly legal 
discretionary power.” (Legualt, 1994-5: 73) 
 
Responding to North Korea‟s missile launches on July 5, 2006, the UN Security 
Council held an emergency session the next day to discuss how to deal with North 
Korea‟s provocation. And on July 15, 2006, the UNSC unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1695, which condemned the missile launches and entailed a partial arms 
embargo against North Korea. Resolution 1695, firstly, required North Korea to stop 
all activities related to its ballistic missile programme. In addition, Resolution 1695 
demanded that all member states “prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, 
goods and technology being transferred to DPRK‟s missile or WMD [Weapons of 
                                                 
72 The UN Charter provides a set of norms, rules and decision-making procedures which in itiates the 
UN‟s role in dealing with international disputes. For details of discussion of the UN Charter, see 
section 4.2. An Analytical Framework of Collect ive Security. 
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Mass Destruction] programmes … and the transfer of nay financial resources in 
relation to DPRK‟s missile or WMD programmes.” (UNSC Resolution 1695, July 15, 
2006) 
 
More significantly, Resolution 1695 asserted that North Korea should return to the 
Six Party Talks unconditionally “to work towards the expeditious implementation of  
19  September 2005 Joint Statement, in particular to abandon all nuclear weapons and 
existing nuclear programmes, and to return at an early date to the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards.” (UNSC Resolution 1695, July 15, 2006) Furthermore, Resolution 1695 
also asked all six parties to commit to the complete implementation of the September 
19 Joint Statement in 2005 in order to realise “the verifiable denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the 
Korean peninsula and in north-east Asia.” (UNSC Resolution 1695, July 15, 2006)  
 
North Korea’s nuclear bomb test and the UNSC Resolution 1718  
 
Soon after North Korea‟s announcement on 3 October 2006, revealing its plan for a 
nuclear test, the UNSC held a meeting and issued a statement on October 6, 2006. 
According to the statement by the President of the UNSC, the Security Council had 
serious concerns over North Korea‟s nuclear test plan. The Security Council 
pronounced that “should the DPRK carry out its threat of a nuclear weapon test, it 
would jeopardise peace, stability and security in the region and beyond … [S]uch a 
test would bring universal condemnation by the international community and would 
not help the DPRK to address the stated concerns particularly with regard to 
strengthening its security.” (UNSC, October 6, 2006) Furthermore, the statement 
warned that “a nuclear test, if carried out by the DPRK, would represent a clear threat 
to international peace and security” and that “should the DPRK ignore calls of the 
international community, the Security Council will act consistent with its 
responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations.” (UNSC, October 6, 2006) 
 
In response to North Korea‟s nuclear test, on 14 October 2006, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1718 condemning North Korea‟s nuclear test and 
imposing sanctions on North Korea. The UNSC Resolution 1718 perceived the North 
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Korean nuclear test as “a clear threat to international peace and security.” (UNSC 
Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006) It demanded that North Korea would not carry 
out any further nuclear tests or ballistic missile launches, and that North Korea should 
abandon all ballistic missile programmes and terminate all nuclear programmes in a 
„complete, verifiable and irreversible manner‟ (UNSC Resolution 1718, October 14, 
2006). 
 
Under the UN Charter Article 41, all member states were required to stop the direct or 
indirect trade of nuclear programmes, weapons-related items and luxury goods with 
North Korea. All member states were also called on to comply with the inspection of 
all North Korean shipments regardless of their port of origin. The Resolution 1718 
asked to freeze any funds related to the production or distribution of WMD or to 
persons involved with such activities (UNSC Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006). 
 
With respect to the Six Party Talks, the Resolution 1718 encouraged all states 
concerned to make stronger diplomatic efforts to help the early resumption of the Six 
Party Talks, “with a view to the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement 
issued on 19 September 2005, … to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the 
Korean peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in 
North-East Asia.” (UNSC Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006) It also appealed to 
North Korea “to return immediately to the six-party talks without precondition and to 
work towards the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 
September 2005.” (UNSC Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006) 
 
In terms of international security, it seems reliable to say that collective sanctions 
against North Korea based on the UNSC Resolution 1695 and 1718, demonstrate the 
slogan of „all for one and one for all‟, which constitutes a central part of collective 
security. Nevertheless, in addition to this, it seems essential to explore the operation 
of the NPT regime regarding the North Korean nuclear issue in order to support the 
main assumptions of collective security.  
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4.3.2.2. The nuclear non-proliferation regime as a collective security regime 
 
On January 10, 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT (KCNA, 
January 10, 2003). Thus, it might seem pointless to examine the North Korean nuclear 
issue from the perspective of the NPT regime. Nevertheless, the non-proliferation 
norm has been actually utilised in formulating collective action to deal with the North 
Korean nuclear issue. For example, the six parties (except North Korea) and the 
UNSC persistently maintained that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearised for 
the international stability and security. Moreover, the IAEA which provides 
international safeguards of non-proliferation took a role in verifying the disablement 
of the North Korean nuclear facilities. Therefore, it seems worth investigating the role 
of the NPT regime regarding the North Korean nuclear issue from the perception of 
collective security. 
 
The focus of this section is to examine the operation of the NPT regime as a collective 
regime since North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test. This observation is limited the time 
between North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test in 2006 and the destruction of the cooling 
tower in 2008. The UNSC Resolution 1695 and 1718 also make reference to the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, the UNSC resolutions were already 
examined through the UN as a collective security organisation. This section will focus 
more on the IAEA‟s inspections regarding North Korea‟s nuclear activities. 
 
In the first place, it seems notable that as mentioned above, the NPT regime has  
already been institutionalised into a combination of international treaties such as the 
NPT, and other associated international systems (for example, the IAEA safeguards). 
The centrepiece of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was endorsed in 1968 and came into force in 1970 
(Thakur, Boulden and Weiss, October 2008) and this acts as the basis to organise 
collective action against proliferators. According to Article I and Article II of the NPT, 
it is prohibited either for nuclear weapons states to transfer nuclear weapons-related 
devices or for nuclear weapons states to develop nuclear weapons-related technology 
by non-nuclear weapons states. Under the NPT, Article III points out that the IAEA 
has responsibility to verify whether all nuclear materials in a State Party is reported to 
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the IAEA and is under the IAEA safeguards (Treaty on the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, July 1, 1968). 
 
In relation to the North Korean nuclear issue, apart from the US‟s „verifiable, 
irreversible, complete dismantlement‟ policy, the non-proliferation norm has been 
reflected in the joint statements. For example, the February 13 Joint Statement in 
2007 declared that “each party will take in the initial phase for the implementation of 
the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005.” (February 13 Joint Statement of the Six 
Party Talks, February 13, 2007) According to the September 19 Joint Statement in 
2005, all the parties concerned agreed that “the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the 
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.” 
(September 19 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, September 19, 2005) 
Furthermore, it announced that North Korea promised its commitment to “abandoning 
all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.” 
(September 19 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, September 19, 2005) Thus, it 
seems possible to say that the non-proliferation norm has played a key role in putting 
North Korea under a collective coalition to realise the nuclear- free Korean Peninsula. 
 
Secondly, in relation to the verification of North Korea‟s nuclear programme, the 
IAEA has had its own role. The perception of the IAEA‟s role was also reflected on 
the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007. The February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 
affirmed that “[t]he DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual 
abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and 
invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as 
agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.” (February 13 Joint Statement of the Six Party 
Talks, February 13, 2007) 
 
As the IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei indicated, since the end of 
December 2002, when North Korea decided to reactivate its nuclear facilities, the 
IAEA was unable to carry out any verification activities in North Korea (IAEA, 
November 23, 2006). Nevertheless, soon after North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test, the 
IAEA demanded that “the DPRK should abandon its nuclear weapons programme in a 
verifiable manner,” (IAEA, November 23, 2006) and announced that “[t]he IAEA 
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stands ready to work with the DPRK – and with all others – towards a solution that, 
inter alia, makes use of the Agency‟s verification capability with a view to assure the 
international community that all nuclear activities in the DPRK will become 
exclusively for peaceful purposes.” (IAEA, November 23, 2006) 
 
As the first step to implement the agreement on 13 February 2007, in late February 
North Korea invited the IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei to discuss the 
verification issue of North Korea‟s nuclear programme. This was interpreted as a 
signal that North Korea would allow all necessary monitoring and verification by the 
IAEA inspectors (IAEA, March 5, 2007). At the invitation of DPRK, ElBaradei paid a 
visit to the country from March 13 to 14, 2007. He reported that the DPRK side told 
him they were willing to accept nuclear inspections, but were waiting for the United 
States to lift its financial sanctions (Xinhua, March 14, 2007). 
 
As the second step, North Korea invited the IAEA inspectors to discuss “the 
procedures of the IAEA‟s verification and monitoring of the suspension of the 
operations of nuclear facilities at Nyongbyon under the February 13 agreement.” 
(KCNA, June 16, 2007). The IAEA accepted the DPRK‟s invitation to discuss 
measures for verification and monitoring the freeze of the nuclear reactor at 
Yongbyon. The IAEA inspection team was scheduled to visit Pyongyang on June 25, 
2007 (IAEA, June 18, 2007). 
 
On 25 June 2007, North Korea stated that it was prepared for a discussion to shut 
down its nuclear facilities with the IAEA inspectors in Pyongyang from 26 June 2007 
(KCNA, June 25, 2007). The IAEA agency team led by Mr. Olli Heinonen, Deputy 
Director General for Safeguards, arranged the modalities for monitoring and 
verification of the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor during their visit to North Korea 
between 26 and 29 June 2007 (IAEA, July 3, 2007).  
 
On 13 July 2007, the IAEA announced that the IAEA inspection team was en route to 
Yongbyon nuclear reactor in North Korea in order to confirm and examine the 
shutdown and sealing of Yongbyon reactor. It was the first time the IAEA was able to 
check the shutdown of North Korea‟s nuclear facilities since January 2003 (IAEA, 
July 13, 2007). On 14 July 2007, North Korea declared that it closed the nuclear 
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reactor at Yongbyon and permitted the IAEA inspection team to watch the facilities 
(KCNA, July 15, 2007). 
 
The IAEA inspectors were informed on 14 July 2007 that the DPRK had shut down 
the following facilities: the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant No.1, the 
Radiochemical Laboratory, the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant, the 
Yongbyon Nuclear Power Plant No.2, and the Nuclear Power Plant at Taechon. On 18 
July 2007, the IAEA inspectors eventually confirmed that the nuclear facilities at 
Yongbyon were shut down and sealed properly (IAEA, July 18, 2007).  
 
The IAEA safeguard is an important part of the NPT regime in terms of verification 
of nuclear activities. Thus, North Korea‟s acceptance of the IAEA inspection means 
that the North Korean nuclear programmes were dealt with through the norms of the 
NPT regime during this period. 
 
The UN‟s engagement and the role of the NPT regime have been explored from the 
perspective of collective security regimes. The following section will examine the Six 
Party Talks from the notion of collective security.  
 
4.3.2.3. The Six Party Talks as an actor of a collective security regime 
 
This research has considered the Six Party Talks as a concert-like diplomacy at the 
initial stage. However, since the UN‟s engagement put the North Korean nuclear issue 
on a different stage after North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test, it seems inevitable to 
observe the process of the Six Party Talks after North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test from 
the perspective of collective security.  
 
As observed before, soon after North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test, the UNSC adopted 
the Resolution 1718, encouraging all six parties to make efforts to continue the Six 
Party Talks “with a view to the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement 
issued on 19 September 2005, … to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the 
Korean peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in 
North-East Asia.” (UNSC Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006) This means that 
although the UNSC decided to order sanctions against North Korea, it left the task of 
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finding a solution of the North Korean nuclear issue in hands of the parties concerned. 
In this regard, it seems necessary to explore the relationship between the notion of 
collective security embedded in the UN Charter and the joint statements of the Six 
Party Talks. The tenets of „An Agenda for Peace‟ related to regional arrangement may 
be able to give an answer to this question.  
 
The UN Charter, Article 52, Section 1 denotes that “[n]othing in the present Charter 
precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such 
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are 
appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their 
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. ” 
(Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945) On the other hand, „An Agenda for 
Peace‟ indicates that although the UN Charter does not give any clear definition of 
regional arrangements and agencies, it may allow “useful flexibility for undertakings 
by a group of States to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action which also 
could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.” (An Agenda 
for Peace, Article 61, January 13, 1992)73 Moreover, „An Agenda for Peace‟ points 
out that “[i]n the past, regional arrangements often were created because of the 
absence of a universal system for collective security … But in this new era of 
opportunity [in the post-Cold War era], regional arrangements or agencies can render 
great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their  relationship with the United 
Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII.” (An 
Agenda for Peace, Article 63, 31 January 1992)74 
 
At this stage, it seems possible to consider the joint statement issued through the Six 
Party Talks as a part of regional arrangements authorised by the UN Charter. Thus, it 
is worth examining the tenets of the joint statements from the notion of collective 
security regime. In this regard, it seems reasonable to consider the principal tenets of 
                                                 
73
 An Agenda for Peace is a report written by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, which 
suggests the UN‟s role in dealing with conflict in the post-Cold War world. 
74
 The UN Charter, Chapter VIII (Article 52, 53, 54) contributes to regional arrangements in dealing 
with security matters. 
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the joint statements issued through the process of the Six Party Talks as a sub-regime 
of the NPT regime.75 
 
According to Janis Stein, there should be three key elements in creating an 
international regime: “convergent expectations among its members, interdependence 
among participants and across policy issues, and procedures for multilateral decision-
making to effect collective choice.” (Stein, 1985: 603) It seems that the joint 
statements of the Six Party Talks have demonstrated these basic criteria: 1) there has 
been and is a common interest among participants – the denuclearisation of the 
Korean Peninsula; 2) the members are interdependent in a sense that they have a 
common interest in denuclearising the Korean Peninsula; 3) multilateral meetings to 
produce agreements have been maintained. Therefore, it might be useful to examine 
the process of the Six Party Talks since North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test from the 
perspective of non-proliferation sub-regime.76 
 
Principles 
 
The principles of regimes can be interpreted as “the purposes that their members are 
expected to pursue.” (Keohane, 1984: 58) In relation to the Six Party Talks, the 
September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 clearly stated the principles of the six party 
framework by stating that “[t]he Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of 
the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a 
peaceful manner.” It also reaffirmed that “[t]he Six Parties committed to joint efforts 
for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.” (The September 19 Joint Statement 
of the Six Party Talks, September 19, 2005) 
 
                                                 
75
 For a d iscussion of examples of sub-regime, see Puchala and Hopkins (1982).  
76
 Here the notion of reg ime refers to “sets of implicit  or explicit princip les, norms, ru les, and decision -
making procedures around which actor‟s expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.” (Krasner, 1983: 2) However, in interpret ing the process of the Six Party Talks from the 
perspective of collective security regime, it seems significant to consider the interpretation of reg ime 
by knowledge-based theories that international regimes are “the product of an on-going process of 
community self-interpretation and self-definition in response to changing context.” (Neufeld, 1993: 55) 
This is because even if the North Korean nuclear crisis has been dealt with through given sets of 
principles, norms, rules and procedures, it is also obvious that the immediate p rinciples, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures of the Six Party Talks have been established through on -going process 
of the international negotiations. 
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These principles seem to be very relevant to the concept of peacemaking in „An 
Agenda for Peace‟. According to „An Agenda for Peace,‟ the notion of peacemaking 
refers to “the responsibility to try to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful 
means,” which lies “between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping the 
peace.” (An Agenda for Peace, January 13, 1992) 
 
Norms 
 
Norms define members‟ behaviour including “responsibilities and obligations in 
relatively general terms.” (Keohane, 1984: 85) In other words, norms are “the general 
legal provisions that help define codes of conduct for the actors in the system.” 
(Legault, 1994-5: 87) In general terms, the six parties agreed that they “undertook, in 
their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and recognized norms of international relations.” (September 19 Joint 
Statement of the Six Party Talks, September 19, 2005) The six parties also reiterated 
that they will take “positive steps to increase mutual trust, and will make joint efforts 
for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.” (February 13 Joint Statement of the 
Six Party Talks, February 13, 2007) More specifically, North Korea committed to 
disabling its entire nuclear programme except for the purpose of electricity generation. 
The US also declared its policy of no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and 
of no nuclear attack on North Korea (September 19 Jo int Statement of the Six Party 
Talks, September 19, 2005). In short, the specific norm which leads the Six Party 
Talks would be found in the mutual understanding of the goal for the denuclearisation 
of the Korean Peninsula. 
 
Rules 
 
Rules “indicate in more detail the specific rights and obligations of members.” 
(Keohane, 1984: 58) Put differently, rules are “the means incorporated into the 
fundamental arrangements which make the norms and principles of the regime 
operational.” (Legault, 1994-5: 90) With respect to the dismantlement of the North 
Korean nuclear programme, the Six Party Talks established very simple rules – 
“commitment for commitment, action for action.” The September 19 Joint Statement 
in 2005 announced that the six parties agreed to “take coordinated steps to implement 
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the [shared consensus] in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment 
for commitment, action for action”.” (September 19 Joint Statement of the Six Party 
Talks, September 19, 2005) The February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 reaffirmed this 
rule by stating that “[t]he Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the 
Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of “action for action”.” 
(February 13 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, February 13, 2007) 
 
For example, North Korea allowed the IAEA inspectors to work in its territory when 
the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue was solved. On 25 June 2007, North Korea 
announced that the BDA issue was eventually settled, and that it would conduct its 
part of the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 regarding the verification of its 
nuclear programme, in accordance with the principle of “action for action” (KCNA, 
June 25, 2007). The IAEA inspection team reentered North Korea and on 18 July 
2007, the IAEA inspectors finally confirmed that the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon 
were shut down and sealed properly (IAEA, July 18, 2007).  
 
Another example can be seen in North Korea‟s declaration on its nuclear programme. 
According to the October 3 Joint Statement in 2007, North Korea agreed to “provide a 
complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs” (October 3 Joint 
Statement of the Six Party Talks, October 3, 2007). On 26 June 2008, North Korea 
officially submitted a declaration on its nuclear programmes to China as proof of its 
commitment to the October 3 Joint Statement in 2007 (Disarmament Documentation, 
June 26, 2008). Furthermore, North Korea destructed the cooling tower at Yongbyon 
as a final step of the disablement of its nuclear facilities (Norimitsu Onishi, June 28, 
2008). In exchange for this, on the same date, US President Bush announced that 
North Korea would be de-listed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism (The New 
York Times, June 27, 2008). Eventually, on 11 October 2008, the US formally 
removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism (Snyder and Gategno, 
March 2008). 
 
Implementation procedures 
 
As Robert Keohane notes, “the decision-making procedures of regimes provide ways 
of implementing their principles and altering their rules.” (Keohane, 1984: 58) In 
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other words, “[i]mplementation procedures are created within multilateral 
organizations through sets of formal and informal arrangements established within the 
organizations themselves. These arrangements include formal legal arrangements, 
tacit conventions, and informal arrangements often established on a case-by-case 
basis.” (Legault, 1994-5: 95) 
 
Regarding implementation procedures, the Six Party Talks have basically been 
dependent on formal arrangements through the continuation of the multilateral 
meetings. For example, the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 established a shared 
goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula which have initiated the process of the Six 
Party Talks. The February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 describes the details of the 
initial actions for the realisation of the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 such as 
North Korea‟s specific obligation to shut down its nuclear facilities and the 
establishment of five working groups to discuss related issues. And the October 3 
Joint Statement in 2007 illustrates the second phase actions for the dismantlement of 
the North Korean nuclear programmes including North Korea‟s responsibility to 
report its all nuclear programmes. 
 
Moreover, the Six Party Talks have also utilised informal and bilateral arrangements 
between the two major actors – the US and North Korea. For instance, as discussed  
earlier, in relation to the report of North Korea‟s nuclear activities, both sides have 
had a set of bilateral negotiations to establish consensus and eventually the declaration 
of the entire North Korean nuclear programme was made.  
 
As mentioned above, a collective security system assumes that it could provide more 
effective measures against a violation of the international security. The following 
section will explore how the Six Party Talks have produced valuable means to 
enhance the international stability in the Northeast Asian region.  
 
4.3.3. Moderating the security dilemma 
 
Collective security has been considered as a system which could provide a stable 
security environment in several ways. First, an aggressor can be easily detected 
because collective security increases transparency about military resources through 
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the institutionalisation of cooperation. This means that “the sharing of information” 
(Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 132) will make it easy to identify a state which begins 
military build-up. Second, the probability of collective sanction may significantly 
increase and this may discourage a potential aggressor from undermining international 
stability. In other words, collective security presumes the certainty of collective action.  
Finally, collective security can lessen the security dilemma by reducing the necessity 
of demonstrating resolve because states do not need to maintain high level of military 
capability under collective security (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991).  
 
In relation to the ease of identifying an aggressor, this chapter has already discussed 
rules of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in detecting North Korea‟s nuclear 
activities. 77  Moreover, an examination of the UN‟s role as a collective security 
organisation can be considered as an evidence of the certainty of collective action.78 
Therefore, this section will mainly focus on exploring empirical evidence which may 
show how the security dilemma has been diminished through the process of the Six 
Party Talks. 
 
4.3.3.1. A reputation for resolve and the repetition of cooperative behaviour  
 
As examined above, North Korea has persistently maintained that its nuclear 
programmes have been essentially based on the purpose of establishing self-defence 
capabilities. North Korea‟s perception could be interpreted as a pursuit of “a 
reputation for resolve” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 134) which might result in the 
stimulation of the security dilemma. However, the resumption of the Six Party Talks 
and the significant outcomes of the processes have demonstrated that the security 
dilemma could be reduced through the repetition of cooperative behaviour. This 
section will explore the question of how the six party processes have diminished the 
security dilemma. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77
 For details, see section 4.3.2.2. The non-proliferation regime as a collective security reg ime. 
78
 For details, see section 4.3.2.1. The UN as a collective security organisation.  
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The resumption of the Six Party Talks 
 
According to Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, under collective security, the 
security dilemma can be diminished through repetition of cooperative behaviour, 
which may contribute to establishing trust and confidence among states (Kupchan and 
Kupchan, 1991). The resumption of the Six Party Talks and the continuation of the  
nuclear talks could be considered as a restarting point of symbolic repetition of 
cooperative behaviour. 
 
After the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1718, the international community saw 
the resumption of the Six Party Talks. This was initiated by China who wanted to 
bring the situation under control. In October 2006, high ranking Chinese officials met 
with the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and clarified China‟s policy position 
regarding the nuclear test by North Korea. For example, when Hu Jintao met with 
Rice, he stated that despite China‟s opposition to North Korea‟s nuclear test and its 
approval of the UNSC Resolution 1718, China would continue to seek a diplomatic 
solution of the nuclear issue. He reaffirmed that China would make efforts to handle 
the situation and to create atmosphere for an early resumption of the Six Party Talks 
(China View, October 20, 2006). Moreover, after his visit to Pyongyang on October 
19, Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan met with Rice in Beijing. He told Rice that 
all parties should leave room for a resumption of diplomatic negotiations because a 
peaceful solution would be in the common interests of all sides. He asked the US to 
take a “more active and flexible attitude” (China View, October 20, 2006). Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao claimed that all parties should try to re-open the six party process. 
He told Rice that “[t]here is no other choice but diplomacy and dialogue.” (China 
View, October 20, 2006). 
 
In late October 2006, the US and North Korea held an informal meeting with Chinese 
support to arrange conditions for restarting the six party process. On 31 October, 2006, 
China announced that the Six Party Talks would resume soon as the US, North Korea 
and China had agreed on the continuation of the nuclear disarmament talks, at an 
informal meeting in Beijing between the three states. The agreement seemed to be a 
revitalisation of a diplomatic process as it was a first sign of reducing tensions since 
the nuclear test by North Korea (Kahn, November 1, 2006). On 1 November 2006, 
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North Korea announced that it had contacts with the US in Beijing on October 31 and 
made a decision to return to the nuclear negotiations under the condition that the BDA 
issue 79  should be resolved through a bilateral discussion between them within the 
context of the Six Party Talks (KCNA, November 1, 2006). 
 
Prior to the resumption of the second session of the fifth round, the US clarified its 
policy position to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue in a diplomatic manner. 
On 15 November 2006, in his testimony to the House International Relations 
Committee on North Korea, the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
Nicholas Burns, stated that the US would not accept the DPRK as a Nuclear Weapons 
State and it would continue to stick to its dual-track strategy by: 1) disciplining the 
North Korean regime through putting the UN sanctions into action; and 2) 
maintaining diplomatic approaches for North Korea to come back to the six party 
process. Nicholas Burns clarified that both sanctions and a diplomatic track focused 
on maintaining diplomacy to realise North Korea‟s nuclear disarmament (Burns, 
November 15, 2006). 
 
The US and North Korea had bilateral talks on 27-28 November 2006, in Beijing. 
During the meetings, the US delegation Christopher Hill presented US position on 
how to implement the tenets of the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005. The US 
suggested a list of actions to be performed by North Korea, including locking a 
nuclear test site, sealing the nuclear reactor in Yongbyun, allowing the IAEA 
inspection, and reporting its entire nuclear-related programmes and facilities. In 
exchange for this, the US proposed that it could terminate financial sanctions, provide 
heavy fuel oil (HFO) to North Korea, consider a discussion for a peace regime in the 
Korean Peninsula and for multilateral security guarantees, and take steps for 
diplomatic normalisation between the US and North Korea (Gross, January 15, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79
 For details of the BDA issue, see Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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The second session of the fifth round 
 
Eventually, the second session of the fifth round of the Six Party Talks was held in 
Beijing on 18-22 December 2006. 80  However, the session ended without any 
noticeable outcomes. This was because while the US repeatedly urged North Korea to 
terminate its nuclear programme, North Korea demanded that the US lifts all 
sanctions against it (Lague, December 19, 2006). As the second session continued, it 
became clear that North Korea‟s top priority was to reconnect itself to the 
international financial system. On the one hand, the US claimed that the financial 
issue should be dealt with separately from the nuclear issue. On the other hand, North 
Korea considered the BDA issue as a major obstacle to the progress of the nuclear 
negotiations (Lague, December 22, 2006). 
 
The fifth round went into recess on December 22, 2006 after issuing a chairman‟s 
statement. According to the chairman‟s statement, all six parties restated that their 
commitments to the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005, in the manner of 
“action for action”. It also announced that all six parties reaffirmed their original 
position supporting a peaceful negotiation through dialogue to achieve the goal of the 
denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula (China View, December 22, 2006).  
 
4.3.3.2. The increase of transparency81 
 
In relation to the security dilemma, it seems notable that collective security 
diminishes the possibility of accidental conflicts by increasing transparency and as a 
result of this, the security dilemma can be reduced through decreasing the uncertainty 
and the risk of misperception. In this regard, it might be helpful to examine two 
issues: first, the processes disabling North Korea‟s nuclear facilities to prove the 
transparency of North Korea‟s nuclear activities; second, discussion within five 
                                                 
80
 The first session of the fifth round of the Six Party Talks was held in Beijing, 9-11 November 2005. 
Between the first session and the second session of the fifth round, North Korea conducted the missile 
launches and the nuclear bomb test. 
 
81
 The term transparency refers to “the sharing of informat ion.” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 132) 
The increase of transparency means the expansion of “the level of informat ion available to all parties” 
(Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 131).  
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working groups, which showed other countries‟ reliable commitment to providing 
security guarantee to North Korea.  
 
The third session and the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 
 
Between 8 and 13 February, the third session of the fifth round was held in Beijing, 
aimed at debating a Chinese-prepared draft. China presented a draft which generally 
referred to the Joint Statement in September 2005. It proposed that in exchange for 
the provision of energy sources by the other five parties to North Korea, the 
Yongbyon 5 megawatt nuclear reactor should be shut down within 60 days. It also 
proposed to setting up five working groups, which could make progress on other 
outstanding issues such as the diplomatic normalisation between North Korea and the 
US, as well as North Korea and Japan (Callick, February 10, 2007). The third session 
eventually produced another joint statement on February 13, 2007, which described 
initial steps for dismantling North Korea‟s nuclear weapons programme.  
 
As the title “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” indicates, 
the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 specified what should firstly be done by 
North Korea. According to the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007, North Korea had 
to complete two key tasks as the initial phase of the disablement of its nuclear 
facilities: first, the shut- down of the Yongbyon reactor, second, the declaration of a 
list of all its nuclear programmes. The followings are key components of the Joint 
Statement of February 13, 2007 (February 13 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, 
February 13, 2007): 
 
In general, the parties reaffirmed the goal of the peaceful denuclearisation of the 
Korean Peninsula and agreed to take a step-by-step plan in accordance with “action 
for action” strategy in implementing the Joint Statement in a phased manner. In the 
initial phase, first, the Yongbyun nuclear facility, including the reprocessing device 
should be shut down and IAEA personnel should be invited by Pyongyang to check 
and verify North Korea‟s nuclear activities. In return, the other five parties guaranteed 
the shipment of emergency energy assistance, 50,000 tons of HFO, to North Korea 
within next 60 days. Second, the US and North Korea would start discussion on 
bilateral issues such as removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of 
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terrorism and terminating US financial sanctions against North Korea. Third, all six 
parties agreed on setting up five working groups – on the denuclearisation of the 
Korean Peninsula, normalisation of diplomatic relation between North Korea and the 
US, normalisation of North Korea-Japan relation, economy and energy cooperation, 
and Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. The working groups would meet 
within next 30 days and form specific plans for implementing the September 19 
statement from 2005 in their respective areas. Fourth, after the commencement of the 
respective implementation, a ministerial meeting including all six parties would be 
held not only for verifying the operationalisation of the 2005 Joint Statement, but also 
to discuss possible ways for encouraging security collaboration in Northeast Asia. 
 
In relation to the security dilemma, the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 
demonstrates a set of mechanisms to reduce the security dilemma. In the first place, 
the six parties restated “their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner” (February 13 Joint Statement of the 
Six Party Talks, February 13, 2007) for the purpose of preventing nuclear arms race in 
Northeast Asia. Furthermore, the Joint Statement indicated that a set of working 
groups would be established to deal with the normalisation of diplomatic relation 
between the US and North Korea, and between North Korea and Japan. It seems 
obvious that diplomatic normalisation between countries would diminish the security 
dilemma. Eventually, the six parties agreed that after the beginning of the 
implementation, they would hold “a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of 
the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation 
in Northeast Asia.” (February 13 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, February 13, 
2007) 
 
In this regard, it seems useful to look at the US‟s perception of the February 13 Joint 
Statement in 2007. The US underlined that the agreement should be understood not 
only as efforts for the goal of the nuclear free Korean Peninsula, but also as an 
endeavour to develop peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia (Rice, February 13, 
2007). The US also understood that the six party framework was not just to solve the 
North Korean nuclear issue. Instead, the US considered the six party processes as one 
of leverage to deal with sources of tension in the region. This was the reason why the 
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agreement included the establishment of a working group to discuss future 
relationship in the region (Hill, February 22, 2007). 
 
According to the February 13 agreement, North Korea committed to its part. On June 
16, 2007, North Korea invited the IAEA inspectors to discuss “the procedures of the 
IAEA‟s verification and monitoring of the suspension of the operations of nuclear 
facilities at Nyongbyon under the February 13 agreement.” (KCNA, June 16, 2007)82 
The IAEA accepted the DPRK‟s invitation to discuss measures for verification and 
monitoring the freeze of the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon (IAEA, June 18, 2007). 
Eventually, on 14 July 2007 North Korea announced the shutdown of its nuclear 
facilities in Yongbyon and this was confirmed by the IAEA inspection team on 18 
July 2007 (IAEA, 18 July 2007). 
 
Regarding North Korea‟s shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor, the US welcomed North 
Korea‟s decision and announced that it would decisively commit to the 
implementation of the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. Nevertheless, the US 
repeatedly asked North Korea to move forward next phases laid out by the February 
13, 2007 Joint Statement – that is, a declaration of all its nuclear programmes as the 
second step and a disablement of all its existing nuclear facilities as the final step 
(McCormack, July 14, 2007). On July 18, 2007, the IAEA inspectors eventually 
confirmed that the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon were shut down and sealed properly 
(IAEA, July 18, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, North Korea also noted that further steps such as North Korea‟s 
declaration of its all nuclear programmes and the complete disablement of its nuclear 
facilities would be taken only when the US commits its part based on the principle of 
“action for action.” More specifically, North Korea demanded the US to lift economic 
sanctions against it and to remove the DPRK from a list of terrorism sponsoring states 
(Herman, July 15, 2007). 
 
 
                                                 
82
 It was the time that the BDA issue moved towards its final solution. For details of the BDA issue, see 
chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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The October 3 Joint Statement in 2007 and North Korea’s declaration of its nuclear 
programme 
 
Regarding the second step of the dismantlement of North Korea‟s nuclear facilities, 
the second session of the sixth round of the talks, which were held in Beijing between 
27 and 30 September 2007, made meaningful progress. The six parties issued the 
October 3 Joint Statement in 2007, named as “Second-Phase Actions for 
Implementation of the Joint Statement”. According to the October 3 Joint Statement 
in 2007, North Korea agreed not only to “disable all existing nuclear facilities subject 
to abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 
agreement,” but also to “provide a complete and correct dec laration of all its nuclear 
programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement by 31 December 2007.” 
(October 3 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, October 3, 2007)83 
 
In early 2008, in his statement before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
the head of the US delegation, Christopher Hill, confirmed that the primary 
disablement tasks were going well. He reported that all agreed disablement tasks both 
at the reprocessing plant and at the fuel fabrication plant were completed prior to 31  
December 2007, and that the discharge of spent fuel at the 5 megawatt reactor would 
continue beyond the deadline due to health/safety and verification concerns (Hill, 
February 6, 2008).84 
 
The issue of the declaration of the North Korean nuclear programmes also went ahead. 
In relation to this issue, the most important principle was „verification‟. Thus, the US 
persistently claimed that it wanted a declaration that is “complete and correct” (Hill, 
January 7, 2008). According to Christopher Hill‟s statement before the US Senate 
                                                 
83
 The US has insisted on the „dismantlement‟ of all nuclear facilities in North Korea. However, the US 
is now employing the term „disablement‟. In relation to the differences between „dismantlement‟ and 
„disablement‟, the US gives a definit ion by saying that “disablement, the concept here is to make it  
difficult  to restart a nuclear program [an  actual physical d isablement] […] [Dismantlement would be 
the] next stage, which is to get rid of all the weapons grade or fissile material and dismantle the 
facilit ies […] Disablement‟s going to be a lot less than that [dismantlement]” (Hill, October 3, 2007). 
In short, Christopher Hill reclarified that “[d isablement] is to create a situation where it is very difficult  
to bring those facilities back online and certainly a very expensive, difficult prospect of ever bringing 
them back online.” (Hill, November 3, 2007)  
84
 The October 3 Jo int Statement in 2007 specified the deadline for d isabling of the 5 Megawatt 
Experimental Reactor at Yongbyon, the Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) at Yongbyon 
and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility at  Yongbyon by 31 December 2007. For details, see the 
October 3 Jo int Statement in 2007. 
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Foreign Relations Committee, the US demanded that “[t]his declaration must include 
all nuclear weapons, programs, materials, and facilities, including clarification of any 
proliferation activities”, as well as that “[t]he DPRK must also address concerns 
related to any uranium enrichment programs and activities.” (Hill, February 6, 2008) 
 
In early May 2008, North Korea provided approximately 18,000 pages of 
documentation related to its nuclear programmes to the US delegation led by Sung 
Kim, director of the State Department‟s Office of Korean Affairs (Kim, May 13, 
2008). On 26 June 2008, North Korea officially submitted a declaration of its nuclear 
programmes to China as an act of implementation of the October 3 Joint Statement in 
2007 (Disarmament Documentation, June 26, 2008). In this regard, the US re-
emphasised its top concern about verification by stating that “the nature of this 
declaration is one in which we believe we have through a verification – sort of 
verification principles and a protocol to be worked out – the means by which to verify 
the completeness and the accuracy of this document.” (Rice, June 26, 2008)  
 
Eventually, immediately after submitting a declaration of its nuclear programme, 
North Korea destructed the cooling tower at Yongbyon as a final step of the 
disablement of its nuclear facilities. The US regarded the destruction of the cooling 
tower as “a very significant disablement step.” (Norimitsu Onishi, June 28, 2008)  
 
Five working groups 
 
The process of the disablement of North Korea‟s nuclear facilities could be regarded 
as a demonstration of transparency which was conducted by the North Korean side. 
On the other hand, it seems necessary to examine how the other parties contributed to 
the increase of transparency to moderate North Korea‟s security concern. In this 
regard, it might be useful to look at an operation of five working groups, which were 
established under the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007. 
 
According to the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007, “in order to carry out the initial 
actions and for the purpose of the full implementation of the Joint Statement [the 
September 19 Joint Statement in 2005]”, the six parties agreed on setting up of five 
working groups; 1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: 2. Normalization of 
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DPRK-US relations: 3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations: 4. Economy and 
Energy Cooperation: 5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (February 13 
Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, February 13, 2007).85 
 
The working group on peace and security in Northeast Asia held two sessions of 
meetings in 2007. The first session held in Beijing on 16 March 2007, with officials 
from all the six parties attending (Xinhua News Agency, March 16, 2007). The 
second session held in Moscow between 20 and 21 August, 2007. However, this 
working group could not produce any significant outcomes because as Russian 
Foreign Ministry‟s Special Envoy, Vladimir Rakhmanin, indicated, the participants 
just attempted to “find opportunities which would favour the advancement of the six-
party process in general.” (Interfax, August 21, 2007)  
 
On the other hand, the working group on normalisation of DPRK-US relations made 
meaningful progress. In accordance with the February 13 agreement, a bilateral 
working meeting was held between the US and the DPRK in New York on March 5-6, 
2007. In this meeting, North Korea stressed that it could disable its nuclear facilities at 
Yongbyon in exchange for the US‟s diplomatic efforts to normalise bilateral relations 
between the US and North Korea. However, North Korea specified the removal of 
North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism as a significant step which 
should be done by the US (Niksch, February 2, 2009).  
 
The second bilateral meeting to discuss the issue of diplomatic normalisation between 
the US and North Korea was held in Geneva on 1-2 September 2007. According to 
the US delegation, Christopher Hill, during this meeting both sides discussed not only 
the bilateral issues such as diplomatic normalisation between them, but also the issue 
of the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Christopher Hill stated that the US 
and North Korea reached an agreement that North Korea would present a list of all its 
nuclear activities including HEU programme and would disable its nuclear facilities 
by the end of 2007 (Hill, September 2, 2007). On the other hand, North Korea also 
                                                 
85
 Among these, three working groups - Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Normalization of 
DPRK-US relat ions and Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism – seem to be very relevant to 
the issue of transparency. However, regarding working group on Denuclearization of the Korean  
Peninsula, the previous section already discussed the process of the disablement of the North Korean  
nuclear facilities. Thus, this section will examine just two working groups – Normalization of DPRK-
US relat ions and Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism.  
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announced that both sides agreed that the US would delist North Korea from the state-
sponsored terrorism list and would lift all sanctions in exchange  for the disablement 
of North Korea‟s nuclear programmes (KCNA, September 3, 2007).  
 
On 3 October 2007, the six parties issued a statement on the implementation of the 
actions regarding the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, which included a 
target deadline of December 31, 2007. The October 3 Joint Statement in 2007 
required North Korea to fulfil two obligations: the disablement of its Yongbyon 
nuclear facilities and a “complete and correct” declaration of its nuclear programmes. 
In exchange for this, the US promised its commitments “to begin the process of 
removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the 
process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect 
to the DPRK.” (October 3 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, October 3, 2007) 
 
The US State Department‟s „Country Reports on Terrorism 2007‟, issued in April 
2008, stated that “[a]s part of the six-party talks process, the United States reaffirmed 
its intent to fulfil its commitments regarding the removal of the designation of the 
DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in parallel with the DPRK‟s actions on 
denuclearization and in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law.” (Country 
Reports on Terrorism 2007: 173) Eventually, on June 26, 2008, US President Bush 
announced that North Korea would be de- listed from the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism in 45 days (The New York Times, June 27, 2008). 86 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the main motivation of this chapter 
was to examine whether the third phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis can be 
interpreted through the lens of collective security. In relation to realising this goal, 
this chapter explored the following questions.  
 
                                                 
86 26 June 2008 was the date that North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear programme to 
China. On 11 October 2008, the US formally removed North Korea from US list of state sponsors of 
terroris m (Snyder and Gategno, March 2008). 
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1. Can the perception of security under collective security be applicable to 
explaining the third phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis?  
2. Is it proper to figure out the UN‟s engagement through the notion of collective 
security? 
3. Can the concept of collective security regimes be appropriate in analysing the 
process of the Six Party Talks since North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test in 
October 2006? 
 
The second part of this chapter principally studied the security implications of 
collective security. In other words, the questions of what the notion of security under 
collective security and how the system offered security to others were examined. 
After completing this work, the topics and cases to be discussed were selected.  
 
The third part looked at the specific cases and topics to evaluate the applicability of 
the concept of security under a collective security system to the third phase of the 
North Korean nuclear crisis. The basic objective of the third part was to assess the 
appropriateness of the selected cases as meaningful empirical evidence with respect to 
collective security. 
 
Regarding collective security, in the first place, the literature has shown that the 
notion of collective security becomes apparent when the balance of power system – 
for example, a concert of powers – can no longer be useful to sustain the international 
peace and security. As Luard indicates, collective security is an outcome to meet the 
demand that there should be a more open and more institutionalised security system 
than the balance of power system (Luard, 1992). 
 
Nevertheless, the literature also illustrates that despite historical examples such as the 
League of Nations and the United Nations, it is difficult to say that those attempt have 
been successful. As a result of this, it is true that many are sceptical about the 
effectiveness of the idea of collective security (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991).  
 
With respect to the establishment of collective security, the literature has discussed a 
set of preconditions. For example, Inis Claude outlines three basic preconditions of 
collective security: distribution of power, legitimacy and institutionalisation. 
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According to Inis Claude (2006), collective security firstly expects that there should 
be almost even distribution of resources in order to make collective sanctions possible. 
Moreover, regarding the scope of its membership, collective security assumes that it 
needs to be worldwide and therefore collective security cannot exclude any state from 
the system due to the probability of aggressive action. Finally, collective security 
supposes the certainty of joint commitment through setting up a formal organisation. 
However, this organisation is “not a design for organizing coalition warfare … but a 
plan for organizing international police action.” (Claude, 2006: 299) 
 
The literature suggests that the simple doctrine of „one for all and all for one‟ 
constitutes the principal perception of security under a collective security system. 
Regarding the security environment in the 20th century, the motto „one for all and all 
for one‟ is related to the increasing interdependence among states (Thompson, 1953). 
With respect to an operation of collective security, the motto „one for all and all for 
one‟ means the certainty of collective action. In Charles Kupchan and Clifford 
Kupchan‟s terms, “[w]hile states retain considerable autonomy over the conduct of 
their foreign policy, participation in a collective security organization entails a 
commitment by each member to join a coalition to confront any aggressor with 
opposing preponderant strength.” (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 118)  
 
In relation to the provision of security, the literature has demonstrated that 
international regimes play a key role in offering security under collective security. 
Most importantly, as Andrew Bennett and Joseph Lepgold suggest, collective security 
itself can be interpreted as a regime (Bennett and Lepgold, 1993). Collective security 
assumes that international regimes can direct state actors‟ behaviour through 
establishing principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. In this regard, 
the literature has discussed the existing collective security regimes – the UN Charter 
and the NPT regime. 
 
Eventually, the literature has revealed that compared to other security system, 
collective security may provide a more stable security environment through 
moderating the security dilemma. As Kupchan and Kupchan note, an aggressor can 
easily be identified due to the increased transparency of information on military 
resources. The certainty of collective action also contributes to diminishing the 
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possibility of miscalculation by an aggressor. This feature of collective security 
discourages state actors to pursue demonstrating resolve which may intensify the 
security dilemma (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991).  
 
For the purpose of considering whether the third phase of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis has demonstrated an operation of collective security, the third part of this 
chapter observed the process of the Six Party Talks since North Korea‟s nuclear bomb 
test in October 2006. A set of cases were selected and examined.  
 
Firstly, North Korea‟s missile launches and nuclear bomb test were observed. Prior to 
its nuclear bomb test, North Korea demonstrated its military capability to strike its 
adversaries by warhead missiles in July 2006. Moreover, in October 2006, it 
conducted a nuclear bomb test despite strong critics from the other five parties. North 
Korea maintained that it was inevitable for it to perform a nuclear bomb test for the 
purpose of self-defence. However, North Korea‟s provocative behaviour resulted in 
serious reactions from the UN as well as its neighbouring states.  
 
Secondly, the UNSC resolutions (Resolutions 1695 and 1718) were selected as cases 
of the UN which might be considered as a collective security organisation. The UNSC 
resolutions criticised North Korea‟s aggressive actions. The resolutions demanded 
North Korea to return to the Six Party Talks in order to realise the goal of the 
denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the resolution 1718 asked all 
members of the UN to participate in organising economic sanctions against North 
Korea in order to prevent North Korea from trading nuclear-related materials. 
 
Thirdly, the process of the Six Party Talks after North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test was 
investigated. After the adoption of the resolution 1718, the US, China and North 
Korea had a set of informal meetings to discuss the resumption of the Six Party Talks. 
The second session of the fifth round was held in Beijing in December 2006. The 
continuation of the Six Party Talks produced meaningful fruits. For example, the 
February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 issued in the third session of the fifth round 
clarified the six parties‟ obligations which should be taken as a first step to implement 
the tenets of the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005. The sixth round of the Six 
Party Talks delivered the October 3 Joint Statement in 2007 which explained the 
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second phase actions. According to the October 3 Joint Statement in 2007, North 
Korea should complete the disablement of its nuclear programmes within a given time 
limit and in exchange for this, other parties promised to implement their parts through 
five working groups. 
 
The evaluation of a range of empirical evidence shows that the third phase of the 
North Korean nuclear crisis can be understood through the notion of collective 
security. Regarding the first hypothesis that collective security considers any violence 
towards one state as an attack on all states, it seems notable that North Korea‟s 
challenging actions such as missile launches and a nuclear bomb test have been 
regarded as a provocation against the international community and therefore this 
brought about collective sanction against North Korea. For instance, the other five 
parties perceived North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test as a critical threat to their national 
security. The UNSC adopted the resolution 1718, which required all members of the 
UN to take part in supervising the punishment of North Korea, because North Korea‟s 
actions were identified as an actual threat to international peace and security. Hence, 
the international community‟s responses to North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test can be 
observed as an example of the principal tenet of collective security, „one for all and all 
for one‟. 
 
The second hypothesis that the concept of collective security can be realised through 
collective security regimes, has been examined by an exploration of a set of examples. 
In the first place, the UNSC resolutions illustrate that the UN has operated as a 
collective security organisation by controlling all members to join collective sanctions 
against North Korea. Moreover, the IAEA‟s inspection of North Korea‟s nuclear 
facilities proves the role of the NPT regime as a collective security regime. Finally, 
the process of the Six Party Talks can be also perceived as an operation of a sub-
regime of collective security. This is because the basic tenets of the joint statement 
which were issued through the process of the Six Party Talks can be classified 
through the regime definition. A set of joint statements – the September 19 Joint 
Statement in 2005, the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 and the October 3 Joint 
Statement in 2007 – demonstrate principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures in relation to the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue.  
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Regarding the third hypothesis that collective security can provide a more balancing 
security environment, the third case, the process of the Six Party Talks revealed that 
the security dilemma was reduced through the continuation of the Six Party Talks. 
The resumption of the Six Party Talks in December 2006 encouraged North Korea to 
stop further action for „demonstrating resolve‟. According to the joint agreements, 
North Korea has implemented its part including the full declaration of its nuclear 
programmes and the destruction of the cooling tower. On the other hand, the other 
five parties have contributed their parts by starting discussions in the five working 
groups. All of these efforts have increased the transparency of information among the 
participants and as a result, the security dilemma seemed to have been diminished. 
 
What could be learnt from these findings? Regarding the distinctive feature of the 
third phase of the Six Party Talks which witnessed the UN‟s engagement, it seems 
reasonable to acknowledge basic hypotheses of collective security as a critical means 
to explain the major elements of the third phase. As this chapter has described, key 
hypotheses of collective security might be proved through an examination of selected 
cases which illustrate the third phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis. In conclusion, 
as an answer of the questions which were remarked in the introduction of this chapter, 
it seems possible to assert that the idea of collective security could be applicable to an 
explanation of the third phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
The thesis has explored the historical phases of the North Korean nuclear crisis based 
on the examinations of four different security models: hegemony, a concert of powers, 
an alliance system and collective security system. The empirical chapters showed us 
that each phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis could be interpreted through the 
particular security perceptions assumed within the different models. This conclusion 
will now bring together these discussions and question what the research findings tell 
us about the organisation of regional security in Northeast Asia.  
 
5.1. Research Findings 
 
The principal objective of this study was to examine the question of how security is 
being organised in the post-Cold War era. In this regard, the study has explored the 
North Korean nuclear crisis through the lenses of different security models – a 
hegemonic power structure, a concert of powers and a collective security system. 
Empirical research into the North Korean nuclear issue demonstrated the following 
key research findings: firstly, the United States (US) created valuable norms such as 
multilateralism in order to achieve its strategic goals; secondly, China‟s proactive role 
in mediating the nuclear confrontation was impressive in relation to the 
multilateralisation of the nuclear issue; thirdly,  unlike a secret alliance policy in the 
European Concert in the 19th century, an alliance system proved its ability to function 
within a concert of powers; and finally,  the emergence of a collective security system 
was examined. 
 
The US’s multilateralism  
 
The first considerable research finding can be seen in the US‟s multilateral approach 
to the North Korean nuclear issue. In relation to the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue, 
empirical research reveals that the US exercised a unilateral action as a hegemon. For 
example, as examined above, the US unilaterally decided to put financial pressure on 
North Korea when the Six Party Talks were stalled because of North Korea ‟s 
reluctance to make a significant progress. On 15 September 2005, the US forced the 
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Macao-based Banco Delta Asia to stop its financial business with North Korea. After 
that, the BDA issue was discussed through bilateral talks between the US and North 
Korea. Even if Russia played a role in transferring North Korea‟s funds at the BDA to 
North Korea in 2007, it was mere technical assistance in resolving the BDA issue. Put 
differently, it was the US‟s unilateral decision that initiated the financial issue, and it 
was a bilateral approach between the US and North Korea that concluded the BDA 
issue. 
 
Nevertheless, the empirical examination of the first phase of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis demonstrates that a multilateral approach has been the US‟s preferred policy 
tool in dealing with the North Korean case. The US firstly exerted its power in 
identifying the North Korean nuclear issue as a threat not only to its national security, 
but also to global security. However, it was difficult for the US to deal with the 
nuclear issue unilaterally even if it could exercise its hegemonic leadership. Thus, it 
was inevitable for the US to create another norm which might be applicable to handle 
the North Korean nuclear issue. 
 
For instance, the US defined the North Korean nuclear issue as a regional issue in 
Northeast Asia. This paved the way for other countries in the region to become 
involved in the nuclear talks and eventually contributed to the establishment of the 
Six Party Talks as a multilateral forum to discuss the North Korean case. In addition 
to this, since the establishment of the Six Party Talks, the US has repeatedly 
reaffirmed the importance of a multilateral approach in dealing with the North Korean 
nuclear issue. The US persistently highlighted that the North Korean nuclear issue 
was not a bilateral issue between the US and North Korea, but a common security 
interests among the US and neighbouring countries in the region. The outcomes of 
this multilateral consultation have been expressed through the issuing of either 
chairman‟s statement or joint statement after the ending of the each round of the Six 
Party Talks. 
 
As mentioned before, the US‟s multilateral approach firstly comes from the Bush 
administration‟s negative evaluation of the 1994 Agreed Framework (AF) which was 
concluded by the Clinton administration. That is, the Bush administration considered 
that a bilateral agreement such as 1994 AF was ineffective in terminating North 
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Korea‟s nuclear programme. More importantly, the US‟s perception of nuclear 
weapons in the post-Cold War era has enhanced its need to pursue policies of 
multilateralism. The Bush administrations regarded nuclear weapons as a possible 
military option in the post-Cold War era (The White House, September 17, 2002; 
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2002) and therefore perceived that the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons might be a serious threat to its national security. This 
perception leads the US to organising multilateral cooperation among states in order 
to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.  
 
It seems notable that the US‟s multilateralism reveals that it recognises the difficulty 
of organising global security in relation to the proliferation of nuclear weapons by 
itself alone, despite and this is significant to reconsider, the circumstance that the US 
has been the sole superpower since the collapse of the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR). As Robert A. Pape indicates, since the 1990s the US has 
rarely had to deal with the need to consider balancing powers in operating its 
unilateral foreign policy. Thus, the observation that “the United States, as a unipolar 
leader, can act without fear of serious opposition in the international system” (Pape, 
2005: 8) has been encouraged amongst scholars. However, the US‟s multilateralism in 
dealing with the North Korean case demonstrates that it is increasingly hard for the 
US to go alone without other countries‟ cooperation in managing the issue of nuclear 
proliferation. In other words, even if it seems true that there is no balancer which is 
strong enough to meaningfully counter the US‟s unilateralist foreign policy, it seems 
also valid to argue that global security in the 21st century can not be organised by a 
single dominant power. 
 
This research finding may lead us to reconsider the hegemonic status of the US in the 
post-Cold War era, because the US‟s multilateral approach to the North Korean 
nuclear issue seems to be quite different from a typical exercise of hegemonic 
leadership, which has been presupposed by hegemonic stability theory. According to 
the theory of hegemonic stability, a hegemon defines rules and rights in the 
international system with a single dominant position, such as the hierarchy of prestige 
among states, which is supported by its distinctive capabilities in terms of the 
distribution of power (Gilpin, 1981). However, in case of the North Korean nuclear 
issue, although the US‟s multilateral approach was originally initiated by the US‟s 
 210 
national interest to make as many states as possible speak with a single voice against 
North Korea, this policy option could only produce a significant outcome through 
international cooperation with other regional actors in Northeast Asia. At this stage, 
therefore, it seems important to discuss the question of whether the US‟s 
multilateralism demonstrates the decline of US hegemonic power, or whether this 
means that US hegemony operates in a different way to traditional assumptions of 
hegemonic stability theory in relation to the post-Cold War management of nuclear 
proliferation. 
 
Regarding the ways of exerting US hegemonic leadership, it seems useful to examine 
Michael Mastanduno‟s discussion on the US‟s policy options in the post-Cold War 
era. For example, Mastanduno (2005) argues that US policy makers do not view 
unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism as a principled way. Rather, according 
to Mastanduno, US policy makers regard these approaches – unilateralism, 
bilateralism and multilateralism – as being “pragmatic rather than principled.” 
(Mastanduno, 2005: 318) From Manstanduno‟s understanding, US‟s multilateralism 
in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue can be considered as one of several 
practical policy options which might be initiated according to the US‟s ideal and 
national interests. 
 
Nevertheless, as the empirical research in this thesis demonstrates, the US multilateral 
approach to the North Korean nuclear issue not only resulted in the establishment of a 
concert of powers system in Northeast Asia, but also triggered the involvement of the 
collective security system at the global level. This suggests that the US can no longer 
control security problems in the contemporary international system solely through a 
hegemonic power structure. Therefore, it seems difficult to say that US‟s 
multilateralism can be interpreted as a different way of exerting its hegemonic 
leadership with respect to managing the post-Cold War nuclear proliferation 
challenges. Rather, US„s multilateralism and its consequences in relation to security 
management (such as the creation of a concert of powers system and the emergence of 
collective security system) seems to demonstrate the decline of the US‟s hegemonic 
status despite its sole superpower position in the post-Cold War world. This is 
because the US multilateral approach and its outcomes reveal the US‟s limits as a 
hegemon in making rules and rights in the contemporary international system.  
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China’s proactive engagement 
 
The second significant research finding is the observation of China‟s policy position 
in relation to the North Korean nuclear issue. First of all, since the US‟s attack on Iraq 
in March 2003, China radically changed its stance from a „hands-off‟ attitude to an 
„engagement policy‟ in the North Korean case. This was because China had an 
essential interest in preventing a war on the Korean Peninsula. As mentioned earlier, 
at the initial stage of the North Korean nuclear crisis, China perceived that bilateral 
talks between the US and North Korea might be the best option to solve the nuclear 
issue. However, following The US invasion of Iraq, China worried about that the 
bilateral nuclear confrontation may bring war to the Korean Peninsula which might 
considerably damage China‟s economic growth strategy. This led China to 
intervening in the North Korean nuclear issue through proactive diplomacy.  
 
It was China‟s proactive diplomacy that significantly contributed to multilateralising 
the North Korean nuclear issue through establishing the trilateral talks in April 2003 
and the Six Party Talks in August 2003. The trilateral talks among the US, North 
Korea and China triggered the multilateralisation of the North Korean case. It was the 
first event which discussed the North Korean nuclear issue by including a third party. 
And the establishment of the Six Party Talks was a successful fruit of China ‟s 
diplomatic efforts which saw the North Korean nuclear issue move onto a very 
different phase. China perceived the characteristics of the Six Party Talks as a concert 
of powers to resolve the nuclear issue. As examined before, the early stage of the Six 
Party Talks operated as a concert of powers. 
 
Finally, China also played a key role in maintaining the six party framework when the 
Six Party Talks seemed to stall. For example, despite North Korea‟s unwillingness to 
continue the nuclear negotiation, China‟s high-profile diplomacy to persuade North 
Korea resulted in it rejoining the Six Party Talks. This means that China has 
successfully conducted a role as a mediator in dealing with the North Korean nuclear 
issue. 
 
In this regard, it seems considerable to re-examine the assumption that the rise of 
China in the post-Cold War era would be a serious threat to the peace and stability in 
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the Northeast Asian region. For example, according to Denny Roy (1994), the 
emergence of China as a major economic power in the region might challenge 
regional security in Northeast Asia by attempting to establish a regional hegemony. 
He underlines the idea that “a stronger China is likely to undermine peace in the 
region. Economic development will make China more assertive and less cooperative 
with its neighbors; China‟s domestic characteristics make it comparatively likely to 
use force to achieve its political goals; and an economically powerful China may 
provoke a military buildup by Japan, plunging Asia into a new cold war.” (Roy, 1994: 
150) 
 
However, as discussed above, it seems obvious that China has played a positive role 
in managing the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, it is significant to listen to 
different voices which consider the rise of Chinese power to be a constructive factor 
in organising regional security in Northeast Asia. For example, David Shambaugh 
indicates that “China‟s new proactive regional posture is reflected in virtually all 
policy spheres – economic, diplomatic, and military – and this parallels China‟s 
increased activism on the global stage … As a result, most nations in the region now 
see China as a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a 
nonthreatening regional power.” (2004/2005: 64) In short, it seems difficult to discuss 
organising regional security without considering China‟s proactive role. 
 
An alliance within a concert of powers 
 
The third research finding concerns the ability of an alliance to function within a 
concert of powers. As examined in Chapter 3, the second phase of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis can best be understood as a concert of powers. And it was China that 
made diplomatic efforts in order to reduce the possibility of a war on the Korean 
Peninsula and this eventually resulted in the multilateralisation of the North Korean 
nuclear issue through creating the trilateral talks and the Six Party Talks. Moreover, it 
seems significant that the establishment of the six party forum paved the way for a 
concert- like diplomacy not only by providing opportunities for regional actors such as 
China, Russia, Japan and South Korea to take part in managing the nuclear issue, but 
also by offering a regular pattern of conferences to discuss regional security issues.  
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In addition to this, it seems noteworthy that an alliance system also has operated 
within a concert of powers to deal with the North Korean case. In fact, while North 
Korea‟s alliances have been loosening in the post-Cold War era, the US‟s alliances 
are still meaningful in Northeast Asia. For example, in the 1990s, North Korea ‟s 
traditional allies – such as China and the former USSR – attempted to re-establish 
diplomatic relations with North Korea. This was because the post-Cold War era has 
witnessed a remarkable change in the international security environment and as a 
result of this, it was necessary for China and Russia to create new political relations 
with South Korea. 
 
By contrast, the US‟s bilateral alliance system – both with Japan and with South 
Korea – still functions despite the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, in relation to the 
North Korean nuclear issue, the US‟s bilateral alliance system in the region has 
developed into a trilateral alliance against North Korea‟s threat. For instance, the 
Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) met and consulted on their 
policy positions to ensure a single voice against North Korea. The TCOG meeting 
contributed to establishing the idea of CVID (a complete, verifiable and irreversible 
dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme).  
 
Thus, the most interesting point is that unlike the European Concert in the19th century, 
an alliance system has continued to act successfully as part of a concert of powers in 
managing the North Korean nuclear issue without destabilising the concert. In the 19th 
century, Bismarck‟s secret alliance policy was part of the cause which resulted in the 
breakdown of the Concert of Europe. However, in the 21st century, the international 
negotiations to deal with the North Korean case reveal that an alliance system can 
exist within a concert of powers and still contribute to achieving the goals of a concert 
of powers. This implies that organising regional security in the 21st century is more 
complicated than that of the past centuries. This is because while Europe in the 19th 
century saw an operation of a single dominant security system in a certain historical 
period, the North Korean case demonstrates the necessity to consider the functions of 
different security systems in understanding certain phases of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis. 
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At this stage, it seems necessary to discuss the roles played by other regional actors in 
relation to regional security architecture in Northeast Asia. Unlike the US and China, 
Russia seems to be less interested in the North Korean nuclear issue. However, as 
mentioned before, Russia is still a stake-holder in the organisation of regional security 
in the region. For example, at the early stage of the North Korean nuclear issue, 
Russia expressed its desire to engage in settling the nuclear issue through establishing 
diplomatic efforts with China in order to encourage a stable security environment in 
the region (Text of Sino-Russia communiqué on North Korea, February 27, 2003). 
Moreover, regarding the progress of the Six Party Talks, Russia was concerned by the 
possibility that the US-led negotiation would produce an obstacle to finding a 
peaceful solution. For example, soon after the first round of the Six Party Talks, 
Russia forced the US to make further necessary steps rather than blaming North 
Korea‟s policy position (BBC News Online, August 29, 2003). In this regard, 
Russia‟s participation in the nuclear negotiation could be interpreted as a counter-
balancing action against both the rise of Chinese power and the US‟s unilateral 
dominance in the region (Kerr, 2005).  
 
For Japan and South Korea, it seems difficult for them to contribute independently to 
stabilising the security environment in the region because their own security is US-
guaranteed. This means that both states acted consistently in alliance with the US. In 
other words, bilateral security treaties – Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
between the US and Japan, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and South 
Korea – have operated as the backbone of US-led security architecture in the region. 
Regarding Japan‟s role in maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia, it seems 
significant that the US expects Japan‟s critical contribution to managing security 
issues in the region to be through building a mutual partnership with it. In addition to 
this, the US-South Korea bilateral security cooperation (such as Mutual Defense 
Treaty) has taken part in addressing North Korea‟s threat to South Korea and 
neighbouring states in the post-Cold War era as well as during the Cold War (The 
United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998). Therefore, in 
relation to the management of the North Korean nuclear programme, Japan‟s and 
South Korea‟s contribution to shaping the regional security architecture has been 
made through their participation in US-led security cooperation. For example, as 
examined above, Japan‟s and South Korea‟s involvement in establishing a concert-
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like Six Party Talks predominantly came through their participation in 
institutionalised cooperation between the US, Japan and South Korea (such as TCOG).  
 
It is also important to figure out North Korea‟s position regarding the regional 
security architecture. During the Cold War, North Korea‟s security concerns were 
managed through China‟s and the former Soviet Union‟s protection. However, the 
end of the Cold War enforced China and Russia to loosen their bilateral alliance 
system with North Korea. This is because in the post-Cold War era, China and Russia 
faced a new security environment which required them to re-establish diplomatic 
relations with South Korea and Japan. As a result of this, North Korea was inevitably 
located outside of any regional security architecture in Northeast Asia. This made the 
security environment in the region unstable and even generated dangerous security 
externalities for neighbouring states. Therefore, the process of the Six Party Talks to 
deal with the North Korean nuclear issue can be understood as a starting point to re-
establish a security architecture including the so-called „rogue state‟ in Northeast 
region in the post-Cold War era.  
 
The emergence of collective security regime 
 
Despite multilateral consultation through the six party forum, the North Korean 
nuclear issue has not been resolved. Rather, it was getting worse and worse thanks to 
North Korea‟s provocative actions such as missile launches and a nuclear bomb test. 
This caused the United Nations‟ (UN) involvement in the North Korean case. The 
fourth important research finding is how the collective security system has operated in 
dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue since 2006. 
Firstly, North Korea‟s missile launches in July 2006 and nuclear bomb test in October 
2006 were regarded as serious threats to international peace and stability and therefore 
this provocative behaviour resulted in the international community agreeing on 
collective actions against North Korea. After North Korea‟s missile launches and 
bomb test, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued resolution 1695 which 
demanded an end to trade of missile-related materials with North Korean and 
announced the resolution 1718 which decided on collective sanctions against North 
Korea. The UNSC resolutions imply that the UN successfully reacted as a collective 
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security organisation in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue under the tenet of all 
against one. 
 
In addition, the nuclear non-proliferation regime (NPT regime) also played a 
considerable role as a collective security regime. For example, the February 13 Joint 
Statement in 2007 showed the importance of verification of nuclear activity as the 
non-proliferation norm. In this regard, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) inspectors played a key role in examining the shutting down of North Korea‟s 
nuclear facilities. They discussed the procedures to monitor North Korea‟s nuclear 
programme and examined the sealing of North Korea‟s nuclear reactor. Eventually, in 
July 2007, the IAEA inspection team confirmed that North Korea‟s nuclear facilities 
were shut down and sealed properly.  
 
Finally, it seems significant that the process of the Six Party Talks after North Korea ‟s 
nuclear bomb test could be interpreted as an operation of a non-proliferation sub-
regime. The Six Party Talks have established principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures in relation to the North Korean nuclear issue. The September 19 
Joint Statement in 2005 announced that the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula 
would be the main objective of the Six Party Talks (The September 19 Joint 
Statement of the Six Party Talks, September 19, 2005). The February 13 Joint 
Statement in 2007 set up the norms and rules for the Six Party Talks by underlining 
the significance of constructing mutual trust and the tenet of action for action (The 
February 13 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, February 13, 2007). In order to 
make a substantial resolution, the Six Party Talks utilised both formal arrangements 
and informal bilateral meetings as decision-making procedures. 
 
To sum up, the exploration of the North Korean case reveals that, firstly, the North 
Korean nuclear crisis has gone through very different phases in terms of organising 
security. The first phase witnessed a bilateral nuclear confrontation between North 
Korea and the US. The second phase was the initial stage of multilateralisation of the 
nuclear issue heralded by China‟s proactive engagement policy. The third phase was 
represented by the UN‟s involvement in dealing with the North Korean case. 
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Secondly, each historical phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis has shown its 
unique characteristics in regard to security models. In other words, the bilateral 
confrontation could be understood usefully from the perspective of a hegemonic 
power structure. The multilateralisation of the nuclear issue might be interpreted 
through the notion of a concert of powers. The issue of the UNSC resolutions and the 
joint statements among the six parties could be categorised as an appearance of 
collective security to conclude the North Korean nuclear issue.  
 
These research findings imply that it is difficult to organise security through a single 
method in the post-Cold War era. The North Korean case demonstrates typical 
features of complexisities in relation to organising security in the post-Cold War era. 
Thus, empirical research suggests that it is required to coordinate security concerns by 
taking into consideration a mix of security models. 
 
5.2. Theoretical Evaluation 
 
At this stage, it is necessary to discuss the implications of the research findings with 
respect to the academic discourses within contemporary security studies. The research 
findings can relate to three significant issues: 1) a discourse on the notion of non-
traditional security which considerably emerged after the end of the Cold War; 2) a 
debate on the usefulness and limitations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the 
post-Cold War era; 3) an investigation into the way of how international security is 
being organised in the post-Cold War era. 
 
5.2.1. Traditional security versus non-traditional security 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the end of the Cold War allowed many 
scholars to reconsider the notion of what is to be secured because the disappearance of 
West-East confrontation seemed to be an important signpost which pointed to a new 
direction for security studies in the post-Cold War era. As a result, new approaches to 
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security studies (such as so-called „human security‟ issues) emerged by challenging 
the dominance of conventional insights of security (Collins, 2007).87 
 
Nevertheless, the empirical study of the North Korean nuclear issue reveals that the 
state-centric security issues still matter in contemporary international relations.  For 
example, it seems clear that the main engine which has initiated the nuclear 
negotiation were the interactions of key factors such as the US‟s perception of North 
Korea‟s nuclear programme, North Korea‟s fear of pre-emptive nuclear attack by the 
US and China‟s concern about the probability of war on the Korean Peninsula. 
Therefore it is possible to re-emphasise that despite the emergence of non-traditional 
security issues, traditional security issues such as national security still occupies 
substantial part of security studies in the post-Cold War era. 
 
5.2.2. The survival of the NPT regime 
 
During the Cold War, the NPT regime was basically operated through the existence of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was established in 1968. The NPT 
classified states into two different categories: the nuclear „haves‟ – the US, the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom, France and China – and the „have nots‟. The treaty 
imposed the nuclear weapon states (NWS) not to spread nuclear weapons to non-
nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and also forced the NNWS not to produce nuclear 
weapons (Smith, 1987). At that time, the major concern about nuclear proliferation 
was the issue of “primary proliferation” which can be defined as “the spread of 
nuclear weapons-relevant material from states or private entities within states that are 
members of the formal nuclear exporters groups, the Nuclear Exporters Committee 
(or Zangger Committee) or the Nuclear Suppliers Group.” (Braun and Chyba, 2004: 
5) This concern was successfully managed through the obligation under the NPT 
during the Cold War period. 
                                                 
87
 As Alan Collins (2007) indicates, traditionally the state has been regarded as the main objective to be 
secured through military force. Thus, according to conventional wisdom, defining security usually 
refers to the notion of protecting national sovereignty. For example, Mohammed Ayoob suggests that 
“security-insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilit ies – both internal and external – that threaten 
or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and 
governing regimes.” (1995: 9) 
 219 
In the post-Cold War era, however, there has been a growing concern about 
“horizontal proliferation” which can be defined as “the spread of nuclear weapons to 
more states or other international actors.” (Walton and Gray, 2007: 210) For example,  
Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba (2004) argue that Pakistan‟s and North Korea‟s 
connections over nuclear proliferation 88  indicate that the world is entering into a 
“proliferation rings” era (Braun and Chyba, 2004: 6) which may significantly damage 
to the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. These concerns led some scholars to 
doubt the value of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.89 
 
Michael Wesley (2005) points out the inability of the NPT in dealing with nuclear 
proliferation: 1) its ineffectiveness because of NNWS‟ disagreement on obtaining 
peaceful nuclear programmes in exchange for giving up the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons; 2) its unfairness due to the inequality in international relations between 
NWS and other states. He continues to argue that due to the absence of moral 
authority, the NPT tends to encourage the development of a secret nuclear programme 
which may lead policy makers to miscalculate their neighbours‟ capabilities.90 Thus, 
he suggests that the NPT should be replaced by a more practical regime which may 
allow a small number of states to obtain nuclear weapons (Wesley, 2005).  
 
Moreover, North Korea‟s withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003 was interpreted 
as an example which demonstrates the uselessness of the NPT. For example, 
Narushige Michishita (2004) claims that North Korea‟s withdrawal from the NPT 
proves the limit of the NPT as a nuclear non-proliferation regime because this event 
reveals that the NPT itself can be used as an excuse for negative behaviours.91 
 
Nevertheless, empirical research shows that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is 
still useful in dealing with nuclear proliferation in the post-Cold War era. In the first 
                                                 
88
 There was a trade of missile and nuclear-related technology between North Korea and Pakistan in the 
late 1990s. For details, see Braun and Chyba (2004).  
89
 Even if the treaty itself cannot be regarded as a regime, it seems obvious that the principal tenets of 
the treaty constitute the principle or norms of the non-proliferation reg ime. Thus, the thesis examines 
discussions on the usefulness and limitation of the treaty as major part  of d iscussions on the 
significance of the existing NPT reg ime. 
90
 Lewis Dunn notes that uncontrolled nuclear programme may result in miscalculat ions by 
neighbouring states and outsiders not only because of their lack of information to decide their count -
balancing action but also because of their uncertainty about regional rivalry ‟s capabilit ies (1991: 20). 
91
 The article X of the NPT guarantees each nation‟s right to leave the treaty to protect its sovereignty 
(The Nuclear Non-Pro liferat ion Treaty, 1968). 
 220 
place, despite North Korea‟s withdrawal from the NPT, the NPT was used as a legal 
principle in disabling North Korea‟s nuclear facilities. For example, the IAEA, which 
is the key institution to monitor whether nations‟ nuclear activities comply with the 
NPT, conducted necessary work of verifying the process of disabling North Korea‟s 
nuclear capabilities. In 2007, the IAEA sent an inspection team to North Korea which 
reported in July 2007 the disablement of North Korea ‟s nuclear programme was 
proceeding properly (IAEA, July 18, 2007). 
 
Furthermore, it is significant that a concrete non-proliferation norm has been created 
through the process of the Six Party Talks. The idea of CVID has been established 
and functioned in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. This means that the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime can be facilitated effectively by organising 
international cooperation to resolve a particular proliferation issue. In this regard, it is 
crucial to listen to voices of advocates of the NPT regime. For example, Timothy 
Savage (2003) argues that it is necessary to develop the enforcement mechanisms of 
the NPT rather than to replace it with a new regime because it seems difficult to 
control proliferation challenge by North Korea or Iran without the NPT.  
 
5.2.3. The necessity of considering multitude security models 
 
Most importantly, empirical research reveals that the security environment in the 21st 
century cannot be interpreted through considering a single security model, but 
requires taking into account of many security concepts. For example, the first phase of 
the North Korean nuclear crisis could be understood through the notion of security 
under a hegemonic power structure. However, as the North Korean nuclear issue 
moved onto a multilateralised stage, a hegemony model could no longer properly 
explain the characteristics of the different situation and as a result, a hegemonic power 
model should give way to a concert of powers model. Moreover, the idea of a concert 
of powers functioned in explaining the features of the second phase. But a concert of 
powers was not applicable for describing the UN‟s engagement. Thus, it was 
inevitable for the idea of a concert of powers to be followed by another security 
model, a collective security system. This process happened in dealing with a single 
security issue, the North Korean nuclear issue. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that 
the North Korean case shows that the 21st century‟s security environment requires 
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considering multi-conceptual approaches in controlling even a single security issue. 
The following section will examine this idea in more detail.  
 
The usefulness and limitation of hegemonic stability theory 
 
Empirical research of the first phase analysed a set of key assumptions of hegemonic 
stability theory and proved the usefulness of hegemonic stability theory in explaining 
about how a hegemon exerted its power. Firstly, the US‟s perception of WMD in the 
post-Cold War era showed the validity of the assumption that a hegemon identified 
the rules and rights which outlined state actors‟ behaviour in the international system. 
The Bush administration perceived WMD as a feasible military option for terrorists 
and terrorism sponsoring states. Moreover, US President Bush designated North 
Korea, Iran and Iraq as the axis of evil that was eager to develop WMD programme 
and thus justified its pre-emptive strategy against nations who were suspected of 
proliferators of WMD. This example reveals that the US exercises its dominant power 
in redefining the rules and norms in relation to the non-proliferation issue in the post-
Cold War era. 
 
Secondly, the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) demonstrated the 
reliability of another important assumption that a hegemon initiates security 
relationships in the international system. The Bush administration established and 
organised the exercises of the PSI to check the potential proliferators‟ shipment of 
WMD-related materials, in particular, North Korea‟s trade of WMD-related materials. 
The idea of the PSI was supported by the US‟s allies and has been signed up to by 
almost 100 countries up to now. This case demonstrates evidently that a hegemon 
establishes security relationships with its subordinates by setting up a security agenda 
of general concern. 
 
Thirdly, the BDA issue examined the credibility of the assumption that an 
international political economy can be maintained by a hegemon‟s willingness to 
stabilise the world economy. The provision of a stable international political economy 
is the key element of a hegemon‟s responsibilities in relation to the provision of 
public goods. However, in the case of the BDA issue, the US exerted its dominant 
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position to expel North Korea from the international financial system due to North 
Korea‟s unwillingness to follow the rules constructed by the US. 
 
However, although the crucial characteristics of the first phase can be understood 
through the concept of a hegemonic power structure, it is difficult to explain the 
multilateralisation of the North Korean nuclear issue within a hegemonic power 
structure. This is because China emerged as a key mediator in negotiating the nuclear 
issue. In addition to this, a considerable multilateral form – the Six Party Talks – was 
established to discuss a possible resolution of the nuclear issue. It was necessary to 
take into account another security model which could describe the emergence of a 
multilateral forum to manage the North Korean nuclear issue.  
 
The advantages and disadvantages of a concert of powers system 
 
The examination of the second phase assessed the key hypotheses of a concert of 
powers system. The first example, China‟s proactive engagement in the North Korean 
nuclear issue, illustrated the reliability of the hypothesis that a concert of powers 
system was valuable in preventing the breakout of major war between members. 
Empirical research proved that it was China‟s fear of a war on the Korean Peninsula 
that forced China‟s policy makers to change its policy position from a „hands-off‟ 
attitude to proactive diplomacy. 
 
The second issue, the establishment and continuation of the Six Party Talks, proved 
the validity of another hypothesis, namely, a concert of powers system can develop 
international cooperation despite the absence of formal institutions. Between 2003 
and 2008, a number of rounds of the Six Party Talks were held and supervised the 
North Korean nuclear issue. Although the Six Party Talks were not a formal 
institution, the Six Party Talks continued as a regular pattern of conferences to deal 
with a particular security issue. In this regard, the Six Party Talks can be considered 
as an important tool which encourages international cooperation outside official 
organisations. 
 
The third case, the sharing of the idea of CVID, made the hypothesis sensible that a 
concert of powers obtained legitimacy by establishing norms. The idea of CVID was 
 223 
created and repeatedly emphasised by the Bush administration. However, as 
international negotiations to manage the North Korean nuclear issue moved onto a 
multilateral forum, the idea of CVID was certainly shared among the participants and 
functioned as a principal norm directing the process of the Six Party Talks.  
 
Finally, it is also significant that empirical research revealed that an alliance system 
could be resident within a concert of powers system. The fourth case, the TCOG 
meetings, proved the validity of the hypothesis that an alliance system operated by 
granting institutionalised security cooperation. In relation to the North Korean nuclear 
issue, the TCOG meetings offered valuable chances to share the idea of CVID among 
the US‟s traditional allies (the US, South Korea and Japan) and this definitely 
contributed to establishing a concert- like diplomacy. 
 
Nevertheless, despite its applicability for interpreting the important features of the 
second phase, it was difficult for the idea of a concert of powers to explain the reasons 
why the UN has emerged as a key actor in dealing with the North Korean nuclear 
issue. This is because while a concert of powers basically consists of small numbers 
of major powers, the proliferation of WMD is a general concern at the global level. In 
the case of the North Korean nuclear issue, the six party framework seemed to be 
successful in setting up a framework to deal with the North Korean nuclear 
programme. However, it was inevitable for the major powers such as the US and 
China to appeal to the UN in order to organise collective sanctions against North 
Korea after North Korea‟s nuclear bomb test. 
 
The benefits and drawbacks of a collective security system 
 
The third phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis was given as an example to analyse 
a set of hypotheses which denotes the idea of collective security. With respect to the 
first hypothesis of collective security that any attack on one state can be regarded as 
an attack on all states, the UNSC resolutions reveal the tenets of the motto of „all 
against one‟. After North Korea‟s missile launches in July 2006 and nuclear bomb test 
in October 2006, the UNSC adopted resolution 1695 and 1718 which not only 
condemned North Korea‟s provocative actions, but also encouraged members of the 
UN to participate in collective sanctions against North Korea. The UN‟s engagement 
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in the North Korean nuclear issue can be considered as the emergence of collective 
security because of the role which the UN played as an actor of a collective security 
organisation by coordinating the collective actions of all its members to control one 
challenging country. 
 
The non-proliferation issue is immediately related to a collective security regime. 
Collective security assumes that the notion of collective security can be achieved 
through the operation of international regimes. By defining international regimes 
empirical research described the NPT regime as a collective regime. Moreover, the 
main tenets of the joint statements of the Six Party Talks were examined as another 
nuclear non-proliferation sub-regime in relation to the North Korean nuclear issue. 
Thus, the third phase saw the emergence of collective security through the operation 
of international regimes. 
 
Finally, the third phase verified the significance of the assumption that collective 
security could reduce the security dilemma. In the first place, despite North Korea ‟s 
nuclear bomb test in 2006, the Six Party Talks were restarted and continued to resolve 
the North Korean nuclear issue. The repetition of international negotiations 
significantly diminished the necessity of demonstrating resolve by North Korea. 
Moreover, the agreements such as the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007 and the 
October 3 Joint Statement in 2007 considerably increased the transparency of the 
process of disabling the North Korean nuclear programme. The establishment of five 
working groups also revealed what other parties‟ strategic objectives would be with 
regard to the North Korean nuclear issue.  
 
However, it is obvious that although the key issues of the third phase proved the value 
of the central hypotheses of collective security, the responsibility to verify the process 
of dismantling the North Korean nuclear programme still remains as the six parties‟ 
concern. Moreover, the idea of collective security is only applicable to explaining a 
particular phase of the North Korean nuclear issue. In this regard, a collective security 
system cannot be considered as a single dominant security model which can interpret 
all security implications of the North Korean nuclear crisis.  
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In conclusion, the examination of the historical phases of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis proved the applicability of different security models to different phases of the 
North Korean nuclear issue. Therefore, it is clear that in the post-Cold War era it is 
difficult to study security issues through utilising a single security model, but 
necessary to consider a multi-conceptual approach in order to elaborate and develop 
comprehensive understandings of the present-day security problems. 
 
5.2.4. Conceptualising power in the post-Cold War world 
 
In order to explain the value of a multi-conceptual approach, it seems important to 
examine the way in which power operates in the post-Cold War world. This is 
because the new security environment in the post-Cold War era has resulted in a new 
complexity of power-relations in managing regional security issues. In other words, as 
discussed in the introductory chapter, during the Cold War, regional security issues 
were dealt with within the frame of two superpowers rivalry. However, after the end 
of the Cold War, bipolarity was deconstructed in the realm of international relations. 
This implies that for small countries there has been a significant increase o f autonomy 
in managing their own security, while for great powers it is more important to been 
seen as acting legitimately if intervening in other countries‟ security matters. This 
new security environment may lead us to conceptualise the notion of power in order 
to give a proper explanation of power-relations in the post-Cold War world. In this 
regard, it seems that an examination of Joseph Nye‟s works on power may provide a 
reasonable understanding about the complexity of power in the post-Cold War era 
because his analysis on power underlines the importance of legitimacy in exerting 
power in the post-Cold War world. 
 
At the general level, according to Nye, power implies “the ability to get the outcomes 
one wants” (Nye, 2004: 1). He also indicates that “more specifically, power is the 
ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants.” (Nye, 2004: 
2) Nye‟s observation seems to focus more on analysing power-relations among 
countries than calculating objective capabilities of a particular nation. Moreover, with 
respect to world politics, Nye points out that “[a]lthough military force remains the 
ultimate form of power in a self-help system, it has become more costly for modern 
great powers to use than in earlier centuries.” (Nye, 1990: 180) He concludes that 
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“[t]he great powers of today are less able to use their traditional power resources to 
achieve their purposes than in the past.” (Nye, 1990: 182) According to him, in 
conventional wisdom, world politics works out through the exercise of hard power 
which consists of military and economic resources. He emphasises, however, there are 
different ways that a state actor encourages others to follow it – such as “admiring its 
values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.” (Nye, 
2004: 5) Thus, Nye indicates that “it is also important to set the agenda and not only 
to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft 
power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather 
than coerces them.” (Nye, 2004: 5) 
 
Nye‟s conceptualisation of soft power highlights the importance of normative aspects 
of power exercise and this seems to be essential to understanding the complexity of 
power-relations in managing regional security in the post-Cold War world. 92  For 
example, in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, it is noteworthy that both the 
US and all the neighbouring countries ultimately preferred diplomatic solutions rather 
than utilising military force. In particular, it is significant that the US multilateral 
approach and China‟s diplomatic efforts were substantially operational in managing 
the nuclear negotiation and this has been done through creating important norms such 
as multilateralism and the idea of CVID. As a result of this, the North Korean nuclear 
crisis has gone through three different historical phases – the bilateral confrontation 
between the US and North Korea, multilateralisation of the issue and the emergence 
of collective security system – and this encouraged the necessity of considering a 
multi-conceptual approach to explaining security issues in the post-Cold War era. 
 
Put differently, as the North Korean case reveals, although the North Korean nuclear 
issue is a traditional security issue (a hard security issue), it is difficult to solve hard 
security issues through military means in the post-Cold War world. This is because 
unlike the Cold War world which saw massive uses of hard power (that is, military 
power), the post-Cold War world requires an extensive utilisation of soft power in 
managing security issues. Moreover, it seems true no single dominant security model 
                                                 
92
 With respect to the sources of the soft power of a country, Nye considers three principal elements: 
“its culture (in p laces where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at 
home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral 
authority.)” (Nye, 2004: 11) 
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is able to completely explain the complicated features of the post-Cold War security 
management. To sum up, the sheer complexity of power-relations in the post-Cold 
War world calls for the necessity of considering a multi-conceptual approach to 
managing security issues in the post-Cold War era. 
 
5.3. Lessons of Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
 
With respect to managing North Korea‟s ambition for a nuclear capability, what 
lessons can be learned from the approach taken by actors in the region? Put differently, 
what has worked successfully and what has failed? Could these lessons be applied to 
other cases of nuclear proliferation (for example, Iran‟s nuclear programme)? Do they 
have any significance for dealing with other regimes with limited power capabilities 
in regional contexts whose actions still manage to generate dangerous security 
externalities on neighbouring states (for example, Zimbabwe)? 
 
The most valuable lesson learned from the North Korean case might be the 
importance of mutual cooperation among the key regional actors in relation to 
organising regional security. As empirical research demonstrates, the North Korean 
nuclear issue has largely been managed through a concert- like diplomacy. In this 
regard, it seems notable that great powers‟ efforts as mediators – such as China‟s 
diplomatic efforts – are quite important not only in diminishing the security dilemma, 
but also in stabilising the regional security environment. It is also significant that the 
creation of shared norms – such as multilateralism and the idea of CVID – has 
contributed to establishing a mutual consensus among the regional actors. On the 
other hand, it should be acknowledged that US‟s unilateral pressure against North 
Korea was not successful, as well as that military options were excluded in dealing 
with the North Korean nuclear issue. This is the reason why the US had to be largely 
dependent on a multilateral approach to the North Korean case.  
 
With regard to the applicability of these lessons to other cases such as the Iranian 
nuclear challenge,93 it seems important and helpful to recognise the value of a shared 
consensus among interested states. As the North Korean case shows, in relation to 
                                                 
93
 For details of Iran‟s nuclear programme, see Clawson and Eisenstadt (2008); see also Dunn (2007). 
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nuclear proliferation issue, it is essential for countries involved to share the principles 
and norms of the non-proliferation regime. For example, in dealing with the North 
Korean nuclear issue, the key regional actors in Northeast Asia not only re-
emphasised the importance of the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, but also 
accepted new norms such as the idea of CVID. Generally speaking, these lessons 
could be useful to managing another nuclear proliferation challenge such as the Iran 
case. Moreover, in order to produce meaningful solutions for the Iran case, it seems 
necessary to understand the role of major powers in the region as a mediator as well 
as the significance of a mutual consensus among interested states. Nevertheless, how 
far the Iran case could be bound to these lessons depends on how well countries 
involved can mediate Iran‟s perception of its own security and other interested major 
actors‟ (for example, the US‟s) security interests.  
 
In relation to managing security externalities, the North Korean case reveals the 
importance of constructing a regional security architecture that includes rather than 
excludes so-called „rogue states‟ in order to control dangerous and unpredictable  
security externalities in a particular region. In other words, the establishment of 
multilateral security cooperation including states that generate security externalities as 
well as major powers in a particular region seems to be necessary in order to find 
peaceful solutions of regional security problems. Zimbabwe might be a case in point 
here.94 The instability in Zimbabwe is having negative security consequences for its 
neighbours. However, if South Africa as the key regional power, wishes to address 
these security concerns, then a regional solution will only be found by including 
rather than excluding Zimbabwe. 
 
5.4. Further Research 
 
Finally, it seems useful to consider limitations of the research and to propose 
suggestions for further research that the thesis has not explored. Three key issues – 
North Korea‟s second nuclear bomb test in 2009, China‟s role in terms of security 
studies and regime theory – can be recommended. 
 
                                                 
94
 For details, see Logan (2007). 
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A new phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis 
 
The thesis has explored the security implications of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 
relation to the issue of organising international security in the post-Cold War era. 
However, the timeframe was limited to the years between 2001 and 2008 (the two 
Bush presidencies). Thus, the research cannot cover new developments in the North 
Korean nuclear crisis after 2008. 
 
For example, it seemed that everything was going well when the US announced that 
North Korea was delisted from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in October 2008 
in exchange for North Korea‟s submission of a declaration of its nuclear programme 
in June 2008. Nevertheless, due to the disagreement between the US and North Korea 
with regard to the issue of how to verify the disabling process of the North Korean 
nuclear programme, the six parties could no longer make any positive progress. 
Between 8 and 11 December 2008, another meeting within the framework of the Six 
Party Talks was held to discuss the verification concerns, but failed to reach 
agreement on verification and this resulted in stalemate of the Six Party Talks again 
(Chairman‟s Statement of the Six-Party Talks, December 11, 2008; McCormack, 
December 12, 2008). In 2009, North Korea restarted its nuclear programme by 
demonstrating its intent to reverse the disablement process of its nuclear programme. 
On 5 April 2009, North Korea launched the satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 which can 
be considered as a long-range missile (KCNA, April 5, 2009). Furthermore, on 25 
May 2009, North Korea conducted a second nuclear bomb test (KCNA, May 25, 
2009). 
 
This new progress of the North Korean nuclear issue may require further empirical 
research which was not considered within this thesis. In this regard, it might be 
helpful not only to examine whether a new historical phase of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis will emerge, but also to evaluate what the security implication of a new 
phase would be. 
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The necessity of re-evaluating China’s role 
 
It also seems important to re-evaluate the role of China in relation to organising 
regional security in the Northeast Asian region. After the end of the Cold War, the 
rise of China has been considered as a negative factor which may destabilise the 
security environment in Northeast Asia.  As examined above, however, China has 
played a significant role as a mediator in managing the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
Moreover, it is considerable that the US regards China not merely as a competitive 
rivalry, but as a strategic partner in the post-Cold War era. The thesis studied China‟s 
role only in relation to the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, it seems necessary to 
work on re-examining the emergence of China through the perspective of security 
studies. In particular, it seems debatable whether China will be able to become a 
hegemonic power which could challenge the US both in the region and at the global 
level. 
 
The study of regime theory 
 
With respect to theoretical issues of International Relations (IR), the research implies 
that a more explicit regime theory needs to be constructed. The thesis utilised regime 
theory in explaining both a hegemonic power structure and a collective security 
system. This revealed that there were differences between a regime in a hegemonic 
power structure and that in a collective security system. In other words, while under a 
hegemonic power structure international regimes are created and maintained by a 
hegemon, international regimes in a collective security system emerge through 
building international consensus and continue through organising international 
cooperation. Moreover, there is another difference between the main actors of a 
regime under a hegemonic power structure and those in a collective security system. 
The former supposes state actors as the key actors of international regimes, but the 
latter considers non-state actors and international organisations such as the UN as well 
as state actors as the main actors of international regimes. However, this thesis could 
not discuss regime theory in greater and necessary detail as outlined because the 
research was limited to the analysis of an empirical case, the security implications of 
the North Korean nuclear crisis. Therefore, it seems significant for further research to 
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expand the study of regime theory in relation to the formation and continuance of a 
regime as well as the major actors within it. 
 
So, how should we think about organising regional security in the twenty first 
century? This thesis suggests that a set of important factors need to be incorporated 
together when dealing with security issues. Firstly, it seems obvious that the rise of 
China significantly affects the security environments in Northeast Asia and therefore 
the role of China in organising regional security should be considered. Secondly, the 
US cannot bear the burden alone in relation to security concerns in this new security 
environment. Finally, the UN continues to have relevance in resolving security 
problems. 
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